If the contention of the appellant were to prevail, the result would be entirely different from what happened in Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt 6 Ind. Cas.
The rule is one of joint and several liability and all that was laid down by the Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Ram Ratan v. Aswini Kumar (1910) 37 Cal 559 at p. 568, is that though the liability of wrong doers in tort is as a general rule joint and several, it cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule that in every case of tort the Court is bound to pass a joint decree against wrong doers making each jointly and severally liable for the whole amount decreed. Further, the learned Judges in that case also found that there was no foundation for the suggestion that the defendants had combined or conspired to keep the plaintiffs out of possession.
4. On behalf of Jogendra Prosad Mitter, it has been finally contended that the appeal should succeed on two other grounds. It has been argued, in the first place, that the decree-holders were disentitled, in view of their own conduct, to execute the decree against him for recovery of the balance thereof. It has been stated that on a previous occasion the decree-holders accepted from some of the judgment-debtors moneys alleged to represent their rateable share of the entire judgment-debt. On this basis, it has been contended that the judgment-debt was by the conduct of the decree-holders split up and the decree-holders can pursue their remedy against each judgment-debtor only to the extent of his separated liability. In our opinion, there is no foundation for this contention. The decree-bolders, no doubt, accepted sums tendered by the different judgment-debtors from time to time. They also undertook not to proceed with execution against those judgment-debtors : but at the same time, they did not release them from liability under the decree, On the other hand, it was expressly stated that if upon execution of the decree against the other judgment-debtors, the whole of the judgment-debt was not realised, the decree-holders would be at liberty to proceed with execution for recovery of the balance even as against those who had made the payments mentioned. Consequently, the principle recognised in the case of Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt 6 Ind. Cas. 69 : 37 C. 559 : 11 C. L.J. 503 : 14 C.W.N. 849. cannot be applied to the circumstances of this case.
12. No doubt, as a general rule the liability of joint wrongdoers in tort is joint and several, but it is not an inflexible rule which needs no relaxation according to the view that is taken of jointness of the act or acts which constitute the wrong. Mookerjee, J., in an elaborate judgment in the case of Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Butt [1910] 37 Cal. 559, in which he has exhaustively dealt with the question, has observed thus:
20. AS a general rule the liability of joint wrong-doers in tort is joint and several, but it is not an inflexible rule; still the controlling genera! principle is that where acts of several persons, by design, or by conduct, tantamount to conspiracy, contribute to the commission of a wrong, they are jointly liable: Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt, ILR 37 Cal 559, which was followed in Kamala Prosad v. Chandra Nath, AIR 1928 Cal 180: ILR 55 Cal 666.
Nor can we accept the extreme contention of the judgment-debtors that the appeal should fail in its entirety, and the whole claim for mesne profits be dismissed. The position is precisely the same as if the decree holders had entered into a compromise with two of the three sons of Sital Prosad and released them from liability. In that event, the decree holders would still be entitled to obtain a decree as against the three judgment-debtors in respect of what would be their share of the mesne profits. This is clear from the decision of this Court in Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt 6 Ind. Cas. 69 ; 37 C. 559 ; 14 C.W.N. 849 ; 11 C.L.J. 503. We accordingly direct the Subordinate Judge to assess mesne profits on the basis of the order of the 26th May 1906; but the amount will be calculated, only in respect of the shares of Bolakilal and Abdulla Yunus and a third share of Sital Prosad. The Subordinate Judge will be at liberty to take evidence to enable him to determine the respective shares of the judgment debtors; if no evidence is given, the presumption will be that the original judgment-debtors were liable in equal shares.
8. The last point is whether the learned Subordinate Judge was right in passing a joint decree against the defendants. It is admitted that the plaintiffs have exonerated some of the defendants. The whole question is, what is the effect of that exoneration. The case of Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt 6 Ind. Cas. 69 at p. 73 : 14 C.W.N. 849 : 11 C.L.J. 503 : 37 C. 559 is directly in point. It was held in that case that where the plaintiff by his own act splits up the claim against the defendants, he cannot get a joint decree against all the defendants. In that case the plaintiff released some of the joint tortfeasors and the learned Judges in the High Court refused to pass a joint decree against the others. We think, therefore, that the decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge in this case cannot be supported. The decree ought to specify separately the extent of liability of each of the defendants.
1. The two points urged before us are these, first, that the Court in assessing mesne profits should have made an apportionment such as was made in Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt 37 C. 559 : 6 Ind. Cas. 69 : 11 C.L.J. 503 : 14 C.W.N. 849. We are unable to apply the principle of that case because here no tenures have been proved, and the decree, by which the Court in execution is bound, is one which treats the defendants as trespassers pure and simple. Then it is urged that this order in execution could not be made by the Munsif, as the amount of mesne profits took the case out of his jurisdiction. It is not suggested that the Munsif had no jurisdiction, if regard be had to the value of the suit at the time of its in stitution: that is to say, if regard be had to the value of the property in suit and of the mesne profits that had then accrued due, but it is said that subsequent mesne profits have so swelled the value of the suit that the Munsif had no jurisdiction. Our attention has been called to certain cases which give some colour of support to the contention that by reason of subsequent events a case may pass beyond the jurisdiction of the Court in which it was properly instituted. Those cases are not direct authorities on the point now before us; and it is enough for us to say that the objection is taken at too late a stage, inasmuch as it is urged before us for the first time in this appeal from appellate order.