Mr. Basu then cited the judgment in the case of
Bijoy Bhai vs. Nabneet Bhai reported in 2004 SCC
(Criminal) 2032 wherein Their Lordships held "the delay
in questioning these witnesses by the investigating
officer is a serious mistake on the part of the
prosecution. We do not think that the High Court erred
in disbelieving these witnesses". It may be pointed out
that Their Lordships were considering an appeal from an
order of acquittal. From paragraph 5 of the judgment it
would appear that the evidence of the P.Ws.4 to 7 failed
to disclose any cogent reason as to why was the deceased
pulled out of his house and was killed near a Babul tree
when the accused were already armed. This mystery left
by the prosecution probablised the case of the defence
that the deceased who had an affair with a woman must
have been killed by some other assaillants near the
Babul tree. What had added further suspicion to the case
of the prosecution was the evidence of the P.W.11 who
gave a graphic picture of the assault by the accused in
Court whereas in his examination under section 161
Cr.P.C. he had stated that he came to the scene of
occurrence after the incident had already happened.
Therefore it was a case of inherent weakness of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution based on which the
High Court had acquitted the accused and the Apex Court
did not interfere. It is not correct to say that the
order of acquittal was recorded merely because there was
delay of two days in examining the witness as urged by
Mr. Basu.
8. It further appears that before 14.11.1994, there
used to be a time limit for filing the claim petitions
but then the High Court of Gujarat had taken the view in
Mer Ramdas Bejanand Bhai vs. Harshad Bhai Mala Bhai, 1992
(1) ACC 717, that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
was applicable in the case of an application for
compensation filed before a claims Tribunal. The fact
that the appellant lost her young son; she was widow; she
had no source of livelihood; and she belongs to a remote
area of Punjab etc., are several amongst the factors
which ex facia would constitute a sufficient cause within
the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone
the delay, if any, that would have occurred had the
3
appellant filed a claim petition prior to 1994. These are
all arguable issues. All that we have observed is that
the Courts ought to have looked into these facts and then
determined whether the appellant made out a case for
condonation of delay before 1994 and if she was able to
explain the delay between 1992 to 1994, could her claim
petition be dismissed for want of limitation when the
Legislature removed the impediment of limitation for
filing claim petition before the Tribunal w.e.f.
14.11.1994.