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Documents citing Olga Thelma Gomes vs Mark Gomes on 27 January, 1959

A.S. Puri vs K.L. Ahuja on 14 April, 1970

32. Vadilal Panchal is clear authority for the proposition that in applying his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgment, he is not fettered in any way except by judicial considerations. The important judicial consideration to which the Sdm alluded is the nature of proof that is necessary to establish adultery. It has been pointed out that the definition of "adultery" under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, for instance, is wider that the definition of "adultery" in Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (vide Olga Thelma Gomes v. Mark). 'Adultery' has itself not been defined in the Divorce Act and for that reason the courts had recourse to the principles laid down by English Divorce Courts. There is no criminal prosecution in England for adultery. Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code speaks of a person haiving sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man. What is essential for the offence of adultery is proof of "Sexual intercourse". It is also true that this could rarely be proved by direct evidence because precautions are taken to screen it from the view of others. But in evaluating the husband's accusation against his wife of adultery the entire back-ground and the context in which such accusation is made is highly relevant. When the parties concerned are sophisticated, conclusions cannot be arrived at on the mere basis of opportunities for sexual intercourse; such an inference may be more readily possible when dealing with persons whose social mores are more rigid and less sophisticated. The fact of adultery has, therefore, to be inferred from the totality of circumstances that lead to it by fair inference and as a necessary conclusion. What those circumstances are cannot be laid down universally. Nonetheless, the circumstances must be such as should lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just mind to that conclusion; it is not to be reached by rash and intemperate judgment, or upon assurances that are equally capable of two interpretations.
Delhi High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Samraj Nadar vs Abraham Nadachi on 10 February, 1969

20. The above view has been taken by a Special Bench of three Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Gomes v. Gomes, (SB). There, the wife filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage with her husband (under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869) on the ground that he was guilty of adultery coupled with cruelty, and adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or more. The trial Court accepted her case, passed a decree and made a reference under Section 17 to the High Court for confirmation of the decree. The learned Judges accepted the findings. There was no difficulty so far as cruelty and desertion without reasonable cause were concerned. So far as adultery was concerned, the evidence showed that the husband had been keeping another house where he was living with girls of bad repute. Actually on one occasion when those premises were visited, a girl of bad repute was found lying on the bed with her body covered with a sheet upto the throat. The learned Judges, therefore, accepted the case that the husband was living with women of questionable character. There was no proof that those persons were married. But it was held that it was immaterial and that the husband was guilty of adultery for the purpose of the Indian Divorce Act. It was pointed out that the narrower definition in Section 497, I. P.C., could not be applied to the Indian Divorce Act because the purposes of the two enactments were entirely different. The learned Judges observed that under Section 7 of the Act the Court shall follow the principles and rules followed by the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England.
Madras High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Subrata Kumar Banerjee vs Dipti Banerjee on 4 June, 1973

21. The primary question for our consideration is whether the respondent committed adultery with the co-respondent at Bombay or at several hotels at Calcutta as well as at New Alipore as alleged by the petitioner. It may, however, be noted that 'adultery' has not been defined in the Act itself. The definition of jadultery as given in Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, is however, too narrow and the word 'adultery' as mentioned jin the Act cannot be restricted to such a definition as given in the Indian Penal Code. The said point came up for decision in the case of Olga Thelma Gomes v. Mark Gomes , that is a decision of the Special Bench presided over by S. C. Lahiri, B. N. Baneriee, A. N. Ray, JJ. Mr. Justice Banerjee in his judgment has held "it is enough in order to be a matrimonial offence, that one of the parties to the sexual intercourse is a married person, if only one is married person it will be a single adultery, if both are married persons the matrimonial offence will also be adultery but in that case it will be a double adultery. The consequence of adultery be it a single or double will be the same in the Indian Divorce Act." In the absence of any definition in the Act itself their Lordships referred to the meaning of the word 'adultery' as given in the English Dictionary, such as Strouds Judicial Dictionary and Tomlin Law Dictionary. Be that as it may in the instant case both the parties agree that in case the evidence justifies the finding that the respondent had sexual intercourse with the co-respondent at any place and point of time as alleged by the petitioner then it will be a clear case of adultery.
Calcutta High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 5 - M M Dutt - Full Document
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