71. With due regards to the proposition of law laid
down in the above cited decision, it cannot be said that the
same could be extended to the present case for the simple
reason that the lessee in that case had used the premises
for running a hosiery factory for manufacturing purpose
which is not the circumstance in the instant case since
DW1 herein is admittedly said to be running business in
the gold and silver refinery work which cannot be said to
be a manufacturing purpose within the meaning of Sec.
106 of the Act. Sec.106 of the Act reads thus:
71. With due regards to the proposition of law laid
down in the above cited decision, it cannot be said that
the same could be extended to the present case for the
simple reason that the lessee in that case had used the
premises for running a hosiery factory for manufacturing
purpose which is not the circumstance in the instant case
since DW1 herein is admittedly said to be running
11. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Umraomal v. Heeralal, 1973 Raj LW 396 = (AIR 1973 Raj 337); Balwantsingh v. Murarilal, AIR 1965 All 187; Abdul
Ghafoor v. Mushir Ali Khan, 1970 Ren CR 247 (All); Rupeswari Debi v. Lokenath Hosiery Mills, AIR 1962 Cal 608; Kali Kumar Sen v. Haridas Roy, AIR 1969 Assam 134 and Joyanti Hosiery Mills v. Upendra Chandra Das. AIR 1946 Cal 317. I have looked into these rulings and am of opinion that they are distinguishable on facts.
In Rupeswari Debi v. Messers Lokenath Hosiery Mills, same was the factual position where the tenant was required to pay the precise amount of taxes as and when demanded by the municipal authorities. It was in this background that the Court held that payment was to be regarded as payment of rent to the landlord.
37. But it is pertinent to note that in the above judgment, learned single Judge of this Court also referred to the judgment of other High Courts reported in Someshwar Dayal Seth v. Dwarakadhish Ji Maharaj, , Raval and Company v. K.G. Ramachandran (Minor) and Ors., 1968 (II) MLJ 50 and Rupeswari Debi v. Lokenath Hosiery Mills, , wherein in was held that the exact amount of tax which was being demanded by the Municipality was agreed to be paid by the tenants therein and therefore, it was held by the Courts that the amount of tax was part and parcel of the rent as it was as [per the demand of the Municipality and as the tenants therein committed default of payment of property tax, it was held that the amount of tax is
the part and parcel of the rent and it was as per the demand of the Municipality and it will form part and parcel of the rent and non-payment of the property tax amounts to wilful default in payment of rent.
On the ground of default, a Single Bench judgment of
this court reported at 66 CWN 414 (Rupeswari Debi v.
Lokenath Hosiery Mills) has been placed for the enunciation of
law therein at page 418 of the report while dealing with the
8
ground of default in that case. It appears that out of seven
chalans only five had been deposited and marked as exhibits
and there was no explanation why the two other money order
coupons had not been brought before the court. However, on
facts, the court found that it was for the plaintiff to
demonstrate that there was default on the part of the
defendant in paying or depositing rent which the plaintiffs
had failed to do in that case. The passage from the report that
has been relied upon deals with the facts peculiar to that
case and there does not appear to be any general enunciation
of law that can be culled out therefrom to be applied to the
facts of the present case.
10. On the evidence before me, however, there is hardly anything to indicate that there was such knowledge on the part of the landlady and, in that view, the above decision would have no application. I would, however, further point out that the observations, relied on by Mr. Dasgupta from the judgment of my learned brother, should not be read apart from their context and, if they are read in their true context, it will be clear that his Lordship was there referring to the conduct of the parties, really as a piece of evidence, supporting the view that the purpose of the tenancy in question was manufacture. This will be further confirmed by the observations, made by my learned brother in the preceding page, where he was referring to an admission of the plaintiffs witness that the lease there was taken for factory purposes and was rejecting his belated and laboured explanation, trying to contradict the same. In any view, as I have said above the said decision would have no application to the instant case. I would accordingly, reject this second submission of Mr. Dasgupta.