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Documents citing Jai Kishan Srivastava vs Income-Tax Officer, Kanpur And Anr. on 15 May, 1959

Smt. Nirmala Nigam, Kanpur vs Income Tax Officer-3(5), Kanpur on 22 February, 2019

22. A similar provision, namely, Section 34(1A)(ii) existed under the Income Tax Act, 1922. A full Bench of this Court in Jai Kishan Srivastava v. ITO [1960] 40 ITR 222 (All) held that non-recording of the reason by the Assessing Officer that the escaped income was likely to be Rs.1 lakh or more was fatal to the issuance of the notice for reassessment.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Lucknow Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Income Tax Officer, Ward-Dimapur, ... vs M/S. Parsuram Sanwarmal Agarwalla & ... on 25 February, 2021

A similar provision, namely, Section 34(1A)(ii) existed under the Income Tax Act, 1922. A Full Bench of this Court in Jai Kishan Srivastava Vs. Income-Tax Officer, Kanpur and another, 40 ITR 222 held that non-recording of the reason by the Assessing Officer that the escaped income was likely to be Rs.1 lac or more was fatal to the issuance of the notice for reassessment.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Gauhati Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Raj Kumar Chawla And Ors. vs Income Tax Officer on 31 January, 2005

The interpretation by learned counsel for the petitioner that the procedure applicable to proceedings for assessment or reassessment of recomputation under Section 34(1)(a) of the Act would be that laid down in Section 23 of the Act is undoubtedly correct. Under Section 34(1)(a) of the Act, the ITO is firstly authorized to serve a notice, in the circumstances mentioned therein, on the assessee or the principal officer of the company, if the assessee is a company, which notice may contain all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 22 and upon the service of such a notice, the ITO is authorized to take proceedings for assessment, or reassessment or recomputation. Then comes the direction that the provisions of the Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under Sub-sec (2) of Section 22 of the Act, This section thus contains a fiction of law which has been introduced for the purpose of making the procedure laid down in Section 23 of the Act applicable to the proceedings for assessment, reassessment or recomputation taken by the ITO in pursuance of a notice issued under Section 34(1)(a). The fiction of law is introduced by using the words 'as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section'. Clearly the effect of this fiction of law is that, even though a notice under Section 34(1)(a) is different from a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act, the ITO, in taking proceedings for assessment, reassessment or recomputation has to comply with the provisions of the Act which apply when he takes proceedings for assessment in pursuance of a notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Act."
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Delhi Cites 92 - Cited by 58 - Full Document

Mathurdas Govinddas vs G.N. Gadgil, Income-Tax Officer, ... on 19 December, 1963

14. Mr. I. M. Nanavati also cited a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jai Kishan Srivastava v. Income-tax Officer. In that case the vires of sub-section (1A) was challenged on the ground that it was discriminatory and violated the constitutional guarantee contained in article 14 of the Constitution. The validity of the sub-section was however upheld by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court and Bhargava J., in the course of his judgment, made the following observations in regard to the scope and purpose of the sub-section :
Gujarat High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Ram Kumar Agarwalla & Bros. (P.) Ltd. on 7 August, 1978

(a) Jai Kishan Srivastava v. ITO [1960] 40 ITR 222 (A11) [FB]. In this case, the Allahabad High Court construed Sections 34(1)(a) and 34(1 A) of the Act of 1922. Section 34(1)(a) provided that in a notice thereunder all or any of the requirements of a notice under Section 22(2) might be included and that the provisions of the Act would apply accordingly, as if the notice was a notice under Section 22(2). But Section 34(1A) only provided that a notice thereunder might include all or any of the requirements of a notice under Section 22(2) whereupon the ITO could proceed to assess or reassess the income and all the provisions of the Act would apply accordingly. Section 34(1A) did not expressly provide that a notice thereunder would be deemed to be a notice under Section 22(2). The High Court held that proceedings under Section 34(1A) would be governed by the other provisions of the Act of 1922 in the same manner as a proceeding under Section 34(1)(a) and the provisions of Sections 23, 31, 33, 37 and 66 would all apply in proceedings under Section 34(1A),
Calcutta High Court Cites 69 - Cited by 32 - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Sundaram Spinning Mills And Ors. on 23 April, 1996

(i) In Jai Kishan Srivastava vs. ITO (1960) 40 ITR 222 (All) (FB) : TC 51R. 2062, it has been held that in respect of proceedings for assessment or reassessment under s. 34(1A) of the IT Act (1922), the procedure laid down in s. 23 as well as the provisions of ss. 31,33,37 and 66 were applicable, that a proceeding for assessment or reassessment of income, profits or gains under s. 34(1A) was, therefore, governed in the matter of procedure and in the matter of appeals and references to the High Court by the same provisions which governed a proceedings for assessment or reassessment under s. 34(1) and s. 34(1A) was not discriminatory as compared with s. 34(1) and did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
Madras High Court Cites 58 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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