1. Revisionist has knocked the door of this court
assailing the order dated 26.03.2011 passed by the
Ld. ACMM in Complaint Case no. 28/J/09 titled
Inder Singh Vs. Sunder Lal & ors. Whereby his
complaint was dismissed by Ld. ACMM considering
the testimonies of CW. He had assailed the order
passed by the Ld. ACMM stating that the order
passed by the Ld. ACMM is against the law, facts and
CR No. 61/11 Page No. 1Inder Singh Vs. State
circumstances of the case and violating the
principles of natural justice. The order passed by the
Ld. Trial Court is based on surmises and conjectures.
Trial Court has failed to appreciate that all the
witnesses of the petitioner have supported and
corroborated and allegations of the petitioner. Trial
Court has failed to appreciate that he has to confine
himself while passing the order upon the evidence of
the complaint and the documents filed by the
complainant and other factors should not be kept in
mind while dealing with the complaint case. He
submits that record of Trial Court be summoned and
the order passed by the Trial Court dated
26.03.2011 be set aside and the Trial Court be
directed to summon the accused.
In other words, if the decision will finally
dispose of the matter in dispute, it is final whereas if the decision will
CR No.79/2018Inder Singh Vs. State Page 7 of 8
allow the action to go on, then it is not final but interlocutory.
Apparently this peculiar attitude was taken by the prosecution because of the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in H.N. Rishbud and another v. State of Delhi (supra). In that case the Magistrate had refused to quash the charge sheet only on the ground that investigation has continued beyond a period of six months. The learned Judge, however, held that if the investigation is not complete within six months and the Magistrate has not given his permission and the prosecution has also not approached the Sessions Court then the only option for the police is to submit a report under Section 169 or 173 Criminal Procedure Code . on the basis of investigation made within a period of six months. In that case the Magistrate can either drop the proceedings if no defense is made out or take cognizance if he is satisfied that there is a case that should go for trial. But if the police does not seek such permission to continue the investigation the Magistrate cannot take cognizance on a report submitted by such an investigation because this is no irregularity but an illegality which is not curable under section 460 or 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code . With respect we are unable to agree. The learned Judge makes a distinction between an irregularity and invalid investigation and the former only being curable under the Criminal Procedure Code .
11. An argument was also raised that strictly speaking Section 167(5) Cr.P.C. may not be applicable because that Section talks of investigation being concluded within a period of six months but does not limit the time as to when the report is to be filed with the Magistrate and the mere fact that a report is filed beyond six months from the date of arrest of the accused does not mean necessarily that the investigation has continued beyond a period of six months. The argument was that Section 173 itself provides that as soon as investigation is completed the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of offence, a report in the form prescribed in the section and this itself would show that the calculation of the period of six months is to be done not from the date the report has been received by the Magistrate but earlier when the opinion has been formed by the Magistrate that there are reasonable grounds and sufficient evidence to take cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate. It is argued by Mr. Lao, that the period of six months must be counted from the date of the arrest of the accused to the date of formation of opinion by the investigating officer. We do not think it necessary in these cases to decide this aspect and we shall proceed on the basis that the period of investigation continues right up to the date when the report is filed before the Magistrate. But what is important to emphasis is that the mere fact of investigation having continued beyond a period of six months without the permission of the Magistrate does not automatically nullify the continuance of the trial. The only result in that case is that the Magistrate will only look into the material which had been collected within a period of six month and will ignore the other material and then decide whether to take cognizance or not. So the question of prejudice being occasioned would not arise because cognizance would be on the basis of investigation which had been conducted legally and within the time permitted. The trial court in ignoring this aspect has patently committed an illegality.
79. Upon a careful perusal of the judgment in the
case of H.N.Rishbud and another v. State of
Delhi (supra) as well as the judgment in the
case of Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa
(supra), we find that this submission of the
learned Additional Public Prosecutor is not
correct. It cannot be said that in the later
judgment the principles of law enunciated by the
Supreme Court in H.N.Rishbud have been diluted
or watered down to any extent. H.N.Rishbud has
been decided by three Honourable Judges of the
Supreme Court whereas Satish Narayan Sawant is
rendered by two Honourable Judges. The very
composition of the Bench strength militates
against such an argument. On perusal of the
Satish Narayan Sawant judgment, it is obvious
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that the later judgment by two Honourable Judges
has not diluted or watered down the principle
laid down in the earlier judgment rendered by
three Honourable Judges of the Apex Court. The
judgment in H.N.Rishbud was cited and taken
into consideration in Satish Narayan Sawant.
