“7. We have given careful consideration to her
submissions. Firstly, we deal with the issue
of desertion. The learned counsel appearing
for the appellant relied upon the decision of
this Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani
[Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, (1964)
4
AIR 1964 SC 40
5
(2022) 5 SCC 459
11
4 SCR 331 : AIR 1964 SC 40] which has been
consistently followed in several decisions of
this Court. The law consistently laid down by
this Court is that desertion means the
intentional abandonment of one spouse by the
other without the consent of the other and
without a reasonable cause. The deserted
spouse must prove that there is a factum of
separation and there is an intention on the
part of deserting spouse to bring the
cohabitation to a permanent end. In other
words, there should be animus deserendi on the
part of the deserting spouse. There must be an
absence of consent on the part of the deserted
spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse
should not give a reasonable cause to the
deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial
home. The view taken by this Court has been
incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-
9. The judgment in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani
(supra) may not have application in regard to the rigour of
appreciation of evidence in the right of promulgation of the Family
Courts Act 1984, the statutory provision of which have
considerably reduced the manner in which evidence has to be
appreciated especially Section 14, which reads as under:-
5. It emerges form the said authority that leaving of matrimonial home is not a necessary criterion for determining the desertion. This concept was further elaborated in Lachman Utamchand v. Meena (supra) and Rohini Kumari v. Narendra Singh, . Thus, desertion is not withdrawal from a place but from a ``State of things". It is not a specific act but a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a fact on which a petition for divorce may be founded, it must exist for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. One of the essential conditions for success in a suit for divorce grounded upon desertion is that the deserted spouse should have been willing to fulfill his or her part of the matrimonial duties. As indicated earlier, the burden was on the respondent to prove that the alleged desertion without reasonable cause subsisted throughout the statutory period.
Following the decision in Bipin Chander case this
Court again reiterated the legal position in Lachman
Utamchand Kripalani v. Meena by holding that in its
essence desertion means the intentional permanent
forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the
other without that others consent, and without
reasonable cause. For the offence of desertion so far
as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there (1) the factum of
separation, and (2) the intention to bring
cohabitation permanently to an end (animus
deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so
far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the
absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct
giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the
matrimonial home to form the necessary intention
aforesaid. For holding desertion as proved the
inference may be drawn from certain facts which
may not in another case be capable of leading to the
same inference; that is to say the facts have to be
viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those
acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both
anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of
separation.
9. Following the decision in Bipinchandra case [AIR 1957 SC
176] this Court again reiterated the legal position in Lachman
Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena [AIR 1964 SC 40] by holding
that in its essence desertion means the intentional permanent
forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that
other's consent, and without reasonable cause. For the offence of
desertion so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the
intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus
deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2)
absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving
the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.
For holding desertion as proved the inference may be drawn from
certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading
to the same inference; that is to say the facts have to be viewed as
to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and
expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual
acts of separation.
In Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena [AIR 1964 SC 40 : (1964) 4 SCR 331] this Court had occasion to consider the true meaning and ambit of Section 10(1)(a) of the Act read with the Explanation. Reference was made in the majority judgment to the earlier decision in Bipin Chander Jaisinghbhai Shah v.Prabhawati [1956 SCR 838 : AIR 1957 SC 176] in which all the English decisions as also the statement contained in authoritative textbooks were considered. After referring to the two essential conditions, namely, the factum of physical separation and the animus deserendi which meant the intention to bring the cohabitation permanently to an end as also the two elements so far as the deserted spouse was concerned i.e. (1) the absence of consent and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the intention aforesaid, it was observed while examining how desertion might come to an end: