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Tata Motors Limited And Another vs State Of West Bengal And Others on 28 September, 2011

Thereafter, he argued that the power to acquire was not an incident of any other power. It was wholly exercise of powers under list III entry 42. List II entry 18 did not cover acquisition of land. The power of the legislature to acquire land was not an incident of any other power. He cited the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 564 and Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and others - v - State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (1980) 4 SCC 136.
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 117 - Cited by 5 - I P Mukerji - Full Document

Somasundaram Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd,. ... vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu ... on 30 January, 1999

"6. Even though in the writ petition the principle challenge to the Act was on the ground that neither the State Legislature nor the Governor of the State had legislative competence to promulgate the Act and the Ordinance inasmuch as the appropriate entry for the enactment of such an ordinance or Act was Entry 52 of List I of the 7th Schedule, but this contention, at the time of arguments, was not raised by Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner presumably because in cases of similar enactments such a contention had been rejected by this Court in the case of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, ; State of Nagaland and others, to mention only two. It was however, submitted by Shri Sanghi that there was no existing public purpose for which the acquisition could have been made. It was contended that the object of the Act is clearly reflected in the preamble which shows that the undertaking was being acquired with a view to secure its proper management. In as much as the management of the undertaking had already been taken over by the Central Government, under the order passed under Section 18AA of the I.D.R. Act, Shri Sanghi submitted that the reason for securing proper management did not exist and, therefore, the Act could not have been passed.

I.T.C. Limited vs Agricultural Produce Market Committee ... on 24 January, 2002

On examining different provisions of the two Acts the Court also held that there consists direct conflict between the two Acts and that conflict could be avoided only if it is held that the Market Act being a general Act covering all types of the agricultural produce and the Sugar Cane Act, which also deals with an agricultural produce like sugar, being a special enactment laying down an independent exclusive machinery for regulating sale, purchase and storage of such a commodity under a special Act, then the special Act would prevail over the general Act for that commodity and by necessary implication will take the said commodity out of the sweep of the general Act.This decision, in our considered opinion is not an authority for the proposition that the expression 'industry' in Entry 52 of List I should be given a restricted meaning, as contended by Mr. Dwivedi. In that case also the extreme contention that there exists possibility of issuance of control order by the Central Government would denude the State Legislature of its authority to make a law in respect of any matter coming under any of the Entries in List II was not accepted. But at the same time it is difficult for us to construe the aforesaid decision of having laid down a ratio that in dealing with a Central Legislation in relation to a controlled industry, the control of which has been taken over by a declaration made by law, enacted by Parliament would not clothe the Central Legislature to make any law other than production or manufacture of the industry in question. Belsund Sugar (supra) by no stretch of imagination can be construed to have even remotely held that the word 'industry' ought to receive a restricted meaning.The said decision, therefore does not support the contention of Mr. Dwivedi, appearing for the State of Bihar as well as for the State of Karnataka.
Supreme Court of India Cites 131 - Cited by 218 - Full Document

Mrs. Elizabeth Samuel Aaron vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 23 March, 1983

18. The scope and effect of a declaration by the Parliament that it is necessary to take over a particular topic of legislation was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1982 SC 697 with reference to the provisions of Entry 54 List I of the Seventh Schedule, the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, and the Madhya Pradesh Municipal enactment relating to property tax. It was held that the declaration by the Parliament contained in Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, which was envisaged by Entry 54 of List I, was to regulate and control the development of mining industry and not for any other purpose; and in relation to any other matter, excepting regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent provided, the State legislature is competent to legislate subject to its powers under the relevant entries in the State List or the Concurrent List. Almost the same question was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 1955, wherein it was held that the power to acquire a particular industry, which was the subject matter of the State legislation, was totally different from the power to regulate and develop the industry as enjoined by Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule read with the declaration of the Parliament contained in Section 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 65 of 1951. The State enactment was justified in a separate but concurring judgment by Pathak and Kaushal, JJ., who held that the enactment was justifiable even under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. In AIR 1976 SC 1654, the Supreme Court had to consider the enactment of the State of Hariyana relating to saltpetre works. The contention raised was that the entirety of the mining industry and minerals having been taken over by the Parliament by virtue of the declaration contained in Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act as enjoined by Entry 54, there was no legislative power in the State in respect of this matter. This contention was repelled by stating that the State enactment and the Central enactment operated in different fields. It was held that the intention of the declaration which was envisaged by Entry 54 List I of the Seventh Schedule was only regulation and development of mines and minerals and not expropriation of private rights in lands where mineral deposit are situate. It was also held that the erosion of the power of the State in relation to fields which are covered by declarations envisaged by legislative entries in List I are only to the extent to which such erosion is necessary and justified by the width and amplitude of the legislative entry, meaning thereby that there is no denudation otherwise of the powers of the State Legislature in relation to the subject matter of the legislative entry. In view of these decisions, we are not persuaded to hold that once a declaration is made under Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, referable to Entry 54 of List I, the State Legislature is deprived of all its powers to legislate in respect of any matter affecting mines and minerals.
Kerala High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 6 - V Khalid - Full Document

Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited vs The Union Of India on 30 June, 2017

III. Whether, the State Government has exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing, selling, distributing, etc. of alcohols including industrial alcohol? In this connection, the extent, scope and ambit of such right or privilege has also to be examined. None of these questions covers the aspects raised before us. Therefore, we hold that the decision in Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. (supra) case does not overrule impliedly or otherwise the decision in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Milk (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (supra) case. The argument that at any rate the takeover of distillery is bad cannot also be sustained in as much as the concept of acquisition of an undertaking is an entirely different matter from the control and regulation of the industries.

K.K. Poonacha vs State Of Karnataka & Ors on 7 September, 2010

In Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. (supra), the Constitution Bench considered the provisions contained in U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 and held that power to legislate for acquisition of property is an independent and separate power and is exercisable under Entry 42 of List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three Lists. This power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of acquisition of property remains intact and untrammelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of an industry by a declaration as envisaged in Entry 52 of List I, a further power of acquisition is taken over by a specific 47 legislation. In our view, this judgment has no bearing on the interpretation of the 1976 Act which, as mentioned above, was enacted for the development of the city of Bangalore and the area adjacent thereto and it contains incidental provisions in Sections 35 and 36 for acquisition of land.
Supreme Court of India Cites 65 - Cited by 3 - G S Singhvi - Full Document
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