Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 188 (3.53 seconds)
Documents citing State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr vs Nalla Raja Reddy & Ors on 28 February, 1967

State vs . Raja on 15 November, 2010

5. Statement of accused was recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C, wherein he denied the entire evidence and stated that he is innocent. He has been falsely implicated in this case. Nothing was recovered from him. Accused stated that he was lifted by the police officials from his village FIR no. 38/06 : PS Narcotics Branch : State Vs. Raja page no. 2/12 2/3 days before the said date. His brother Guddu made a telegram to this effect to the senior officers and later on, he was falsely implicated in this case. He also examined DW­1 Guddu in support of his contention. Thereafter the defence evidence was closed and the case was fixed for final arguments.
Delhi District Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State vs Raja And Ors on 29 October, 2024

15. In the opinion of this Court, the depositions of prosecution witnesses do not fulfill the necessary ingredients of offence punishable u/s 304-B/498-A/406/34 IPC. In such circumstances and in view of the entire discussion in preceding paragraphs, all the accused persons are entitled to benefit of doubt in the case of prosecution. Accused persons namely Raja, Vineeta, Rekha and Suraj stand acquitted of the charged offence State vs. Raja & Ors.
Delhi District Court Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State vs . Raja 1 Of 16 on 30 April, 2013

Hearing ruckus, the residents of the colony assembled there and seeing the crowd gathering, the accused fled away from there. He was taken to MB hospital in ambulance. His statement Ex.PW2/A was recorded by the police and at that time, SHO was also present. Motive stated by PW2, is that accused Tinku and his associates had misbehaved and teased his wife when she was pregnant, and thereafter, had committed theft in his house for which he had registered cases State vs. Raja 6 of 16 against them. He further deposed that one Dhan Prasad, who was resident of his colony and was one of the accused in theft case, was pressurizing him to withdraw that case. When he refused to compromise the theft case, it was Dhan Prasad, who was threatening him to eliminate from the face of the world. He further deposed that when he did not bow down before the demand of Dhan Prasad, he instigated the accused Tinku, Raja, Sunny @ Chhotu and other three boys, one of whom was Ramesh S/o Nathu Ram, r/o House No.299, C­block, Holambi Kalan, to finish him. He stated on oath that the accused Sunny, who was present on that day in the Court, was not the same Sunny who had given him beatings. His clothes were stained with blood at the time of incident but were not seized by the police. He sustained 13­14 stitches on the head. Accused Sunny was declared P.O. midway trial and was apprehended later. PW2 was re­summoned for testimony against accused Sunny and he deposed specifically that he was not the same Sunny who was with accused Tinku at the time of incident. PW6 Shakuntala deposed that on 18.09.2010 during noon hours, accused Gaurav @ Tinku abused her while passing from the street in front of her house.
Delhi District Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State vs . Raja And Others on 7 July, 2011

18. It has been observed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Karambir Vs. State 1997 JCC 520 that "In this regard it was also pointed out that Moharrar Malkhana with whom State Vs. Raja and other Page 8/9 FIR no. 154/07 the case property was deposited, was not examined by the prosecution. Besides it was further pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Investigating Officer, RW 3 had not stated that he had deposited the specimen impression of the seal with the Moharrar Malkhana alongwith the case property".
Delhi District Court Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

V. Devaki Ammal vs Assistant Controller Of Estate Duty on 10 October, 1972

23. As already stated, the revenue concedes that there is differentiation between coparceners leaving lineal descendants and others and the property passing on the death of the former is subjected to a higher duty but seeks to sustain that differentiation on the ground that it is intended to place the incidence of taxation equitably on all persons. It is pointed out that, if such an aggregation as is provided in Section 34(1)(c) is not adopted, it results in the members of the Dayabhaga family being put to a higher burden of tax than the members of the Mitakshara family if the death of a member occurs. It may be true that the tax effect is different depending upon the school of Hindu law by which the deceased was governed at the time of his death. If he was a member of the Dayabhaga family, the extent and value of the property passing on his death would be considerably more than what it would be if he had been a member of the Mitakshara family and, naturally, there is a higher burden of tax. But, that difference was entirely due to the fact that the personal law governing the deceased was different. The persons belonging to the Dayabhaga law are not persons similarly situate as members belonging to the Mitakshara law, for the right of inheritance and devolution under their personal law is entirely different, and to compare them with the members of a Mitakshara family who are governed by different rules of inheritance and devolution is to ignore a difference when there is one. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Nalla Raja Reddy, a statutory provision may offend Article 14 both by finding differences where there are none and by finding no difference where there is one. When the share or extent of the coparcenary property passing on death is different, the tax burden also has to differ. A member of a Dayabhaga family on whose death a larger extent or share of joint family property passes on death cannot be treated alike with a member of the Mitakshara family on whose death comparatively a lesser share of joint family property passes on death, and the liability for estate duty, which is an impost on the property passing on death, cannot be made equitable between the two without reference to the actual extent of property passing. If Parliament had intended to treat them alike, it would have made a provision that, on the death of a member of a Mitakshara joint Hindu family, not only his interest in the joint family property but also the interest of his lineal descendants should be deemed to have passed on such death, as it has introduced deeming provisions in other circumstances. In Section 9 property taken under a disposition made by the deceased purporting to operate as an immediate gift inter vivos whether by way of transfer, delivery, declaration of trust, settlement upon persons in succession, or otherwise, which shall not have been bona fide made two years or more before the death of the deceased shall be deemed to pass on death. Even though the title might have passed from the deceased to the donee by way of gift inter vivos and there is no actual passing of property on the death of the deceased in that case. Parliament deems that there has been a passing of property in respect of those properties at the time of the death of the deceased. We are not, however, expressing our opinion as to whether such a deeming provision if made will be valid or not. We are only pointing out that without such a deeming provision it is not possible to bring the interests of the lineal descendants also to charge under Section 5. We are also of the view that though the ultimate object or the policy behind the Act is to see that there is a fair distribution of wealth, and to remove inequalities in the concentration of wealth, it is only the specific object of the Act, that is, to provide for a levy and collection of estate duty on a graded scale on the property passing on death, that can be taken into account for finding out as to whether the differentiation has got any reasonable nexus. Otherwise, every statutory provision can be sustained on the ground that it is intended to remove inequalities in the distribution of wealth and to avoid concentration of wealth. The intention, scope and object of the Act has only to be gathered from the provisions of the Act.
Madras High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 5 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Vivian Joseh Ferreira & Anr vs Municipal Corporation Of Greater ... on 4 November, 1971

The third attack was on the exemptions, the ground of attack being that some of them had no foundation in principle and were totally arbitrary. Reliance was placed in this connec- tion on some of the decisions of this Court to show that discrimination results where classification among equals is based on no rational principle and which has no reasonable nexus with the object with which the impugned legislation is enacted. Similarly, such discrimination arises where there is no classification even though the objects which are subjected to tax are unequal and yet treated alike. [see K. T. Moopil Nair v. Kerala(1), State of Madras v. R. Nand Lal & Co. (2) and Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy(3)]. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that those decisions had no application to the Present Act as the classifications made and the exemptions provided thereunder were based on principles which had intimate relation to the objects with which the Act was passed and the evil it sought to avert.
Supreme Court of India Cites 34 - Cited by 39 - J M Shelat - Full Document
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next