23. The society also has a hospital. Sadhus who have themselves registered: ate supplied with lodging and a monthly allowance for their maintenance. In connexion with the above facts, reference may be made to bye-laws Nos. 40, 56, 64 and 76. Learned Counsel for defendant 1 pleads that the Satsang Sabha is not only a society for the diffusion of useful knowledge, but is also a charitable institution within the technical and legal meaning of this term and in this connexion he refers us to In Re Foveaux; Cross v. London Antivivisection Society (1895) 2 Ch. D. 501, Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income-tax v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. J.F. Yorkshire Agriculture Society (1928) 1 K.B. 611. It is unnecessary for us to consider these authorities, inasmuch as foamed counsel for the plaintiff concedes that the objects, as set out in the Sabha's Memorandum of Association and bye-laws -the bona fides of which he does not impeach--are of a "charitable" nature within the legal meaning of that term; but he pleads that defendant 1 is not a society registrable under the Act and also that it Is not a charitable society, because there is no trust vesting the property in the Sabha.
The principles stated in that case were approved in Commissioner of Taxes v. Malborne Trust Ltd., 1914 AC 1001 at p. 1010: (AIR 1914 PC 230 at p. 234); 1928 AC 132 at p. 140; ; Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore, 67 Ind App 464 at p. 481: (AIR 1940 PC 230 at pp. 235-236).
14. Counsel for the defendant has also referred to Eastham (Inspector of Taxes) v. Leigh London and Provincial Properties Ltd. 1971 Tax LR 1576. In the said case a company had entered into a contract with the owner of the site to construct a building on it within two years. If the building was to be completed, there was then a condition that the owner was to lease out the building to another person for a period of 125 years from the date of agreement i.e. June 22, 1962. The building was duly constructed and in May 1964, lease was granted. The owner was assessed to capital gains tax on the basis that the lease was required by a in 1964. The question, which arose for decision, was whether lease could not come into existence on June 22, 1962, when the agreement was made or came into existence in May 1964? The question posed before the court was: If the agreement dated June 22, 1962, were to be held to be a conditional contract within the meaning of Para (3) of schedule 9 of the Finance Act, 1962, then date of acquisition would be the said date of the contract and in case the contract was not a conditional (one) then the date of acquisition by A would be the date when the lease was granted. It was held that though the grant of lease depended on the fulfilllment of certain obligations on the part of the lessee, the contract was not a conditional contract. The construction of the building within two years was not a condition precedent to the grant of the lease. The case is based on totally different facts. Here, what we have to see is whether there came about a concluded contract between the parties or not with regard to the agreement to take on lease the premises in question.
The decision in Cross (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. London
and Provincial Trust Ltd.(1) on which counsel for the
appellant relied has, in our judgment, no application to
this case. In 1932 the Brazilian Government suspended
payment of interest on Government bonds for a period of
three years and issued interest bearing funding bonds in
exchange for the interest coupons. The London and
Provincial Trust Ltd. which held among its investments
Brazilian bonds received funding bonds which it sold from
time to time, It was held that by issuing the funding bonds
the Government of Brazil did not pay interest and the
assessee Bank received no interest when it received the
funding bonds. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R. observed :