However, on the facts of that particular case in
Satish Narayan Sawant, the Supreme Court
stated that it is not said in the judgment of
H.N.Rishbud that if the Police Officer takes
merely one or two steps indicated by it what he
has done must necessarily be regarded as
investigation. In Satish Narayan Sawant, it was
clear from the evidence on record that PW21
received information regarding the death of the
deceased without any details showing how the
incident had happened or who had caused the
occurrence. This aspect emerges from Paragraph
23 of the judgment. It is in this context that
the Apex Court observed that if a Police Officer
takes only one or two steps as indicated it
cannot necessarily be regarded as an
investigation. However, in the present case,
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the full details of the incident had been
revealed in the "Yaadi" at Ex.40 by PW3 Shriram
Dhondiba. The "Yaadi" discloses the date, time,
name and age of the deceased as well as the
place where the incident took place. It
describes the injury stating that the injured is
in a serious condition and has been admitted to
the Hospital. Pursuant to this "Yaadi" PW12
arrived at the Hospital and went to the
deceased. He has stated that the deceased could
not speak and as his near relatives were not
present he could not record the statement. It is
then that he discovered that the respondent was
also admitted to the same Hospital and went to
him and took his statement. Though PW12 has
made a conscious effort in his testimony to
create an impression that when he went to the
Hospital the deceased had already been shifted
to Ahmedabad but his own endorsement on the
`Yaadi' exposes his falsehood and demolishes the
improvements made by him in his testimony. The
endorsement on the Yaadi further falsifies the
version of PW1 who states that he met his son
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while he was being lifted out from the rickshaw
and taken into the Hospital on a stretcher.
Thereupon the Apex Court went on quoting the relevant observations made in H.N. Rishbud's case and two judgments of Privy Council. That was a case where the initial investigation was conducted by a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Gwalior, and thereafter by an Inspector, SPE, who was stated to have been duly authorized by the Superintendent of Police, SPE, under his orders issued under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After the investigation, sanction was obtained and the charge-sheet was filed. Exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, the Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed the investigation and the consequent proceedings on the ground that for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(e) of the said Act, the investigation had not been conducted by an authorized officer in terms of Section 17 of the said Act. However, the Supreme Court ultimately set aside that order".
40. The learned Amicus Curiae submitted that
the expression "cognizance" cannot be construed as
encompassing the stage of investigation under the
scheme of the P.C Act and the Cr.P.C. The learned
Amicus Curiae also submitted that if the expression
"cognizance" is construed as encompassing the stage
of investigation, the non-compliance with the
mandatory safeguard extended by the P.C Act at the
stage of investigation would necessarily vitiate
the trial. The learned Amicus Curiae, referring to
the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in
H.N.Rishbud and Another v. State of Delhi 104, State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali 105 and A.R.
Anthulay v R.S. Nayak106, submitted that non-
compliance with the mandatory safeguard extended by
104 AIR 1955 SC 196
105 AIR 1959 SC 707
106 (1984) 2 SCC 500
Crl.M.C. NO. 4677 of 2022
45
the PC Act, would not vitiate the stage of
cognizance and trial.
13. Before dropping the curtains by writing the operative portion
of this order infra, this Court deems it appropriate to make it clear that
learned Advocate General very fairly submitted that as regards powers of
this Court to transfer the case to CBI, there can be no doubt or debate but
the submission is, in the light of catena of case laws and plethora of legal
principles laid down in the long line of authorities starting from Rishbud
case in 1954, the case on hand is one that does not warrant transfer much
less transfer on the ground that DVAC lacks jurisdiction and only CBI
can investigate owing to Assistant Director of ED being a Central
Government Officer. As regards the Assistant Director of ED (Mr.Ankit
Tiwari) and or any other person or entity who may be subjected to
investigation/further investigation or proceeded against, as they are not
before this Court in the PIL at hand, we make it clear that all their rights
and contentions including malafides contention are preserved qua FIR in
Crime No.6 of 2023 on the file of DVAC Wing, Dindigul District for an
alleged offence under Section 7(a) of PC Act. In other words, to put it
differently this order will neither impede nor serve as an impetus (except
saying that powers of DVAC are neither curtailed nor denuded qua
proceedings under PC Act against Central Government officials) as
regards Assistant Director of ED, ED and or anyone else who may be
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Page No.38 of 45 W.P(MD)No.30029 of 2023
proceeded against by DVAC pursuant to said FIR.
An illegality committed in the
course of an investigation does not affect the
competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and
where cognisance of the case has in fact been taken
and the case has proceed to termination the invalidity
of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result
unless the miscarriage of justice has been caused
thereby, see Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi.