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Documents citing Sundram Chetti And Ors. And Ponnusami ... vs The Queen on 9 January, 1883

Muthuswami Servaigaran And Anr. vs Thangammal Ayiyar on 11 October, 1929

6. In the Code of 1872 Section 518 corresponds to Section 144 of the present Code and Section 520 states that orders made under Section 518 are not judicial proceedings. This latter section was obviously the result of the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court already referred to. Under the Code of 1872 we have two decisions upon this point, namely, E.V. Ramanuja Jeeyarswami v. Ramanuja Jeeyar (1881) I.L.R. 3 M. 354, a decision of Innes and Muthuswami Aiyar, JJ., in which it was held that proceedings under Section 518 of that Code are not revisable by the Courts as such orders were expressly declared in that Code to be not judicial proceedings and Sundram v. The Queen., Ponnuswami v. The Queen (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 203 (F.B.), where at page 222 Sir Charles Turner stated:
Madras High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Mahomed Hanif Sahib And Ors. vs Anagappa Mudali And Ors. on 7 March, 1916

Great stress is laid on this, both in setting out the facts at the commencement of the judgment and in applying the previous rulings in Muthialu Chetty v. Bapun Sahib 2 M. 140 and Sundram Chetti v. Queen and Ponnusami Chetti v. Queen 6 M. 203 : 2 Weir 77. It is not necessary for us in the present connection to interpret the words of Section 296, Indian Penal Code. In disposing of a charge under that Section which might arise out of this dispute in future, the existence of a declaration such as has been prayed for is doubtless only one of several factors which might have to be considered in deciding the guilt or innocence of the accused. But we are clear that there is no conflict between such a declaration and the section quoted; and no reason why on this score the declaration should be refused.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sudalaimuthu Chettiar And Ors. vs Enan Samban on 30 September, 1915

In the case of Sadagopa Chariar v. Rama Rao 26 M. 376, Davies and Benson, JJ., held following the case of Sundram v. Queen and Ponnusami v. Queen 6 M. 203 : 2 Weir 77 that "every member of the public, and every sect, has a right to use the public streets in a lawful manner, and it lies on those who would restrain him in its exercise to show sonic law or custom having the force of law depriving him of the privilege" (page 384). This decision was confirmed by the.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Agni Kumar Das vs Mantazaddin And Anr. on 13 July, 1928

106. If, however, the aforesaid meaning be not attributed to the word "dispute," necessity arises to consider the second question. In dealing with this question one has to look at it in its several aspects. Firstly, the object of the proceedings will have to be borne in mind, namely, to prevent a breach of the peace by making a temporary or tentative order which is to be in operation so long only as the rights of the parties are not decided by a competent Court and the rightful party is not put in possession by eviction, if necessary, of the wrongful one (Section 145) or a decision has been passed as to who is the person entitled to possession (Section 146.). The criminal Court thus exercises only a limited jurisdiction, the limits of which must be co-extensive with the exigencies of the object it seeks to attain. As Turner, C.J. put it in his decision in the Full Bench case of Sundaram Chetti v. The Queen [1882] 6 Mad. 203, which was a case under Section 518, Act 10, 1872 (=Section 144 of the present Code):
Calcutta High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

In Re: The Matter Of Nagendra Nath ... vs Unknown on 1 October, 1923

17. We have not been informed as to what happened to the petitioner between the 5th August and the 16th August and whether there was or was not strict compliance with the provisions of Section 61. It is also not clear that the scheme of the Code with regard to remands was kept in view. The power of remand under Section 167 is given to detain prisoners in custody while the police make the investigation, and in a proper case, to commence the inquiry. But the custody mentioned in Section 344 is quite different and is intended for prisoners. Section 167 gives the Magistrate discretion (recording his reasons) to remand, from time to time, but limits the period for the exercise of the discretion to fifteen days in all. Section 170, Criminal Procedure Code, authorises the police officer, if there is evidence or reasonable ground for suspicion, to forward the accused to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of an offence on police report. Then, under Section 344, an application might be made for cause shown as specified there to the proper Magistrate to postpone the commencement of the enquiry and remand the prisoner. The intention of the Legislature, having regard to Sections 61 and 167 and to the requirements of justice generally, is that an accused person should be brought before a Magistrate competent to try, or commit with as little delay as possible: Ponnusami v. Queen (1882) I.L.R. 6 Mad.
Calcutta High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Nagendra Nath Chakrabarthi vs King-Emperor on 1 October, 1923

