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Devaki Amma Mookambi Amma vs Meenakshy Amma Vijayama And Anr. on 23 June, 1989

These last words are of capital importance, because, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Batty in Tarubai v. Venkatrao (1903 ILR 27 Bom 43), they express the well-known rule which is conveyed in the maxim contra non valentem agere non currit prcscriptio, that is to say prescription does not run against a man during the time when he is not entitled to immediate possession."
Kerala High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shukar Hanan Mutawali And Ors. vs Malkappa And Ors. on 20 December, 1979

12. A reference was made in Tarubai's case (supra) to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Chinto v. Janki ((1894) ILR 18 Bom 51) where Telang, J. had observed that possession would not be adverse to the mortgagor because he was not entitled to immediate possession; i. e. to say that if the plaintiff-mortgagor was not entitled to immediate possession then the defendant's act in taking possession would not infringe any right of the plaintiffs to possession and would not be adverse to the plaintiff. Referring to those observations, it was observed in the case of Tarubai that if the ouster of the mortgagee were such as to operate as a Virtual dispossession' of the mortgagor, the mortgagor would be entitled to claim immediate possession.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Maramittath Theruvil Moothachettiam ... vs Kuttiyil Machikandy Chekkara Cheppan ... on 10 November, 1936

It was held that from 1908 the trespasser was holding adversely not merely to the mortgagee who had a right to possession but to the mortgagor also, because he was ousting the mortgagor by erecting the buildings on the property, which only the mortgagor had a right to do. A passage from the judgment of Batty, J. in Tarubai v. Venkatrao (1903) 27 Bom 43 at p. 68, was approved as setting out the law on the question as to how far possession by a trespasser could be held to be adverse to the mortgagor when the mortgagor had no right to possession.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Marimittath Theruvil Moothachettiam ... vs Kuitiyil Machikandy Chekkara Chappan ... on 10 November, 1936

It was held that from 1908 the trespasser was holding adversely not merely to the mortgagee, who had a right to possession, but to the mortgagor also, because he was ousting the mortgagor by erecting the buildings on the property, which only the mortgagor had a right to do. A passage from the judgment of Batty, J., in Tarubai v. Venkatrao 27 B 43, at p. 68, was approved as setting out the law on the question as to how far possession by a trespasser could be held to be adverse to the mortgagor when the mortgagor had no right to possession. It is No doubt as long as the mortgagee is in possession, he and all those claiming under him represent the mortgagor's possession. If the mortgagee in possession is dispossessed on grounds affecting only his right, as, for instance, his right as heir to represent the original mortgagee, or his right to possession in spite of a third party's lien on the property, then the dispossession of the mortgagee obviously does not imperil or call in question any right of the mortgagor, and the mortgagor is not concerned or entitled to insist on being immediately restored to possession; and the possession taken is not adverse to him and cannot cause time to run against him. To give the mortgagor a right to insist on immediate possession, there must be an unequivocal ouster preventing the possession of the mortgagor from continuing altogether, by leaving no room for doubt that the person taking possession does not profess to represent the mortgagor, but to hold in spite of him. In such a case the mortgagor is as effectually and unmistakeably displaced as if there had been no mortgagor at all. When an ouster takes place in that manner the mortgagor knows that no one is in possession who can represent or continue his possession, or who is entitled preferentially to possession, and, therefore, he becomes entitled (and it is necessary and his duty, if he does not want his right to be barred) to possession immediately.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Malkappa Dod Chanbasapagowda vs Mudkappa Basappa Mudigavdar on 1 August, 1912

6. I am of the same opinion. It seems to me to be impossible to hold that the plaintiffs can be prejudiced by reason of the fact that a deed of sale was executed behind their back by their agent, the first defendant, in favour of a stranger, the second defendant. In spite of this deed of sale, there was no transfer of possession, but possession remained, as uptil then it had always been, with the first defendant who is the agent of the plaintiffs in that behalf. There was nothing in these circumstances to put the plaintiffs on notice that any change of possession had occurred, or that their title was in any way imperiled. As was said by Mr. Justice Batty in Tarubai v. Venkatrao (1902) I. L. R. 27 Bom. 43, 61, to constitute an adverse possession against the real owner possession must be in some way or other ostensibly adverse. In this case the possession remained ostensibly that which it had always been, with the result that the purchaser's possession was not adverse to the plaintiffs.
Bombay High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Malkarjun Mahadev Belure vs Amrita Tukaram Dambare on 27 February, 1918

These last words are of capital importance, because, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Batty in Tarubai v. Venkatrao (1902) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 43, 51 : 4 Bom. L.R. 721 they express the well-known rule which is conveyed in the maxim contra non valentem agere non currit prescriptio, that is to say, prescription does not run against a man during the time when he is not entitled to immediate possession.
Bombay High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Velayutham Pillai vs Subbaroya Pillai And Ors. on 23 September, 1915

In Tarubai v. Venkatrao 27 B. 43 : 4 Bom. L.R. 721, Batty, J., says: "in the second, when there has been no such ouster as to give notice of the adverse nature of the possession, it is incumbent on the person alleging that the title set up against him is barred by twelve years' adverse possession, to show, not only that his possession has lasted for twelve years, but that it has all the time been in open conflict with the title on which the plaintiff relies. The result is, as above indicated, if there has been no ouster or open and notorious act of taking possession', then the person relying on his possession to defeat title must show that it was of such a nature, and involved the exercise of rights so irreconcilable with those claimable by the plaintiff, as to give the plaintiff occasion to dispute that possession (or, in other words, that it was such as to give a cause of action or right to sue for possession) throughout the twelve years next preceding the suit.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
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