27.22. Testing the impugned decision. made in G.O.Ms. No. 289 Revenue (LD II.1) Department dated 4-6-1999, of the Government, refusing the renewal of lease, within the contours of the principles laid down in a catena of decisions referred to above, both the issues (II) and (III) are answered in negative.
In Anamallai Club (supra)7, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court merely reiterated
the settled proposition of law that a person cannot be dispossessed
without due process of law. In the present case, writ petition itself was
filed in due process of law to obtain the eviction of the appellant, without
respondent no. 1 having resorted to any tactics of force. That apart, the
present writ petition is also by way of implementation of the already-
existent order dated December 24, 2001 of the writ court for the State to
vacate possession of the property.
In Anamallai Club (supra)7, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court merely reiterated
the settled proposition of law that a person cannot be dispossessed
without due process of law. In the present case, writ petition itself was
filed in due process of law to obtain the eviction of the appellant, without
respondent no. 1 having resorted to any tactics of force. That apart, the
present writ petition is also by way of implementation of the already-
existent order dated December 24, 2001 of the writ court for the State to
vacate possession of the property.
In Anamallai Club (supra)7, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court merely reiterated
the settled proposition of law that a person cannot be dispossessed
without due process of law. In the present case, writ petition itself was
filed in due process of law to obtain the eviction of the appellant, without
respondent no. 1 having resorted to any tactics of force. That apart, the
present writ petition is also by way of implementation of the already-
existent order dated December 24, 2001 of the writ court for the State to
vacate possession of the property.
We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case plaintiff appellants are not entitled to get benefit of pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Anamallai Club Vs. Government of T.N. And others (1997) 3 S.C.C. 169 as well as in the case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani reported in 2003 (2) ARC 171 (supra).
Sub-section (12) of Section 203 of the Act further provides remedy by way of filing the appeal before the concerned District Judge. The amendments in the provisions of Section 203 of the Act relate only to the enhancement of the punishment which came into effect from 27.8.1991. Thus, the procedure is provided under Section 203 of the Act and no civil suit on behalf of the M.C. was required to be filed. The submission made by learned counsel for the M.C. finds support from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in Anamallai's case (supra).
13. Although it is true, as contended by Mr. Sanyal, that the licence there was governed by the G.G. Act which is not the case here, the materiality of the decision to the present controversy lies in this that the Apex Court had affirmed the finding of the Division Bench that the question regarding legality of termination of licence could not be gone into by the Estate Officer in proceedings under the concerned Public Premises Eviction Act (while taking steps in terms of Sections 4 and 5 thereof) and that is what applies with full force in the present case. Correctness and/or propriety of a decision to determine a lease cannot therefore be an issue for adjudication and be tried by an Estate Officer under the P.P. Act. This Court is not at all impressed with Mr. Sanyal's contention that the decision in Anamallai Club (supra) would have no application in the facts of the present case.