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Documents citing Virsa Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 11 March, 1958

Shamshuddin S/O. Hazisab Savanur vs The State Of Karnataka on 24 September, 2025

"...that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application ofSections 299 and 300 of the Code is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses of the said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of sections 299 and 300 of the Code and the drawing support from the decisions of the court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818) and Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, (AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509) speaking for the court, Justice RS Sarkaria, neatly brought out the points of distinction between the two offences, which have been time and again reiterated. Having done so, the court said that wherever the Court is confronted with the question whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, on the facts of a case, it would be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the ftrst stage would be that the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Two, if such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to culpable homicide as deftned in section 299. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the First or Second part of Section 304, depending respectively, on whether this second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive but the cases come within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable
Karnataka High Court Cites 59 - Cited by 0 - S R Kumar - Full Document

CRL.A(J)/32/2023 on 19 May, 2026

The Division Bench also further held that the decision in Virsa Singh case [Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] has throughout been followed as laying down the guiding principles. In both these cases it is clearly laid down that the prosecution must prove [1] that the body injury is present, [2] that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, [3] that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury, that is to say it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. In other words clause Thirdly consists of two parts. The first part is that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and the second part that the said injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Under the first part the prosecution has to prove from the given facts and circumstances that the intention of the accused was to cause that particular injury. Whereas under the second part whether it was sufficient to cause death, is an objective enquiry and it is a matter of inference or deduction from the particulars of the injury. The language of clause Thirdly Page No. 22/27 of Section 300 speaks of intention at two places and in each the sequence is to be established by the prosecution before the case can fall in that clause. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the circumstances, such as the weapon used, the ferocity of attack, multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances. The framers of the Code designedly used the words 'intention' and 'knowledge' and it is accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. But that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue. As compared to 'knowledge', 'intention' requires something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely, the purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end.
Gauhati High Court - Itanagar Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

(Against The Judgment Of Conviction And ... vs The State Of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) on 20 December, 2025

7. ... These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down in Virsa Singh case [Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465], for the applicability of clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law.‟ The Division Bench also further held that the decision in Virsa Singh case [Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465] has throughout been followed as laying down the guiding principles. In both these cases it is clearly laid down that the prosecution must prove (1) that the body injury is present, (2) that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, (3) that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury, that is to say it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. In other words clause Thirdly consists of two parts. The first part is that there was an intention to inflict 19 ( 2025:JHHC:38753-DB ) the injury that is found to be present and the second part that the said injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Under the first part the prosecution has to prove from the given facts and circumstances that the intention of the accused was to cause that particular injury. Whereas under the second part whether it was sufficient to cause death, is an objective enquiry and it is a matter of inference or deduction from the particulars of the injury. The language of clause Thirdly of Section 300 speaks of intention at two places and in each the sequence is to be established by the prosecution before the case can fall in that clause. The „intention‟ and „knowledge‟ of the accused are subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the circumstances, such as the weapon used, the ferocity of attack, multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances. The framers of the Code designedly used the words „intention‟ and „knowledge‟ and it is accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. But that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue. As compared to „knowledge‟, „intention‟ requires something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely, the purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end."
Jharkhand High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - S N Prasad - Full Document

Rambhai Manubhai Gohil vs State Of ... on 3 February, 2016

The court also held, after viewing the case in light of the principles enunciated in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) that for the purpose of proving that the case falls under clause "thirdly" to section 300 of the IPC, the prosecution must establish objectively that the bodily injury is present. It was also held that the prosecution must also prove the nature of the injury as also the intention to inflict that particular injury i.e. to say that the injury was not accidental or unintentional or that some other injury was intended.
Gujarat High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - H Devani - Full Document
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