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In Re: Colaba Land And Mills Co. Ltd. vs M. Deshpande And Anr. on 31 January, 1970

43. As already stated in the above discussion in connection with these contentions, there are extremely relevant observations in the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Governor-General in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. and of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. India Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. There are also relevant observations in the case of Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay. We, however, find it unnecessary to discuss these decisions and to arrive at any finding as regards these rival contentions, in view of the fact that we have accepted the above second contention made on behalf of the appellants.
Bombay High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

In Re: Colaba Land And Mills Co. Ltd., ... vs V.S. Kondaskar on 28 September, 1967

44. As already stated in the above discussion in connection with these contentions, there are extremely relevant observations in the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Governor-General in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. There are also relevant observations in the case of Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay. We, however, find it unnecessary to discuss these decisions and to arrive at any finding as regards these rival contentions in view of the fact we have accepted the above second contention made on behalf of the appellants.
Bombay High Court Cites 43 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Janda Rubber Works Ltd. vs Income-Tax Officer, Salaries Section ... on 29 December, 1949

Mr. Sikri drew our attention to Clause 29 of the Letters Patent which refers to "any final judgment, decree or orders in order made in exercise of original jurisdiction" and that orders in company matters do not differ in substance from decrees in suits as is clear from Section 199 of the Companies Act, which provides that all orders made by a Court under that Act may be enforced in the same manner in which decrees of such Court made in any suit pending therein may be enforced. He relies on Governor-General in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd., where it was held that 226 applies to the jurisdiction conferred on the Allahabad High Court by the Companies Act. In that case the company prior to its being wound up carried on business in Basti district of the United Provinces. It went into liquidation on 17th April, 1942, and for the assessment year 1941-42 notice of demand was made on the 10th March, 1943. On 13th March, 1943, the Official Liquidator asked the Income-tax Officer to make a claim, but the latter sent a demand notice and took proceedings under Section 46 of the Income-tax Act and the Official Liquidator made an application under Sections 171, 228 and 232 of the Companies Act and the Allahabad High Court restrained the Income-tax Officer and the Collector from proceeding further, but left the Income-tax Officer free to make an application under Section 171 of the Companies Act, with leave to proceed with such recovery, and an appeal was taken against that order to the Federal Court, and in appeal one of the objections taken was that the original jurisdiction mentioned in Section 226 referred to the original jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court and to the ordinary original jurisdiction exercised by the High Court at Madras, Calcutta and Bombay as successors of that Court, but none of the other High Courts exercised original jurisdiction as contemplated by Section 226. This contention was overruled and it was held that the Court did exercise original jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 226. It was observed by Spens, C.J. :-
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 69 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Income-Tax Officer vs Official Liquidator, Swaraj Motors ... on 22 November, 1978

8. Unlike that section, Section 220(2), which is involved in the present appeal, occurs in Chap. XVII of that Act, which deals with collection and recovery of tax. So, the provisions of Section 446 of the Companies Act would be attracted to the demand for interest under Section 220(2) of the I.T. Act, and the decision of the Federal Court in Governor-General in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. [1946] 14 ITR 248; 16 Comp Cas 71, would apply to a case like that involved in the present appeal.
Kerala High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Life Insurance Corporation Of India vs Asia Udyog (P.) Ltd. And Others on 16 April, 1981

