Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 9 of 9 (0.93 seconds)
Documents citing The Governor-General Of India In ... vs G. Krishna Shenoy on 10 August, 1950

K.V.V. Ardhanari Chettiar And Co., By ... vs The Union Of India (Uoi) Represented By ... on 15 December, 1955

I am in respectful agreement with the liberal interpretation given by the Calcutta High Court that the word "loss" was wide enough to include all cases where the goods are not forthcoming and, therefore, included a case of non-delivery. But if the Court on the evidence comes to the conclusion that there is any wilful withholding of the goods by the company, then undoubtedly it cannot be said to have been lost by the company. If, however, the withholding or the disappearance of the goods is due to the misconduct of the servants of the railway company, which eventually the administration is not able to trace and recover, then the mere fact that it is the company's servant that is responsible for the disappearance is no ground to say that the goods have not been lost by the company, and it will amount to a loss even in such a case. I am in respectful agreement with the view of Horwill, J., in Governor-General of India in Council v. Krishna Shenoy that it is necessary for the railway company to give some proof that the goods have been lost destroyed or deteriorated. But when once they place sufficient material to show that the goods have disappeared at some stage and therefore are not forthcoming it will then be for the plaintiff to establish if it is his case that there is a wilful withholding of the goods and the goods have not been in fact lost but are under the control of the company and the company is able to deliver them.
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Oudh And Tirhut Railway vs Mrs. Karam Chand Paras Ram on 14 August, 1957

He conceded that loss can be proved By circumstantial evidence, as for example when from a parcel containing silver bars, one bar was found missing on its reaching the destination. Section 77 was held inapplicable to a case of mere non-delivery in the Governor-General of India in Council v. Krishna Shenoy, AIR 1951 Mad 327 (H); Horwill J. held that if the railway in a suit based on mere non-delivery, claimed that it was barred for want of a notice under Section 77, it should show that the consignment had been lost.
Allahabad High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Amichand Udayram vs Pratap Singh Harpal Singh And Ors. on 23 April, 1963

"Courts and Tribunals are constituted to do justice between the parties within the confines of a statutory limitations and undue emphasis on technicalities or enlarging their scope would cramp their powers, diminish their ettectiveness and defeat the very purpose for which they are constituted. It must be made clear that within the limits prescribed by the decisions of the Supreme Court the discretionary jurisiction of the Tribunals to amend the pleadings is as extensive as that of a civil Court. The same well settled principles laid down in the matter of amendments to tne pleadings in a suit should also regulate the exercise of tne power of amendment by a Tribunal."
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Dwarka Das vs The Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 30 September, 1952

In still another case of the same Court, -- 'Governor-General of India in Council v. Krishna Shenoy', (1950), 2 Mad L. J. 506, notice was sent to the Secretary of State, but it was treated by the Government as a notice to the Governor-General in Council, but that was a case under Section 77, Railways Act and is not of much assistance in this case. In that section there is nothing corresponding to s. 80 in regard to the institution of suits. All that it provides for is that a person is not entitled to compensation, etc.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Dasa K. Lakshmiah vs Union Government And Anr. on 26 October, 1967

This notice was forwarded by the Railway Board to the General Manager, M. and S. M. Railway as the competent authority to deal with the matter, It was held that the notice was proper notice under Section 80, Civil P.C. In support of that principle Governor-General of India in Council v. Krishna Shenoy, ; Subrahmanyam v. Union of India, ; Sankunni Menon v. South Indian Railway, ; Ramaswami v. Secretary of State, AIR 1933 Mad 105 and Bholaram Shiubdhan v. Governor General in Council, AIR 1949 Pat 416, were relied on . See the observations at page 840 in the above-mentioned case.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 18 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Sodhi Shamsher Singh vs Pepsu State And Ors. on 17 February, 1960

In Governor-General of India in Council v. Krishna Shenoy, AIR 1951 Mad 327, the name of the Secretary of State was inadvertently given at the head of the notice but it was treated by the Governor-General-in-Council as a notice to him, and action was taken on the notice in the same way as if the notice had been addressed to the Governor-General-in-Council. It was held in that case that that was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 80, notwithstanding the error in the matter of designation.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Percy Jal Padiwalla vs The Bar Council Of India And Ors. on 12 February, 1987

14. It was urged by Mr. Jasinghani learned counsel for the Bar Council of India. That thepowers of the Bar Council of India that thepowers of the Bar Council of India to students who wish toenroll as anadvocate was unfettered andunqualified and it was not open to the court toconsider whether any a restriction was reasonable or had anything todowith the functions of the Bar Council of India or with the standard of education and so on. Insupport of this submission Mr. Jaisinghnai placed reliance of the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court inthecase of Bar Council of India v. G. kesavaramayya . Inthat case it has been observed as follows; "In regard to person obtaining a degree inlaw after that date (28 theFebruary 1963), the statue has inexpress terms left it to the descertiony of the Bar Council of India .................... Having regard tothis position ther can be no escape from the conclusion that thelegislature had conferred anunqualified power and dicretion on the Bar Council of India to recognise of not to recognise for he purpose of the Act the degree in law conferred by Universitioes in India after the the 28the February 1963, Inour view the observation the Andhra Pradesh HighCourt have tobe considered inthelight of thefacts of that case. Inthat casethe degree inlaw was obtained by the student concerned after 30th June 1964 and it was not obtained after undergoing a course of study inlaw for not less then 2 years after graduation which was the munimum period for study of law prescribed under the relevant rule adopted by the Bar Council of India. This limitation imposed bythe Bar council of India, nemely of 2 years minimum study of law after granduation was clearly connected with the students legal education and hence it was clearly withinthedicretionary power of the Bar Council tohave framed such a rule. In our vies allthat the observation means is that the Advocates Act does not expressly precribe any limitationonthe discretion conferred on the Bar Council of India of frame rules for the purposes mentioned in s. 49 of the Act We do not think that the learned Judges ever meant tosaythat thediscretion conferred by Section 49 of the Advocates Act on the Bar Council of India of frame Rules was a totally untrammelled and unfettled discretion because sucha discretion is unknown tothelaw of the country any would be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It is wellsetled inlaw they every subordinate law making authority had a power to frame subordinte legislatiion only provied to frame subordinate legislation only provided it is reasonble and withing thelimits of therule making power of that body.
Bombay High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - S V Manohar - Full Document

Union Of India Owning The Southern ... vs Sha Vastimull Harakchand on 14 July, 1958

11. We may next take un the principle discussed by Krishnaswami Nayudu J., in 1955 Mad WN 171 (D) and Horwill J., in Governor-General of India in 'Council v. G. Krishna Shenoy, (J). In holding that no notice was necessary in cases of nondelivery of goods, Horwill J., took the view that it was for the Railway company to establish that the goods have been lost whilst in their possession and therefore the railway could not deprive the plaintiff of his right of suit on the plea of want of notice under Section 77.
Karnataka High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Governor-General In Council, ... vs Gujrathi Sankarappa Being Minor By Next ... on 25 February, 1953

8. Horwill J. in -- 'Governor-General of India in Council v. Krishna Shenoy', (F), has held that where although the name of the Secretary of State was inadvertently given at the head of the notice, yet it was treated by the Governor-General in Council as notice to him and action was taken in the same way as if the notice had been addressed to the Governor-General-in-Council and that it is sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 80, C. P. C. because the Governor-General in Council was in fact given notice. It must be held that the notice was given to the Governor-General in Council notwithstanding the error in the matter of designation. The learned Judge distinguished -- 'AIR 1946 Mad 366 (D)'.
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
1