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Voltas Ltd. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 7 February, 2001

In the decision in Union of India and Ors. v. Hindustan Development Corporation and Ors., 1993(1) SCC 467, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the justification for different rates for big and small manufacturer in awarding Government contracts for manufacturers and supply of cast steel bodies to Railways. In the fixation of price and allocation of quota, dual pricing policy was adopted by Railways to break monopoly of big manufacturers and to encourage small manufacturers to become viable for open competition. Identical tender offers were quoted by there big manufacturers. Post tender offers were also made by them uniformally quoting a lower price. Railways considered such price to be an unreasonable price for smaller manufacturers and entertained a suspicion that the big manufacturers had formed a cartel for securing larger quantities and creating a monopoly. Accordingly, Railways gave counter offers at the quoted lower rate to the big manufacturers and at a higher rate to the smaller manufacturers. The Supreme Court held that the big manufacturers must be deemed to be in a position to supply at the lower rate quoted by them and thus they formed a distinct category and, therefore, the different price fixed was not discriminatory. Even though there was not enough material to establish formation of cartel by the big manufacturers, suspicion in that regard entertained by the Railways, including the Minister, was not per se malicious or actuated by extraneous considerations. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in directing that all the manufacturers should supply at the same lower price. Tender Committee was, therefore, directed to fix a reasonable price for smaller manufacture considering the data given in support of the lower offer, percentage of profits available to all manufacturers, and other relevant aspects. But, the Supreme Court held that reduction in allotment of quota of bogies for big manufactures by the Minister, accepting the suggestion regarding formation of cartel, in absence of firm foundation therefore was not justified and directed that the Minister for Railways, being the final authority, may take decision in future in the allotment of quota on objective basis. According to the Supreme Court, the Government is also expected to be just and fair in allotment of quotas for smaller manufacturers. At the present stage, the three big manufacturers should be allocated the quantities as per the recommendation of the Tender Committee and the quantities finally allotted by competent authority to small manufacturers need not be disturbed, the Apex Court said. Finally, the Honourable Supreme Court directed that the Railways are entitled to exercise 30% option, if not already exercised, and the time to complete supply was also extended.
Gujarat High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - P Majmudar - Full Document

Poovizhi vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu on 8 February, 2002

13. There are plethora of precedents elucidating principles of doctrine of legitimate expectation. We feel it not necessary to refer all such decisions. Suffice it to mention some judgments of the Supreme Court, which are closer to the point and which, in fact, have surveyed all the previous judgments. Judgments on the topic of 'legitimate expectation' dealt with by the Supreme Court in NAVJYOTI COO-GROUP HOUSING SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA (AIR 1993 S.C. 155), UNION OF INDIA v. HINDUSTAN DEVELOPMENT CORPN. (1993) 3 S.C.C. 499, M.P. OIL EXTRACTION v. STATE OF M.P. (AIR 1998 S.C. 145), NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPN. V. S. RAGHUNATHAN (1998) 7 S.C.C. 66 and PUNJAB COMMUNICATIONS LTD v. UNION OF INDIA (1999) 4 S.C.C. 727, unanimously hold the view that the principle of legitimate expectation consists of two parts, i.e. (1) substantive and (2) procedural and it was held that a case of substantive legitimate expectation would arise when a Government or an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of Indian Constitution, by representation or by past practice, arouse expectation, which it would be within its powers to fulfil and the Court can interfere when the decision taken by the authority is arbitrary, unreasonable or not taken in public interest. The further requirement is that the representee should suffer detriment acting upon such representation. Yet another legal principle evolved by the above judgments of the Supreme Court is that the doctrine of legitimate expectation as in the case of audi altrem partem, cannot be put into straightjacket formula and that each case has to be weighed on its facts as to whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation is fit to be invoked or not.
Madras High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 8 - Full Document
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