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Documents citing Sri Raja Venkata Narashimha Appa Row vs Sri Raja Parthsarathy Appa Row on 10 December, 1913

Bai Kesarba vs Shivsangji Bhimsangji Thakor on 12 April, 1932

The Madras decision in Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Sri Rajah Rangayya Appa Row (1905) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 437 was considered and dissented from, and the text of Mann, Chapter IX, v. 142, has been considered as generally prohibiting the taking by the adopted son and as not restricting the taking to that which would devolve on him after the adoption, and proceeds on the fundamental idea underlying an adoption that the boy given in adoption gives up the natural family and everything connected with the family and takes his place in the adoptive family, as if he had been born there, as far as possible. The decision has not been dissented from or overruled, and for the reasons which I have already given, I am inclined to the view that the decision is correct on the merits.
Bombay High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Kovvidi Sattiraju vs Patamsetti Venkataswami And Ors. on 11 October, 1916

I am further of opinion that the dictum in Sri Rajah Venkata Narsimha Appa Row v. Sri Rajah Rangayya Appa Row 29 M.437 : 16 M.L.J. 178 (the decision in which as I said was reversed by the Privy Council on another point) that an adoption under coercion may be ratified just as a contract under coercion can be ratified is not, with the greatest respect, sustainable as the act of adoption is not an act in the nature of a contract and the validity of an act changing the status of a person cannot be made to remain in suspense at the option of the acters in the transaction. The question of coercion and voidability again does not arise in the present case. It is not alleged that the adoption of Viyyammal was brought about through coercion and hence is voidable, but the contention is that she was incompetent to give a valid legal consent to take a boy in adoption and to accept the gift made of a boy in adoption to her husband having then not attained the legal age of discretion according to the Hindu Law. The analogy applicable (if analogy from the law of contract is at all legitimate) is rather that of a contract made by a minor than that of a contract made by a major under coercion.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

K. Sattiraju vs P. Venkataswami And Two Ors. on 11 October, 1916

I am further of opinion that the dictum in Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Sri Rajah Rangayya Appa Row (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 437 (the decision which as I said before, was reversed by the Privy Council on another point) that an adoption under coercion may be ratified just as a contract under coercion can be ratified is not, with the greatest respect, sustainable as the act of adoption is not an act in the nature of a contract, and the validity of an act changing the status of a person cannot be made to remain in suspense at the option of one of the actors in the transaction. The question of coercion and voidability again does not arise in the present case. It is not alleged that the adoption of Viyyammal was brought about through coercion and hence voidable, but the contention is that she was incompetent to give a valid legal consent to take a boy in adoption and to accept the gift made of a boy in adoption to her husband, having then not attained the legal age of discretion according to the Hindu Law. The analogy applicable (if analogy from the law of contract is at all legitimate) is rather that of a contract made by a minor than that of a contract made by a major under coercion.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Dattatraya Sakharam Devli vs Govind Sambhaji Kulkarni on 1 February, 1916

13. The decision of the Madras High Court in Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Sri Rajah Ranaayya Appa Row 29 M. 437 at p. 452 : 16 M.L.J. 178 is directly in point and undoubtedly conflicts with the view I take of the Hindu Law on this point. I have already stated some of the reasons for not adopting the view, which has found favour with the Madras High Court, in dealing with Mr. Shingne's contentions. I need hardly add that I have considered the judgment with care and respect, to which it is undoubtedly entitled, but unfortunately I am unable to agree with it, and it is plainly my duty to give effect to my view, as the decision is not binding upon this Court.
Bombay High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Ramchandra Vishnu Joshi vs Ramabai Govind Gadre on 16 April, 1936

9. The issue therefore that remained to be determinedthe only issue before usarose in these circumstances. The petitioner said that the document in question was a will, in every respect conforming with the requirements of the Indian Succession Act, Section 2, Clause (h). The opponents contend that though on the face of it the document looks like a willthis cannot be deniedyet it cannot on a proper construction be treated as a will. The question then to which the learned Judge ought to have addressed himself was, in what respects according to the opponents' contention the document failed to conform with the definition in Section 2(h); "Will" means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death. For that purpose the document had to be construed and its language interpreted in accordance with principles which have been frequently laid down. They are stated in extenso in Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Parthasarathy Appa Row (1913) L.R. 411. I.A. 51, 70-72 : s.c. 16 Bom. L.R. 328.
Bombay High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Mahableshwar Narayanbhat Devte vs Subramanya Shivram Joshi on 24 November, 1922

As their Lordships said in Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Sri Rajah Rangayya Appa Row (1905) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 437, 161 there is a great danger in speaking of adoption as civil death and a re-birthand in attempting to enforce the consequences that might be supposed to logically flow from those conceptions. It could only be on the assumption that the first defendant was civilly dead that his father as his heir would be considered as entitled to deal either inter vivoa or by will with the property in the first defendant's possession. There are certain circumstances which by operation of law may bring about the devolution of an interest in property from the holder to another person, but I do not think that the texts which have been relied upon in this case show that under Hindu Law the interest of the first defendant in the suit property devolved upon his father on his adoption. I think the appeal must be allowed and the suit dismissed with costs throughout.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Dattatraya Sakharam Devli vs Govind Sambhaji Kulkarni And Ors. on 1 February, 1916

13. The decision of the Madras High Court in Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Sri Rajah Rangayya Appa Row (1905) 29 Mad. 437 at p. 452 is directly in point and undoubtedly conflicts with the view I take of the Hindu Law on this point. I have already stated some of the reasons for not adopting the view, which has found favour with the Madras High Court, in dealing with Mr. Shingne's contentions. I need hardly add that I have considered the judgment with care and respect, to which it is undoubtedly entitled. But unfortunately I am unable to agree with it, and it is plainly my duty to give effect to my view, as the decision is not binding upon this Court.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kovvidi Sattiraju vs Patamsetti Venkataswami And Ors. on 11 October, 1916

12. The foregoing assumes that an adult widow can validate an adoption originally imperfect by subsequent conduct. That position also however is in my opinion unsustainable. It is supported by one authority only Sri Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Sri Rajah Rangayya Appa Row (1905) I.L.R. 29 M. 437. It is material that no one's interest was prejudicially affected in that case by the subsequent ratification in consequence of anything which happened before it, and that the lady who made the adoption, was dead, when the litigation began. And accordingly, when the Court had found that during the years, for which she lived after the ceremony, she fully agreed to the adoption and was anxious to establish it, it would naturally strive to uphold it. It did so every shortly on the grounds that Hindu Law did not treat an adoption as void an account of coercion, the objection under consideration, and that under the law of contracts it would be only voidable. This conclusion was reached without reference to the decisions to be cited infra and it was not disputed, when the case went on appeal to the Privy Council, the judgment there proceeding on other grounds.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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