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Documents citing Sardha Ram And Kanhya Lal vs Abdul Majid Mohd. Amir Khan And Ors. on 1 September, 1959

Sant Ram And Ors. vs Labh Singh And Anr. on 28 August, 1961

The conflict between the two decisions was, however, later resolved by another large Full Bench decision of that Court, in Sardha Ram v. Abdul Majid Mohd. Amir Khan, AIR 1960 Punj 196, where all learned Judges held unanimously that the provisions of the Punjab Preemption Act 1913 including those granting the right of pre-emption on the ground of vicinage continued to be valid and had not become ultra vires under the Constitution.
Allahabad High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Sheo Kumar Dubey vs Smt. Sudama Devi And Anr. on 13 November, 1961

He urged that when this right attaches to the land and the purchaser takes it subject to that incident, there is no violation of Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution, inasmuch as the right to hold and dispose of properties is in no way circumscribed. Reliance was placed upon the Full Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah, ILR 7 All 775, the Nagpur High Court in Ramchandra v. Janardan, AIR 1955 Nag 225 (FB) and the Bombay High Court in Dash-rathlal v. Bai Dhondubai, AIR 1941 Bom 262 and also upon the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Sardha Ram v. Haji Abdul, AIR 1960 Punj 196 (FB) and the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhimrao v. Patilbua Ramkrishan, AIR 1960 Bom 552. These decisions support his contention and have laid down that the customary law of pre-emption is valid and constitutional. We are thus confronted with conflicting decisions of the different High Courts, and the solution of the question, in my opinion. entirely depends upon the nature of the right of pre-emption under the Mahomedan law.
Patna High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 4 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Nazar (Nazir) Singh vs Munshi Singh on 1 December, 1969

10. Nor does the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1923 All 250 (corresponding to 71 Ind. Cas 1034) help in the decision of the issue before me. The compromise pre-emption decree in that case directed that the money had to be paid or tendered to the vendee, and it was only on the refusal of the vendee to accept it that it was to be deposited in Court within thirty days. It was found on facts that the decree-holder had never tendered the money to the vendee out of Court, but that he deposited it straightway in Court within the period of thiry days. The trial Court, the first appellate Court, as well as the High Court held that the deposit in the Court, in the above said circumstances, was not a sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree. The High Court further found that the vendee made an application to the Court that the decree-holder was present with the money and should be required to pay it; that the Court Officer called for the decree-holder, but he was not to be found and on the same day the decree-holder, instead of paying the money to the vendee, deposited it in Court. That appears to be a case in which the pre-emptor showed deliberate disregard to the terms of the decree. No right to reap the fruits of the decree by depositing the money in Court could accrue to the pre-emptor in that case without the amount being first endeared to the vendee. No such thing has happened in this case.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Bhau Ram vs B. Baijnath Singh on 7 March, 1962

Later the High Court held in Sardha Ram v. Haji Abdul Majid Mohd. Amir Khan (2) by a five-Judge Bench that the provisions contained in clause "sixthly" of s. 16 were not ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution inasmuch as the restrictions imposed were not unreasonable. The appellant thereupon came to this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court challenging the view of the High Court that the first, third and fourth grounds were Constitutional. Further, in view of the five- Judge decision in 1960 which has shaken the view taken in the judgment under appeal on the sixth ground,%, the appellant has urged that that decision is correct. It may be noted that under s. 7 of the Punjab Act, is. 16 only applies to a town sub-division of a town when a custom of pre-emption is proved to have been in existence in such town or subdivision at the time of the commencement of the Act and not otherwise. It is not disputed that s. 16 applies to that area of old Delhi in which the property is situate. The fact however that such a custom was prevalent in this area before 1913 when the Punjab Act came into force is not a decisive factor in holding that the provisions of s. 16 of the Punjab Act are necessarily reasonable. We have already dealt with this aspect of the matter when dealing with the Rewa Act, and need not add anything more. We have also dealt with the question as to the right of pre-emption based on vicinage when dealing with the Rewa Act, and for the reasons given earlier we hold that pre-emption based on vicinage is an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold, acquire or dispose of property conferred by Art. 19 (1) (f). We may however briefly notice the grounds on which the two Punjab cases of 1954 and (1) A.I.R. 1954 Pun. 55.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 20 - K N Wanchoo - Full Document
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