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Veerabahu Pillai (Deceased) And Ors. vs Kavanna Seena Chittiram Pillai ... on 3 July, 1942

In Rasan Chettiar v. Rangayan Chettiar A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 105. , it has been pointed out that the general trend of the decisions under the present Code is that an application for final decree is not a proceeding in execution and therefore Order 21, rule 2, will not apply at all. It is urged however that in spite of the prohibition contained in Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Court going into any adjustment or payment out of Court in the matter of passing-a final decree in pursuance of the preliminary decree, it is open to a party who pleads such an adjustment to move the Court under Order 23, rule 3, as the suit has to be considered to be pending till the final decree is passed or till a decree is passed under Order 34, rule 6, in cases where the right to proceed personally against the mortgagor subsists and that consequently the question of adjustment will have to be gone into for recording the adjustment and passing a fresh decree as directed in Order 23, rule 3. As already pointed out above, the trend of the decisions of this Court has throughout been against the right of a party to ask the Court to go into the question of adjustment or payment out of Court in respect of a preliminary decree passed in a suit on a hypothecation debt.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Vangayil Madhavan Nayanar vs V. Parameswara Ayyar And Ors. on 15 September, 1947

In view of the language of Order 34, Rule 4(1) read with the relevant portions of Order 34, Rule 2(1) the form of decree we have referred to and the allied form No. 5 which is adopted where accounts are directed to be taken, as also from the language of order 34, Rule 5(1) in so far as it relates to the stage before a final decree, the view was at one time taken in this Court that all adjustments made out of Court between the dates of the preliminary decree and the final decree cannot be pleaded against the passing of the final decree, that the provisions of Order 34, recognising only one method of payment, namely, payment into Court are imperative and that these provisions were advisedly inserted in modification of the corresponding provisions of Sections 88 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act which provided for payment to the plaintiff or into Court (See Rasan Chettiar v. Rangayyan Chettiar A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 105).
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

A.E. Venkatarama Chettiar And Anr. vs Marudachala Goundan And Ors. on 6 August, 1931

This case has since been reported as Hasan Chettiar v. Rangayyan Chettiar A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 105 and a perusal of it makes it clear I think that, while it is not obligatory upon a Court to issue notice, it is nevertheless a practice advisable, and the case is certainly not an authority for the position that the Court would be acting ultra vires in adopting such a course. There is in fact a considerable body of case-law in favour of the view that notice should issue, as in the generality of interlocutory applications. The mere circumstance that the Court can dispense with notice and can direct that a final decree be passed under Order 34, Rule 5 (2), Civil P.O., does not therefore invalidate the orders passed by the Court in the present case. Whether or not in directing the issue of notice the learned District Munsif who passed the order did so with his eyes open as to the discretion vested in him to abstain from such a course is no doubt another matter.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Muchi Dola Behera And Ors. vs Jujisti Janni And Ors. on 29 October, 1934

These cases were again considered by Wallace and Pakenham Walsh, JJ., in Rasan Chettiar v. Rengayyan Chettiar 1930 Mad 105. In this case it is recognized that there is no express provision making notice in such a case compulsory so that it could not be said that a failure to issue notice would be an illegality which ipso facto renders the decree void. At the same time it was open to the Court and, as Wallace, J., says, "in practice it is advisable," to issue such notice. And it was further held that if any party was aggrieved by the omission to issue such a notice he could get the decree set aside upon that ground.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Muchi Dola Behara And Ors. vs Jujisti Jami And Ors. on 29 October, 1934

These cases were again considered by Wallace and Pakenham Walsh, JJ. in Rasan Chettiar v. Rangaya Chettiar A I R 1930 Mad 105 : 120 Ind. Cas. 72 : 30 L W 551 : Ind. Rul. (1929) Mad 1032 : (1929) M W N 867. In this case it is recognised that there is no express provision making notice in such a case compulsory so that it could not be said that a failure to issue notice would be an illegality which ipso facto renders the decree void. At the same time it was open to the Court and as Wallace, J. says, " in practice it is advisable", to issue such notice. And it was further held that if any party was aggrieved by the omission to issue such a notice he could get the decree set aside upon that ground. In this state of the law we find it quite impossible to hold that the Court below in directing notice to issue before passing a final decree was doing something which it was incompetent to do or unjustified in doing. If it was justified in directing notice to issue, it follows we think that it was incumbent upon the decree-holders to do what was necessary on their part in order to give effect to it. It is impossible to accept the position that it was open to them to commit default in so seconding the efforts of the Court on the ground that it was open to the Court not to issue notice. If then it was incumbent upon the decree holders to take the steps required of them. We think that it is impossible to find that the Court was wrong in dismissing the application, to the extent to which failure to take steps would justify such dismissal.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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