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R.L. Narasimhan (Deceased By Lrs.) vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr. on 29 October, 1985

To similar effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Hosiery Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, . There also it has been pointed out that although a taxing statute can be challenged on the ground of infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution, in deciding whether the law challenged is discriminatory, it has to be borne in mind that in matters of taxation the Legislature possesses the largest freedom in the matter of classification and wide discretion can be exercised in selecting person or objects which will be taxed and the statute is not open to attack on the mere ground that it taxes some persons or objects and not others. The Supreme Court has also further pointed out that when within the range of the selection the law operates unequally and cannot be justified on the basis of a valid classification, then, there would be a violation of Art. 14. Thus, on a consideration of the well marked distinction between the wet lands and dry lands justifying their classification as two distinct or different entities and applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, it follows that no objection can be taken-to the exclusion of wet lands alone from the scope of urban land as opposed to dry lands, though both kinds of land would fall under the description of agricultural lands.
Madras High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

R.L. Narasimhan (Deceased) And Ors. ... vs The State Of Tamil Nadu, Reptd. By The ... on 29 October, 1985

To similar effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Hosiery Mills (P) Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. (1970) 26 S.T.C. 341 : (1971) 1 S.C.J. 481. There also it has been pointed out that although a taxing statute can be challenged on the ground of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, in deciding whether the law challenged is discriminatory, it has to be borne in mind that in matters of taxation the Legislature possesses the largest freedom in the matter of classification and wide discretion can be exercised in selecting persons or objects which will be taxed and the statute is not open to attack on the mere ground that it taxes some persons or objects and not others. The Supreme Court has also further pointed out that when within the range of the selection the law operates unequally and cannot be justified on the basis of a valid classification, then, there Would be a violation of Article 14. Thus, on a consideration of the well marked distinction between the wet lands and dry lands justifying their classification as two distinct or different entities and applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, it follows that no objection can be taken to the exclusion of wet lands alone from the scope of urban land as opposed to dry lands, though both kinds of land would fall under the description of "agricultural lands". The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the observations in the decision of the Supreme Court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair etc. v. State of Kerala and Anr. does not in any manner advance the case of the petitioners. It is seen therefrom that inequality resulting from the properties of the same class similarly situated being subjected to an incidence of taxation is objectionable as creating an inequality amongst the holders of the same kind of property. Wet and dry lands, though comprised in agricultural lands, cannot be stated to be the same class of property. Besides, there is no question of any inequality arising from the incidence of taxation with reference to the same class of property similarly situated, being held by different persons in this case. As noticed earlier, those who held the wet lands are treated alike by excluding such holdings from the definition of "Urban Land" under the Act. But ail dry lands are included. There is no differential treatment meted out to owners of wet lands in that all of them alike are taken out of the provisions of the Act and all dry lands are covered by the Act without exception.
Madras High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

True Chem Pharma (P) Ltd. vs Collector Of Central Ex. on 10 April, 1991

"The counsel for the petitioners advances a third argument saying that if the interpretation of the respondents is accepted, then the notification would not violate Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. Here again, the counter affidavit, in answer to the above contention, says that the petitioners' fundamental rights to carry on business are in no way hampered by the impugned notification. On the other hand, the petitioners are at liberty to do business and discharge their statutory liabilities. While examining the argument of the counsel for the petitioners with reference to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to note the purpose of the impugned notification. The counter-affidavit in this respect refers to a genuine small unit for the purpose of allowing exemption. According to the respondents, the exemption is based on the economic policy of the Union of India to give relief only to the genuine small manufacturers. Reference is also invited to Jaipur Mills v. Raj AIR 1971 SC 1330 where the following observations are found: -
Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Manager, Atlanta Infrastructure Ltd. vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 20 November, 2006

17. I have carefully examined the ratio of the judgment in O.N. Ganguly cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner. Apart from the distinction pointed out by the Division Bench of this Court in Jaipur Spinning & Weaving Mills (supra) it should be noticed that that was a case where the issue involved was one pertaining to cancellation or super-session of the reference made and not of the modification or correction. The said case is therefore distinguishable on facts and it ratio cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. Besides that, in para No. 10 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken categorical note of Section 10(5) of the Act and has observed as under:
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - M Rafiq - Full Document

Darshan Hosiery Works vs Union Of India on 11 April, 1980

The Allahabad High Court in that decision has also referred to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Jaipur Hosiery Mills v. State of Rajasthan, (1967) 19 Sales Tax cases 416. The Rajasthan High Court has in that decision held that "hosiery" means machine-knitted garments. 12. We are, therefore, not impressed by the arguments which Mr. Vakil has raised before us. We are of the opinion that "Banians" and "Jangias" which are "articles of hosiery" are statutorily exempted from payment of excise duty under Item 22D and, therefore, do not attract any provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and we declare accordingly.
Gujarat High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 24 - Full Document
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