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Documents citing Krishnaswami Naidu And Ors. vs Perumal Alias Mammaya Naidu And Anr. on 17 April, 1924

Gade Rajagopalarao And Anr. vs State Of Orissa And Ors. on 27 April, 1956

It is equally clear by very high authorities and it does not require any discussion by us; and particularly as the position is not challenged, in order to construe whether the Inam grant constitutes an estate within the meaning of the Madras Act, we are to consider the circumstances existing at the time when the grant was made, that is to say, that the grant was in respect of a whole village at the time when it was made. It would not be taken to be an estate if subsequent to the grant, the area granted formed the village. We may in this connexion simply refer to two highest authorities on the subject in the case of .District Board, Tanjore v. M.K. Noor Mohamed, reported in AIR 1953 SC 446 (A), and in the case of Kriahnaswami v. Perumal, reported in AIR 1950 PC 105 (B).
Orissa High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mantravadi Bhavanarayana And Anr. vs Merugu Venkatadu And Ors. on 26 August, 1953

The question as to how far the so-called exclusion of poromboke or waste land in computing the area of the inam grant would make the grant only of a part of the village, was considered by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in --'Krishnaswami v. Perumal', AIR 1950 PC 105 (B), and the observations at page 108 snow that the words in the specification "deduct poromboke" do not mean that poromboke. was excluded from the grant, but should be understood as showing that the poromboke, or waste land, was deducted in ascertaining the assessment since such land could not be assessed. It is therefore clear that when in columns 4 & 5 of Ex. P. 1 we find a deduction of poromboke land of the extent of 44 acres 96 cents it was intended only for the ascertainment of the assessment but that the poromboke land should be understood as being included in the land as well. The observations of the Judicial Committee are direct authority for negativing the contention that the exclusion of poromboke would detract from the nature of the grant of a whole village as inam, if otherwise the conditions contained in Section 3(2)(d) of the Act are complied with. We therefore agree with the conclusion arrived at in the order of reference regarding this point.
Madras High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Srinivasa Ayyangar By Power Of Attorney ... vs Revenue Court By Its Presiding Officer ... on 14 May, 1957

18. Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam complained that the Revenue Divisional Officer in the present case ignored the rules of evidence laid down in Section 185 of the Estates Land Act and arrived at his finding that the lands involved in Writ Petition Nos. 1092 and 905 of 1956 were private lands without reference to these rules and that in consequence the orders were vitiated by apparent error. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents did not seriously contest this position. The result of this would be that subject to the determination of the other points to which we shall presently advert, the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer in W.P. Nos. 1092 and 905 of 1956 would have to be set aside and the petitions remitted to him for reconsideration.
Madras High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

P. Paul James Alias Paulus vs P. Jesudas Cyril And Ors. on 18 January, 1996

In Krishnaswami Naidu and Ors. v. Perumal alias Nammayya Naidu and Anr. 47 M.L.J. 522 : A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 112 : 83 I.C. 84 : 1924 M.W.N. 742, this Court further held thus: (at pages 113 and 114) The principle underlying these cases is that when there is a definite intentionn to divide, that intention should be given effect to; but where, as in this case, the intention has been expressed, but shortly afterwards negatived, by the withdrawal of the partition suit, the mere filing of the suit cannot be deemed to be a sufficient proof of that intentionn in the light of subsequent events.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika ... vs State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr on 7 November, 1963