12. We have not been informed as to what happened to the petitioner between the 5th August and the 16th August and whether there was or was not strict compliance with the provisions of Section 61. It is also not clear that the scheme of the Code with regard to remands was kept in view. The power of remand under Section 167 is given to detain prisoners in custody while the Police make the investigation and, in a proper case, to commence the inquiry. But the custody mentioned in Section 344 is quite different and is intended for under-trial prisoners. Section 167 gives the Magistrate discretion (recording his reasons) to remand, from time to time, but limits the period for the exercise of the discretion to fifteen days in all. Section 170, Criminal Procedure Code, authorises the police officer, if there is evidence or reasonable ground for suspicion, to forward the accused to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of an offence on police report. Then, under Section 344, an application might be made for cause shown as specified there to the proper Magistrate to postpone the commencement of the enquiry and remand the prisoner. The intention of the Legislature, having regard to Sections 61 and 167 and to the requirements of justice generally, is that an accused person should be brought before a Magistrate competent to try, or commit with as little delay as possible : Ponnusami v. Queen [1882] 6 Mad.
Calcutta High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 100 - Full Document

Mandakinee Debee vs Basantakumaree Dabee on 7 March, 1933

Their Lordships were dealing with a suit for damages for preventing the plaintiffs from conducting a religious procession along a highway and for a permanent injunction against the defendants, but it seems clear that the same rule is applicable to all cases of obstruction of a highway and, just as in that case and certain Madras cases referred to by their Lordships, Parthasaradi Ayyangar v. Chinnakrishna Ayyangar (1982) 5 Mad 304, Sundram Chetti v. the Queen (1883) 6 Mad 203 (FB) and Sadagopachariar v. A. Rama Rao (1902) 26 Mad 376, it was held that no special damage, other than the obstruction of the procession, was needed, so here I would hold that no special damage is required further than the plaintiff's inability to carry large articles into her house owing to the obstruction. It is however urged for the respondent, that the learned Judge's finding that this is a public passage is contrary to the pleadings, inasmuch as though, at the end of her plaint, the plaintiff prays to be allowed to conduct the suit On behalf of the public, she says the public have no right of egress and ingress over this passage. According to the learned Judge, the plaintiff has all along alleged that it is a public road and the case has proceeded throughout on this basis. It seems that the plaintiff was not sure whether it could be called a public road and pleaded alternatively that, whether it was public or private, her rights had been infringed. The learned Judge definitely finds that it has been claimed by the plaintiff to be and is part of a public road. In these circumstances, I think the finding that it is a public road should be accepted.
Calcutta High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Ram Manohar Lohia And Ors. vs V.S. Sundaram on 26 April, 1955

But the Magistrates should bear in mind that every citizen has a right to ventilate his grievances either in the public or in private and ask for redress, and this right cannot be curtailed so long as it is exercised in a lawful manner; and it is illegal assumption of power to issue an order under Section 144, Criminal P. C. on a pretended apprehension of danger of the breach of public peace: vide 'Francis Duke Coleridge Summer v. Jogendra Kumar' AIR 1933 Cal 348 (B); 'Abdul v. Lucky Narain Mundul', 5 Cal 132 (C); Tlafizuddin v. C. Laborde' AIR 1928 All 14 (D) and 'Sunda-ram Chetti v. The Queen', 6 Mad 203 (FB) (E).
Gauhati High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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