In the decision reported in Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu, , the Supreme Court has observed as follows (at page 1079); "It is well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, rights of the parties are decided according to law, as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. A plain reading of the impugned Act would shows that there was nothing of this kind which expressly or by necessary intendment affects pending actions. There is no non-obstante clause in these Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. these Amending Acts were published in the Government Gazette of December 23, 1957, and will, therefore, be deemed to have come into force from that date only. They could, therefore, be construed as having prospective operation only. In the Amending Act 20 of 1960, also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned. It will, therefore, be deemed to have commenced on June 23, 1960, which is the date on which it was published in the Government Gazette."
He cited the judgment in K.C. Dora v. C. Annamanaidu, , the observations of V.R. Krishna Iyer, JJ., in paragraph 75 where the learned Judge has quoted with approval the observations of justice Cardozo, who in turn quotes Wheeler, J., in Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn 74, 99 to say, "If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors".
39. The Respondent Corporation submits that the impugned amendment
represents a valid exercise of legislative power to enact retrospective fiscal
legislation, particularly for the purpose of curing defects which had
rendered the earlier statutory regime unenforceable. It is well settled that
the Legislature is competent to enact laws with retrospective effect,
including validating statutes, provided the basis of the judicial declaration
of invalidity is removed by an appropriate statutory cure. Learned Senior
Counsel submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently
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recognised the power of the Legislature to neutralise the foundation of2026:CHC-OS:99
a
judicial decision through retrospective legislation. In the present case, the
amendment expressly addresses the deficiencies noted in the earlier
judgment and, therefore, satisfies the constitutional parameters of a valid
validating enactment. Reliance in this regard is placed on Rai
Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar, reported as 1963 SCC OnLine SC 31,
Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, reported as (2014) 4
SCC 583, and Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu,
reported as (1974) 1 SCC 563.
Now, if you take a look at Section 393 of the said Act, you will find that
drainage development fee may be levied by the corporation. Section 602 of
the said Act empowers the corporation to make regulations not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the rules made there under
for discharging its functions under the said Act. Therefore, the corporation
could impose the drainage development fee by regulation. It does appear
from the application made by the appellant corporation styled as one for
"appropriate order" filed on 21st November, 2013 that the Mayor-in-Council
on 10th July, 2010 duly made its recommendation for imposition of the
drainage development fees including imposition with retrospective effect.
In those circumstances, the intention of the appellant Corporation to undo
the effects of the Asian leather judgment is explicit in their resolution of
24th July, 2010. The circular dated 17th August, 2010 levying drainage fee
with effect from 10th July, 1999 followed the mandate of the resolution.
Therefore, to equally this case with Katikara Chintamoni Dora Vs.
Guntreddi reported in (1974) 1SCC 567 and Madan Mohan Pathak Vs.
Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1978 SC 803 is plainly wrong. In
these cases, the Supreme Court held that there was no express intention
manifest by the legislature to undo the judgment in question. In this case,
such an intention is manifest.
In these circumstances, when the rulings on which the learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance in Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu (supra) is looked into, perusal of paragraph 62 therein shows that the bar to file an appeal against a consent decree in Sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code is based on the broad principle of estoppel. The said sub-section presupposes that the parties to an action can, expressly or by implication, waive or forego their right of appeal by any lawful agreement or compromise, or even by conduct.
9. As far as the application bearing the CM No. 31554/2021 filed
by the appellants seeking recall of Consent Order dated August 30,
2018 is concerned, Mr. V.R. Singh stated the same has been filed after
a delay of three years without any application seeking condonation of
delay that too on an assumption that Sunder Nagar is going to be
excluded from the Luytens Bungalow Zone („LBZ‟, for short) which
would then entail in an increase in the Floor Area Ratio („FAR‟ for
short) which would ultimately result in the respondent getting more
rights of construction. It is the case of Mr. V.R. Singh that as per
Section 96(3) of the CPC, no appeal shall lie from a decree that has
been passed by the Court with the consent of parties. He has referred to
Signature Not VerifiedDigitally Signed By:ASHEESHKUMAR YADAV RFA 554/2018 Page 13 of 45Signing Date:01.06.202210:50:40
the judgment Kartikara Chintamani Dora vs. Guntreddi
Annamainaidu, (1974) 1 SCC 567, to emphasise that the parties can
expressly or by implication waive / forgo their right of appeal by any
lawful agreement or compromise and, therefore, the principle of
estoppel underlying Section 96(3) CPC would come into force and the
decree in terms of the agreement would become final and binding on
the parties. He stated that the application moved by the appellant
against the consent order dated August 30, 2018 is barred as the said
order was passed with the consent of both parties, who at that time did
not object to any of the terms and agreed to the said settlement through
their own volition.
Learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon another judgement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 1069 (Katikara Chintamani Dora and others v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu and others). The relevant portion of paragraph no. 55 which the learned counsel relied upon is being reproduced here as under :-