Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 3 of 3 (0.67 seconds)

Sh. Raju Lal vs Sh. Munna Khan on 22 November, 2011

(viii)Krishnan Servai Vs. Arulmighu Kaliamman Temple Vatlagundu, 1983 (1) RLR 589, (IX) B. Selvaraj Vs. Sri Kamakashi Amman Devasthannam, 1986 (1) RLR 663, Eviction Petition No. E­65/09 Page 4 of 15 (X) Kanti Lal Ravji Mehta Vs. Sayarabai Chhaganlal Kering, 2003 (2) RCR 491, (XI) Rehmath Bai Vs. Sahul Hameed, 1981 (2) RLR 489, (XII) V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1745.
Delhi District Court Cites 22 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

V.Ashok Kumar (Died) vs Bala Thirupathi S.V.Baluchamy Ayyar ... on 16 September, 2021

6.The second and third substantial questions of law proceed on the premise as if the plaintiff did not adhere to the mandate set out under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the said provision opens with the expression “in the absence of a contract to the contrary”. In the present case, the tenant had made an endorsement on 16.04.1993 that he would vacate and hand over possession of the suit property by September 1997 and that he would not ask for any extension. This endorsement made by the tenant was marked as Ex.A3. The learned counsel for the plaintiff draws my attention to the decision reported AIR 1983 Madras 142 (Krishnan Servai Vs. Arulmigu Kaliamman Temple, Batalagundu). Paragraph No.4 of the said decision reads as follows:-

Kannan vs Kanagavalli Ammal on 13 April, 1993

4. I think the above principle would apply even if the recipient of the notice, having accepted and acted upon such notice, seeks to contend that it is invalid, when he has allowed the other party to file the suit for his ejectment and that too when the other party pleaded that the tenancy was according to the English Calendar month, himself did not choose to deny the said plea of the other party. Further even though Ex. A-2 notice is alleged to be defective, no exception was taken to it in Ex.A-3 reply, that means the defendant accepted the notice given. Even Section 106 begins with the words, "In the absence of a contract... to the contrary, such contract to the contrary as per Section 106 was also implied by this Court in Krishnan Servai v. Arulmighu Kaliamman Temple , relying on Ramkumar v. Jagdish . It was also observed therein, "and if the requirement of the notice can thus be waived by an agreement between the parties, it would be reasonable to think that it could also be waived by such conduct as would be evidence of the intention of the parties, In my view, this appears to be the reasonable and the practical construction that could be put on Section 106 of the Act...." [emphasis supplied]. Therefore if the defendant has not taken exception to Ex.A-2 notice while sending the reply Ex.A-3, it is implied that he has agreed to the notice that has been given.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
1