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Senairam Doongarmal Agency (P.) Ltd. ... vs K.E. Johnson And Others. on 15 March, 1963

For the first proposition that both sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 37 operate on the same field and the provisions of section 37(2) being more onerous, should be struck down, reliance has been placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Suraj Mall Mohta & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and a decision of the Calcutta High Court in S. M. Nawab Ariff v. Corporation of Calcutta. In the first case before the Supreme Court, the validity of section 5(4) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act was called into question. During the proceedings before the Income-tax Investigation Commission, it was found that the petitioner also evaded payment of tax. His case was sought to be referred under section 5(4) of Act XXX of 1947. It was urged that on a plain reading, section 5(4) is not limited only to persons who made extraordinary profits and to a substantial extent evaded payment of taxation on income, but applies to all persons who may have evaded payment of taxation on income, irrespective of whether the evaded profits are substantial or insubstantial. That being the true scope of section 5(4), it deals with the same class of persons who fall within the ambit of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and are dealt with in sub-section (1) of section 34. The income of such persons could also be taxed under proceedings under that section. Inasmuch as proceedings under the Act XXX of 1947 were more onerous, and persons belonging to the same class could on the sweet will of the Investigation Commission be treated under section 5(4), although they could also be proceeded against under the provisions of section 34 of the Income-tax Act, this was a clear case of discrimination. The validity of section 5(1) of the Act XXX of 1947 was not decided in this case.
Gauhati High Court Cites 141 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Maula Bux And Etc. vs State Of West Bengal And Others Etc. on 19 January, 1990

In this connection a reference may be made to a Special Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in S. M. Nawab Ariff v. Corporation of Calcutta (supra) relating to recovery of consolidated rates under Ss.237, 245 and 251 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. In the aforesaid sections two modes of recovery of tax, one by distraint and another by suit, was enacted and no classification was indicated of defaulters and as such discrimination was inherent in the Statute. Their Lordships held by majority decision that the Act of 1951 has not laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Municipal Authorities, namely, the Commissioner and the Corporation, in the matter of selection or classification of defaulter in deciding whether any particular defaulter should be proceeded against by way of suit under S. 251 or by the other modes under Ss. 237 and 245 and thus the discrimination was inherent in the Act itself. Their Lordships further obsered that where out of the two different iaws to which the same person or same class of persons are subjected one law is more burdensome than the other, the law which is burdensome would be struck down as discriminatory and void.
Calcutta High Court Cites 69 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Commissioners Of Basirhat ... vs Anukul Chandra Das And Ors. on 20 March, 1973

6. The impugned distress was issued on March 7, 1958 and goods were attached, seized and ultimately sold on April 19, 1958 when the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 as amended by 1955 Amendment Act was in force. On the principle of the decision Ariff's case (SB) the provisions for recovery of dues of the Municipality by suit at the discretion of the Commissioners instead of proceeding by distress or certificate as contained in Section 162 (2) of the Act must be considered as discriminatory being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The distress, attachment, seizure and sale impugned in the suit must therefore be held unconstitutional and void. I however refrain from declaring Section 162 (2) of the Act brought in by 1955 amendment, ultra vires and void, as by 1961 Amendment Act the said provision is no longer in the statute since October 13, 1961.
Calcutta High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Tangail Textiles Ltd. vs The Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 17 February, 1964

In support of this argument Mr. Chatterjee has relied on the Special Bench decision of this Court in S.M. Nawab Ariff v. The Corporation of Calcutta, reported in 64 Cal WN 1: (ATR 1960 Cal 159 SB). In that case by a majority of 2 to 1 the Bench decided that the procedure of distraint as provided under Section 237 of the. Calcutta Municipal Act was more onerous than the alternative procedure by way of suit under Section 251 thereof and therefore the law as laid down in Section 237 of the Calcutta Municipal Act being more discriminatory was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and so, void under Article 13 of the Constitution. There the competition was between the procedure of distraint and the procedure by suit. It is at once to be noticed that the distraint there was entirely summary procedure and it was carried out by the Corporation Administration itself without going through any independent agencies, a! point which would here be relevant later on for distinction.
Calcutta High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Manindra Bhusan Sanyal vs State Of West Bengal on 11 September, 1975

8. The first case relied on by Mr. Das was the case of S.M. Nawab Ariff v. Corporation of Calcutta (SB), a decision of a Special Bench of this Court, where the Special Bench by a majority decision struck down Section 237 of the Calcutta Municipal Act on the ground of being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the Act did not make any reasonable classification 'between the cases where the consolidated rates could be recovered by the Corporation of Calcutta by the use of distress warrant in accordance with the provisions of Section 237 and the cases where the procedure by way of suit under Section 251 was to be followed. No guideline was laid down in the Act for resorting to the alternative mode for recovery of consolidated rates. So also in the instant case, according to Mr. Das, no guideline has been laid down for fixation of rates. Such fixation would be based on caprice of the Rent Controller and was bound to be discriminatory and thus would contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. The impugned provisions are also bad according to Mr. Das, on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power upon the Rent Controller. The impugned provisions in the instant case have conferred, according to Mr. Das, uncontrolled and uncanalised power on the Officer concerned.
Calcutta High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Karnani Properties Ltd. vs The Corporation Of Calcutta And Ors. on 30 April, 1973

In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of S. M. Nawab Ariff v. The Corporation of Calcutta, . It is true that Section 200 gives certain discretion to the Commissioner of the Corporation of Calcutta. The section grants an additional power of realisation. But the scope of the discretion, in my opinion, is circumscribed by the conditions mentioned in Section 200 itself, namely, either land or building must be occupied by more than one person holding in severally, or it must be valued at less than five hundred rupees. If either of these conditions are fulfilled and unless the occupiers voluntarily pay then shares of the consolidated rate to the Corporation, the Commissioner, in my opinion, is bound to take resort for the purpose of speedy realisation to Section 200 of the Act. If either of these conditions are not fulfilled and if the occupiers do not voluntarily pay their shares, then and under those circumstances, in my opinion, the Commissioner has no discretion but has to take resort to Section 200. Reading the section in the aforesaid light I find not the conferment of any unguided or arbitrary power to the Commissioner but an additional power to facilitate the speedy realisation of the dues of the Corporation. In the aforesaid view of the matter it is not possible to accept the argument that the aforesaid section violates the rights of the petitioner.
Calcutta High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 2 - S Mukharji - Full Document

The Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Ors vs M/S. Neelambar Finvest P.Ltd on 16 March, 2009

In this regard we fully rely on the majority decision of the Special Bench in the case of S.N. Nawab Arif (supra). We thus hold that the subject provision must have appropriate guidelines to prevent misuse and to avoid any violation of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Hence, two options are before us; either to strike down the impugned provision and thus affirming the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge to the extent that it did not have any appropriate guideline or to read down the said provision by giving appropriate guideline to maintain harmony and to avoid misuse. 15.7. The doctrine of "Reading down" was interpreted by the Apex Court in the earlier precedents discussed above.
Calcutta High Court Cites 53 - Cited by 0 - A K Banerjee - Full Document

Alka Ceramics vs Gujarat State Financial Corporation ... on 27 December, 1989

In the case of S. M. Nawab Ariff v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1960 Cal 159, it was held that where out of two different laws to which the same person or same class of person is subjected, one law is more burdensome than the other, the law which is burdensome will be struck down as discriminatory law. In para 10, the Calcutta High Court found that no principle or policy or guidance was laid down.
Gujarat High Court Cites 74 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
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