In Re: V.N. Sundar And Ors. vs Unknown on 12 December, 1974
In the Express Newspapers case (supra) a scheme making gratuity payable at the end of three years was upheld except in one particular aspect (See paragraph 202).
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Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd.,And ... vs The Union Of India And Others(And ... on 8 January, 1958
Siemens India Ltd. vs The Commercial Tax Officer And Ors. on 14 June, 1976
Ltd. v. Union of India [1974] 33 S.T.C. 254 (S.C.). The test that has to be applied is that the sale must be in the course of import. It is not enough that the sale is for the purpose of import. The importation must be as a result of the sale and must be occasioned by the sale in respect of which exemption is being sought for. The act of importation and the sale in question must form an integrated transaction. How a particular sale and importation should be considered to have formed an integrated transaction depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No one test or combination of tests can be decisive in all cases. The fact that there are two different contracts-one a contract of purchase from the foreign seller and another a contract of sale to a buyer in India-may pro-vide good indication of the fact that the sale in question was in the course of importation. Again, in my opinion, the fact that for effecting the sale the goods were imported or prior to the importation there was specification by the buyer or use of the actual user's licence of the buyer are not decisive of the matter. The important factor to be determined is whether the importation and the sale formed an integrated transaction. That requires detailed examination of the transactions in question. In the impugned order the Commercial Tax Officer has observed: "It appears that each transaction claimed for deduction under Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, consisted of two distinct sales". The Commercial Tax Officer has not discussed the evidence on record and how he has come to the conclusion. He has further gone on to observe that one transaction was the purchase of the dealer from the foreign supplier. Then after taking delivery of the goods in India there was another sale being sale by the dealer to the customer. He has not considered whether these two operations formed an integrated transaction. Judged from that point of view, in my opinion, he has not applied the correct principles as laid down in the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mod.
Gullapalli Nageswara Rao And Others vs Andhra Pradesh State Road ... on 5 November, 1958
As my learned brothers aforesaid have stated the relevant
facts in detail, it is not necessary for me to repeat them,
but as I differ from my learned brother Subba Rao, with whom
some of my colleagues on the Constitution Bench have agreed,
and for whose opinions, I have the greatest respect, I
should state my reasons for differing from them and for
agreeing with our brother Wanchoo. It may be taken as the
settled view of this Court that the question whether a
certain decision envisaged in a statute, is judicial or
quasijudicial or only administrative in character, must de-
pend upon the terms of the statute law itself, apart from
any pre-conceived notions about the functions of a court or
other tribunals vested with the duty and jurisdiction to
decide controversies as a judicial body, vide Province of
Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani (1), Nagendra Nath Bora v.
Commissioner of Hills Division(2) and Express Newspapers
Limited v. Union of India (3).
Pandit M. S. M. Sharma vs Shri Sri Krishna Sinha And Others on 12 December, 1958
To the same effect is the decision
of this Court in Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India
(3), where Bhagwati, J., delivering the judgment of the
Court, held that freedom of speech and expression includes
within its scope the -freedom of the Press.
Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25 January, 1978
A reference has been made to the
decision of Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. and Anr. V. Union
of India,(2) where the test laid down was that there must be
a direct and inevitable consequence of the legislation.
Ravatmal Mohanlal vs The Principal Commercial Tax Officer on 1 October, 1975
12. A. P. Dairy Development Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India (1975) 2 A.P.L.J. Sh. N. 29, is a decision of our learned brother, Jeevan Reddy, J., sitting singly. The learned Judge was construing the meaning of entry I-B in the Finance Act, 1969, While construing the language of that entry, the learned Judge opined that levy of excise duty on milk powder manufactured and stored in kraft paper bags for purposes of regeneration into fluid milk was not sustainable. It was clearly a case which was limited to the scope of entry I-B in the Finance Act, 1969, and cannot have any relevance to the understanding of the present entry.
Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. vs Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd., National ... on 18 May, 1977
It may also be pointed out, us indicated by the Allahabad High Court in l.T.C Ltd v. Union of India (supra), that the Madras High Court has also taken the same view as the High Court other than Gujarat High Court.
Thellur M. Dharmarajan, Editor, ... vs The Union Of India (Uoi), Represented By ... on 10 November, 1976
Referring to the earlier decisions in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras , and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi , and Express Newspapers v. Union of India 1958 S.C.J. 1113 : A.I.R. 1958 S.C, the learned Judges held that the impugned Act and the order were directed against the circulation of a newspaper, and, this being so, the result would be a direct interference with the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). In that case it was argued for the State that the Act and the Order complained of were directed not on the rights of free press but, rather, on the business or trade of newspapers. Repelling this contention, the Supreme Court observed that the reference to the Press being a business and to the restriction imposed by the main Act as a restriction on the right to carry on the business of publishing a newspaper would all be wholly irrelevant for considering whether the impugned Act infringes or does not infringe the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). Consequently, the learned Judges struck down the order as violative of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution.
P. Venkatachalapathi And Ors. vs Commercial Tax Inspector, ... on 26 February, 1965
62. While it may be correct to summarise the effect of the arguments on behalf of petitioners by stating that the central point of attack is the absence of real or effective safeguards for the protection of honest men, we do not think that we can accept the suggestion of Mr. Advocate-General that the mere fact of the substantive part of the section considered in isolation having been held to be reasonable would constitute a complete answer or an almost complete answer to the attack of unreasonableness directed against the procedural part. Such a view would be opposed to the clear principle stated by the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper (Private) Limited v. The Union of India that both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness.
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 3 March, 1966
See Ram Singh v. State of Delhi(2)
Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India(3),
Hamdard Dawakhana Wakf v. Union of India(4). Many laws
incidentally encroach on the freedom of speech, but, judged
by the test of the directness of the legislation, they do
not infringe Art. 19 (1) (a). Section 54 of the Indian
Specific Relief Act, 1877, empowers the Court to grant a
perpetual injunction to prevent the breach of an obligation,
and illustrations (h), (i), (v), (y) and (z) to the section
show that the Court may restrain the publication of
documents and information in breach of the fiduciary
obligations of a legal or medical adviser, or an employee,
the piracy of a copyright and other publications infringing
the proprietary rights of the owner. Order 39, r. 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, empowers the Court to grant a
temporary injunction restraining the defendant from
publishing documents in breach of his obligation under a
contract or otherwise during the pendency of a suit for
restraining the breach. Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955, makes it unlawful for any person to print or
publish any matter in relation to any proceeding, under the
Act conducted in camera without the previous permission of
the Court. Under the rule of practice prevailing in the
Bombay High Court, it is not permissible to print or publish
in the press a report of any proceeding heard in chambers
without the leave of the Judge, see Purushottam Hur wan v.
Navnitlal Hurgovandas.(5) so also, the law relating to the
inherent powers of the Court preserved by s. 151 of the Code
of Civil Procedure enables the Court in the ends of justice
to pass orders restraining the publication of the report of
its proceeding during the pendency of the litigation. fudged
by the test of the directness of the legislation, none of
these laws infringes Art. 19 (1) (a). Instances may be
multiplied. The law relating to discovery and
interrogatories, the law which punishes a witness for giving
false evidence, the law which compels the assessee to
furnish a true return of his income and forbids the
disclosure of the statements in the return are all outside
the purview of Art. 19 (1) (a).