every person entitled to collect the rents of the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of any transfer from the owner,
and I think the grant in inam must be regarded as such a transfer. A certain difficulty may arise, where, as in the present case, the grant was of both varams: this I shall consider later. But where the grant is only of the melvaram, I do not see how a Court can refuse to treat it as a transfer by the owner of the right to collect the rent of the portion of the estate to which it relates: and whatever may have been the intention of the Legislature we have to deal with the Act as it left their hands. This is the view taken in a series of cases before this Court, starting with Appalanarasimhulu v. Sanyasi (1915) I.L.R., 38 Mad., 33. The difficulty referred to by the learned Chief Justice as regards the definition of rent is dealt with by Sundara Ayyar, J., in that case: and I entirely agree with his view. The rent which the inamdar is entitled to collect by virtue of his inam grant is identical with the rent which was lawfully payable to the zamindar before the grant, and with all respect to the view of my Lord the Chief Justice, I think the significance sought to be placed on the words 'in his estate' in the definition of 'rent' is misplaced.
In Appalanarasimhulu v. Sanyasi (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 33, Sundara Ayyar and Sadasiva Ayyar, JJ., held that a Darmila inamdar was a landholder within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the instates Land Act, though the mam may not be an estate under Section 3(2). It appears from the judgment that what was granted as inam in that case was only a portion of the melvaram right and not the kudivaram as well. The learned Judges observe at page 35:
6. The suit lands admittedly, but for the grant in Inam, would fall within Clause (a) of Section 3(2) of the Act. As regards the definition of the " land-holder" it may be conceded at once that so long as the Zemindar reserves to himself a quit-rent, the Inamdar cannot be regarded as the owner of the lands in the ordinary legal meaning of the term. But the definition of the land-holder includes " every person entitled to collect the rents of the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of any transfer from the owner," and I think the grant in Inam must-be regarded as such a transfer. A certain difficulty may arise, where as in the present case, the grant was of both varams: this I shall consider later. But where the grant is only of the melvaram, I do not see how a Court can refuse to treat it as a transfer by the owner of the right to collect the rent of the whole or any portion of the estate to which it relates: and whatever may have been the intention of the Legislature we have to deal with the Act as it left their hands. This is the view\taken in a series of cases before this Court starting with Appalanarasimhulu v. Sanyasi (1913) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 33. The difficulty referred to by the learned Chief Justice as regards the definition of rent is dealt with by Sundara Iyer, J. in that case: and I entirely agree with his view. The rent which the Inamdar is entitled to collect by virtue of his Inam grant is identical with the rent which was lawfully payable to the Zemindar before the grant and with all respect to the view of ray Lord the Chief Justice, 1 think the significance sought to be placed on the words "in his estate" in the definition of rent is misplaced.
2. That document clearly alienates in perpetuity 125 rupees of the annual melvaram income in favour of the grantee under it and that grantee had thereafter, not to pay the 300 rupees which was "the rent legally due upon it" (see definition of ryot in Section 3, Clause 15 of the Estates Land Act) but had to pay only the favourable kattubadi cist of Us. 175. Being the owner of a part of the melvaram right in the lands which formed part of the estate ryoti lands, he became owner of part of the estate, though the part owned by him did not itself come under the definition of "Estate" in Section 3, Clause (2). The ratio of the decisions in Suryanarayana v. Ballayya Civil Revision Petition No. 895of 1910, Nukanna v. Sanyasi Naidu Second Appeal No. 168 of 1912, Appalanarasimhulu v. Sanyasi (1915) I L.R., 38 Mad., 33; S.C. 17 I.C., 120, Brundavanachandra Horischandra Raja v. Ramayya (1914) 26 M.L.J., 600 and Tungala Mallanna v. (Gottumukkala Ramaraju (1914) 23 I.C., 531, is that a person may not be the owner of an "Estate" owing to the lands of which he is the owner not coming under the definition of the word "Estate" but he may yet be a "landholder" within the definition of Section 3, Clause (5), as owning the melvaram in a portion of an estate.
1. The only question that arises in these appeals is whether a usufructuary mortgagee of a post-settlement inam is a landholder within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. There is abundant authority in support of an affirmative answer (vide Appalanarasimhulu v. Sanyasi(1912) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 33.
1. The plaintiff is the holder of an inam of 65 cents, in a ryotwari (or ayan village) of Seevaramperi, belonging to Government. The defendant is his tenant and the suit is for rent. An inamdar, by which I mean the owner of an inam, excluded from the scope of the permanent settlement (and either enfranchised by the Inam Commissioner or not but not the so-called 'darimila inam,' can be governed by the Estates Land Act, only if it is a whole village, and even then only if the conditions of Section 3(2)(d) are satisfied, as to which the onus is on the parson who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. In the present case we have not a case of a whole village. The case in Appalanarasimhulu v. Sanyasi (1915) 38 Mad. 33 related to a subsequent inam, i.e., land granted by a zamindar after the settlement, (a grant before the settlement provided it was included in the assets of the zamindari, stands on the same footing). It did not relate to a case of enfranchised or enfranchisable inam.