14. Closely related to the first point dealt with, and possibly merely another aspect of the same question is whether the entire land of the village was not the subject of inam, under the original grant. We have already pointed out that in Column 3 of Ex. A2 both the dry as well as the Poramboke of a total extent of 686, 97 acres-as set out in Columns 4 and 5- is shown as the extent of the inam. That the entirety of the dry lands in the village was granted was not disputed, but the argument was that the Poramboke was not. However, in the face of these entries in Columns 3 and 4 of the Inam Fair Register, it appears to us idle to contend that the Poramboke was not granted to the shrotriemdar but was reserved by the grantor. Even in cases where the words 'deduct poramboke' were used, it has been held that these words were used not for the purpose of excluding Poramboke from the grant but merely for indicating that it was being deducted for ascertaining the assessment, since waste land is not assessed (vide Krishnaswami v. Perumal Goundan, 1950 AIR(PC) 105 at p. 108). The case before us is a fortiori because Column 3 shows that the Poramboke is comprised in the grant.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 39 - Full Document

Nallathambi Alias Venkatachalam ... vs Perumal Chetty And Ors. on 18 December, 1952

6. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on the ruling of the Privy Council in -- 'Krishnaswami v. Perumal', AIR 1950 PC 105 (A). The facts of that case were totally different. In that case, there was originally a grant in pre-British times of a whole in am village. In 1795 a small part of that village was resumed by the Government and granted in ryotwari tenure but the rest of the village continued to be treated as an inam village. That continued for nearly 100 years, and in 1895, the Government granted on inam tenure the rest of the village which had been treated as a whole village for the past 100 years. Their Lordships held that the subject-matter of the grant of 1895 fell within the definition of estate in Section 3(2) (d), Madras Estates Land Act. The reasoning of their Lordships can be discovered in the following passage of the judgment: "In their Lordships' view it is irrelevant that the village so granted had once formed part of a larger village. The important fact is that the grant of 1895 comprises the whole of what was then regarded as an inam village." We have nothing like this in the case before us. The grant made by Macleod did not comprise the whole of what was then regarded as an inam village. The grant was certainly of scattered portions of a ryotwari village.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Ganapathi, Minor By Mother And Guardian ... vs Subramaniam Chetty And Ors. on 25 March, 1929

4. The first point to be considered is whether the filing of this plaint did constitute a final division in the family. When a declaration has been made of an intention to separate by the filing of a plaint for partition and such plaint has resulted in a partition decree, undoubtedly the date of separation would be the date of the filing of the plaint. But the mere filing of the plaint does not necessarily effect a final severance in status for it has been held that a plaintiff may withdraw his declaration of intention and that then no severance is effected. Vemi Reddy v. Nallappa Reddy (1920) 11 L.W. 611 and Krishnaswami Naidu v. Perumal (1924) 20 L.W. 540.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Karri Sitaramiah And Ors. vs Venkadaru Sarvayya Dubacherla And Ors. on 24 July, 1944

2. Under Order 41, Rule 21, Civil P. C, where an appeal is heard ex parte and judgment is pronounced against the respondent, he may apply to the appellate Court to rehear the appeal, but must satisfy the Court either that notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called on for hearing. It is conceded in the present case that notice was duly served and although an attempt has been made to suggest that the words "he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing" applied only to the party himself and not to the advocate who represents him in the appeal, we find it difficult to accept this contention. Under Article 169, Limitation Act, the period fixed for an application for the re-hearing of an appeal heard ex parte is 30 days from the date of the decree in appeal when notice of appeal has been served. Section 5, Limitation Act, permits an extension of time for filing applications only if this section has been made applicable to such applications by or under any enactment. It is conceded that there is no enactment extending the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act, to applications under Order 41, Rule 21, although a rule has been framed by this High Court extending the provisions of Section 5 to the somewhat similar applications under B. 19 of Order 41. It seems to be settled so far as this High Court is concerned by the decision in Krishnaswami Naidu v. Changalroya Naidu ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 114 that the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, Civil P.C., cannot be utilised to take the place of an express provision extending Section 5, Limitation Act, to an application of this kind. The result seems to be that there is no provision of law under which the prayer in this petition can be granted. It is a matter for consideration whether it is desirable to frame a rule similar to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of Order 41, so as to make the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act, applicable to a petition under B. 21 of Order 41. In the absence of any such rule we have no option but to dismiss this application with costs.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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