The argument of Mr. Gupta, counsel for the LIC, that only proceedings before the ordinary courts are covered by s. 446 of the Companies Act stands negatived by the decisions in Governor-General in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills Ltd. [1946] 16 Comp Case 71; 14 ITR 248 (FC) and Colaba's Case [1972] 42 Comp Case 168; 83 ITR 685. It is not, therefore, correct to say that if any proceedings are to take place before other than ordinary courts the same will be immune from the rigour of s. 446 of the Companies Act. It is no doubt true that in view of these decisions it is possible that a part of the proceedings may be outside the purview of s. 446 of the Companies Act like the assessment proceedings under the I.T. Act, but still proceedings for recovery of tax would fall within s. 446 of the Companies Act. At first blush it may seem that this dichotomy shows an unsatisfactory state of affairs and such an interpretation should be avoided. Now it is true that if the interpretation inevitably leads to such an oddity it will be no reason not to give full effect to the statute if that is its plain meaning. But, as it is, we do not find that there is any anomaly in the situation. The reason is that the legislature intended that the assets of the company in liquidation should be dealt with at one place by the company judge, who would, on an overall view of the matter, be in the best position to distribute the funds of the companies equitably so that there is no unseemly scramble of the various creditors to realise their dues from the company. For this purpose, in cases like the proceedings under the I.T. Act and some other analogous Acts, the proceedings for determination of the rights and liabilities of the companies and the other persons may have to be determined initially by authorities which have been specially created under the specific statute; this is because the proceedings are such which are not normally appropriate for determination by ordinary courts. It is for this reason that such like proceedings for example income-tax, sales tax, excise, etc., may in the first instance have to be decided by the authorities under the special Acts. As the said matters cannot be determined in the first instance by the winding-up court, it is self evident that there is no need to obtain prior leave to proceed before the said authorities. However, when the time comes for realisation of dues from the company in liquidation the court dealing with the winding-up comes into the picture and prior leave will have to be obtained for starting proceedings for recovery. The test, therefore, according to us is whether the proceedings are such which can normally and appropriately be the subject matter of decision of ordinary courts. If they are not, leave need not be obtained excepting of course, when recovery is to be made against the funds of the company. However, in matters in which proceedings even though before a different forum than the ordinary courts, are contemplated like under the Act of 1971 or even under the Rent Control Act, these proceedings, which are for recovery of possession or for recovery of damages, are normally and appropriately such which can be determined by the winding up courts. It is evident that but for the creation of a separate forum the present proceedings are of such a nature which would ordinarily be dealt with by the ordinary courts of law. In such a case leave will have to be obtained even initiate proceedings against the company.

Allahabad Bank vs Canara Bank & Another on 10 April, 2000

other rulings of Supreme Court and High Courts cited by counsel: It was then argued for the respondents that the proceedings before the Tribunal/Recovery Officer under the RDB Act, 1993 are `legal proceedings' and could be stayed under section 537 read with section 442 and reliance was placed on the decision of the Federal Court in Governor General in Council Vs. Shirmani Sugar Mills Ltd. ( AIR (33) 1946 FC 16). In our view, this judgment cannot help the respondents. In the above case the Income Tax Officer tried to demand income tax from the Company through a certificate got issued by the Collector and the demand was sent to the official liquidator. The official liquidator filed an application under Section 171 of the Old Act (corresponding to Section 446(1) of the 1956 Act) and obtained stay and required a direction from the Company Court that the Income Tax Officer should seek leave under Section 232(1)(a) ( corresponding to section 537 of the 1956 Act). It was held that the limited priority extended to Crown debts was not sufficient to enable the Income Tax Officer to avoid the provisions of the Companies Act and that the Crown was bound by the provisions of the Companies Act.
Supreme Court of India Cites 81 - Cited by 627 - M J Rao - Full Document

Ali Ahmed vs The Collector Of Bombay on 14 April, 1949

In Governor General v. Shiromani Sugar Mills , a notice of demand in respect of income-tax due from a company was served upon the official liquidators after the company had gone into liquidation. The official liquidators pointed out to the Income-tax Department that the proper procedure was to lodge a claim in respect of arrears of tax alleged to be due from the company. Instead of adopting that procedure the Income-tax Department decided to take action under Section 46, Income-tax Act and a certificate asking the Collector to recover the amount as an arrear of land revenue was sent to the Collector of Allahabad under Sub-section (2) of this section. An application was then made by the Liquidators to the High Court praying that the Income-tax Officer should be directed to put in a formal claim to the official liquidators in respect of the amount of income-tax and for an order restraining the Collector from recovering the amount as an arrear of land revenue. It was contended before the High Court that it had no jurisdiction to interfere by injunction or otherwise in view of Section 226, Government of India Act. The Allahabad High Court did not accept this view, and ordered that the proceedings before the Collector should not be proceeded with without leave of the Court. In appeal the Federal Court set aside the High Court's order, and held that Section 226 deprived the High Court of its jurisdiction in the matter. Spens C. J. in his judgment at pp. 491-492 observed as follows:
Bombay High Court Cites 35 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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