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Otters Club, Mumbai vs Dit (E), Mumbai on 15 June, 2018
Shri K.Srikanth, Chennai vs Acit, Chennai on 19 May, 2020
10. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view
that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring
pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact
that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of
90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in
force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time
limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence
in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law
being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is
required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in
consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic
approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster
Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the
functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of
Otters Club Vs DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble Bombay High
Court did not approve an order being passed by the Tribunal beyond a
period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble Bombay High
Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed
"while calculating the time for disposal of matters made timebound by this
ITA No.307/Chny/2010 &
ITA Nos.1015 & 1016/Chny/2012 &
ITA No.1324/Chny/2012
:- 23 -:
Diversey India Hygiene Pvt ... vs Asst Cit 11 (2)(1), Mumbai on 27 May, 2020
14. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than
taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days,
disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute
the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force.
We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement
of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social
ITA No. 7292/Mum/2019
Assessment year: 2015-16
Page 9 of 9
order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is
required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the
letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified
under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the
functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT
[(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being
passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble
Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed "while
calculating the time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which
the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand
extended accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon'ble jurisdictional High
Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated
as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our
considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above analysis of the
legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of
time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the
exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with
respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the
present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches
to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time
when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized,
but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts
of this case.
Ito 22(2)(4), Mumbai vs Newtech (India0 Developers, Mumbai on 27 May, 2020
10. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than
taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days,
disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should
compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown
was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for
the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a
pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of
pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so
assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also
a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management
Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery
system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club v. DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)],
Hon'ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being passed by the Tribunal
beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble Bombay High Court
itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed "while calculating the
time for disposal of matters made time- bound by this Court, the period for which the order
dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended
accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon'ble jurisdictional High
Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be
treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force.
In our considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above
analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded
for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963.
Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in
rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly
comes into play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar
ITA No. 3251/Mum/2018
Assessment year: 2009-10
Page 11 of 11
on the discretion of the benches to refix the matters for clarifications because of
considerable time lag between the point of time when the hearing is concluded and the
point of time when the order thereon is being finalized, but then, in our considered view,
no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts of this case.
Mott Macdonald P.Ltd, Mumbai vs Dcit Cir 2(2), Mumbai on 27 May, 2020
Ashapura Minechem Ltd, Mumbai vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, ... on 27 May, 2020
Hamon Shriram Cottrell Pvt. Ltd., ... vs Dcit - 9(2), Mumbai on 27 May, 2020
24. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than
taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days,
disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute
the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force.
We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement
of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social
order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is
required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the
letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified
under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the
functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT
[(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being
passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble
Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed "while
calculating the time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which
the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand
ITA Nos. 3911/Mum/15, 1882/Mum/14 and 4771/Mum/16
Assessment year: 2007-08, 2009-10, 2010-11
Page 12 of 12
extended accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon'ble jurisdictional High
Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated
as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our
considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above analysis of the
legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of
time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the
exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with
respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the
present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches
to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time
when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized,
but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts
of this case.
Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax ... vs Tata Industries Limited, Mumbai on 27 May, 2020
Delmas (Uk) Limited, Mumbai vs Ddit (It)-4(2), Mumbai on 27 May, 2020
14. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than
taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days,
disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute
the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force.
We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement
of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social
order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is
required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the
ITA Nos. 2496/Mum/2009, 8423/Mum/2010
Assessment years: 2005-06 and 2007-08
Page 8 of 9
letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified
under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the
functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT
[(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being
passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble
Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed "while
calculating the time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period
for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time
shall stand extended accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon'ble
jurisdictional High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown
cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in
force. In our considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above
analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for
the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed
thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule
34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into
play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion
of the benches to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between
the point of time when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon
is being finalized, but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried
out on the facts of this case.
Lionbridge Technologies P. Ltd, Navi ... vs Asst Cit 15(2)(1), Mumbai on 27 May, 2020
was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at
least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor
ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the
pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is
a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the
basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The
interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and
spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster,
notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented
disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in
the case of Otters Club Vs DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble
Bombay High Court did not approve an order being passed by the Tribunal
beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble Bombay
High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that
directed "while calculating the time for disposal of matters made time-
bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March
2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended
accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon'ble
jurisdictional High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this
period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the
normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without
the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above analysis of the legal position,
the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of
time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed
thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent
in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety
days, clearly comes into play in the present case.