"The original assessment in these cases was completed on 2.11.98 under sec.143(3) read with sec.147 of the I.T. Act. These were subjected to appeal. The CIT(Appeals) allowed the deduction claimed by the Assessee under sec.80HH and 80-I vide his order dated 01.03.1999. After passing the order by the CIT(Appeals), the assessment was reopened following the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd. & Others (237 ITR 174), vide Notice dated 11.10.1999. In our opinion, this is not correct. Even the bad order of the Appellate Authority has reached finality. The Assessing Officer cannot sit over judgment of the Appellate Order. The only option open to him is to prefer an appeal before the higher forum. The Assessing Officer, in this case, has failed to do so. In view of this, we hold that the re-opening of the assessment was bad in law. Accordingly, we annul the assessment and the ground taken by the Assessee is allowed."
It has been submitted by the learned Counsel that facts of the case in case of Venkateshwara Hatcheries (supra) are altogether different to the facts involved in the present case as in this case the assessee is not producing or manufacturing the same thing which would have produced or which would have been available without deploying any processing or manufacturing. It has further been contended that once the assessee fulfils all the criteria of 100 per cent export oriented zone and the license has been granted by the Ministry of Commerce, treating the unit of assessee as processing unit, the action of the Revenue in treating the-assessee company as not entitled for the benefit under Section 10B was not correct as the assessee is certainly involved in the manufacturing process of ornamental fishes.
In the decision reported in 237 ITR 174 (SC) (CIT V. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd.), the Apex Court pointed out "When the word is not so defined in the Act it may be permissible to refer to the dictionary to find out the meaning of that word as it is understood in the common parlance. But where the dictionary gives divergent or more than one meaning of a word, in that case it is not safe to construe the said word according to the suggested dictionary meaning of that word. In such a situation, the word has to be construed in the context of the provisions of the Act and regard must also be had to the legislative history of the provisions of the Act and the scheme of the Act. It is a settled principle of interpretation that the meaning of the words, occurring in the provisions of the Act must take their colour from the context in which they are so used. In other words, for arriving at the true meaning of a word, the said word should not be detached from the context. Thus, when the word read in the context conveys a meaning, that meaning would be the appropriate meaning of that word and in that case we need not rely upon the dictionary meaning of that word."
5. It appears to us clear that a question of law is involved and that, therefore, the High Court ought to have required the Tribunal to refer to it the aforestated question. The High Court then would be entitled to consider the question on the merits and take the earlier judgment in the case of CIT v. Sri Venkateshwara Hatcheries (P.) Ltd. into account.
20. Now, the question is whether the hotel building could be considered as
plant? The Ld. counsel had strongly relied upon the decision of Hon'ble
Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT Vs S Shivalik Hatcheries
P. Ltd. [2010] 329 ITR 432 (HP). I n that case a dispute arose as to whether a
poultry shed would constitute plant. In that case it was observed as under:-
Further, the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue relying on the decisions of INDIAN HOTELS CO. LTD., V. I.T.O (245 ITR 538); STERLING FOODS V. STATE OF KARNATAKA (1996) 3 SCC 469) and CIT V. VENKATESWARA HATCHERIES (P) LTD (237 ITR 174), contended that in those cases, the Supreme Court held that the assessees are not engaged in manufacture or production of any article or thing. In the first cited case, the assessee is a hotel and in another case, it is a hatchery unit. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court held that they are not engaged in manufacture or production of any article or thing and hence, those judgments are not helpful to advance the case of the revenue.
2. It is not in dispute that the case is covered against the assessee by the judgment of this court in CIT v. Venkateswara Hatcheries P. Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 174. The further point that was made by the assessee was that it not only reared the chicken but also dressed them for sale in the market and, therefore, a process of manufacture was carried out. But, it appears that there was no material laid before the Tribunal in this behalf. It is, therefore, not possible to conclude in the present matter that the dressing of poultry is tantamount to manufacture.
21. We, therefore, reject the submissions of the learned counsel for the
assessee. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the decision by the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Sri Venkateswara
Hatcheries (P) Ltd.18 does not lay down the correct view of law,
whereas we approve the decision of the Bombay High Court in the
case of CIT v. Deejay Hatcheries19.
I
find that this interpretation of Ld. AR is totally misplaced and for such
interpretation, he has relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of CIT Vs. Venkateshwara Hacheries in wrong
manner because firstly of the definition provided in Explanation 3 is
not about the word "substantial" but it is to define "substantial
interest" in a concern as provided in section 2(22)(e) with reference
to any concern in which such share holder is a member or a partner
and in which he has substantial interest. It has been provided that if
such share holder at any time during the previous year is beneficially
entitled to not less than 20% income of such concern shall be deemed
to have a substantial interest in such concern. Therefore, this
definition relates to define a substantial interest of a share holder in a
concern providing that he should have beneficial entitlement of more
than 20% of income of such concern. Secondly, this definition is
nowhere related to substantial part of the business of the company.
The business of the company is determined by its activity and volume
of such activity. It may be possible that a company may be engaged in
manufacturing activity on a large scale having huge amount of
turnover but from such activities, it may incur loss or nominal profit
and because of its funds invested, it might have earned interest income
but just by earning interest income which may be more than 20% of is
nominal profit or in case of loss, the net income of the company may
be only because of its interest income, it would not mean that the
company is in money lending business only because of its interest
income. The nature of the company would be decided by the volume
of its business. In the present case, it can be seen from the P & L A/c
of M/s Malwa Vehicles Pvt. Ltd., though the company is mainly
engaged in selling of vehicles and by these activities, it has achieved a
turnover of Rs.15,32,54,219/- apart from its other income of
Rs.66,75,937/- which includes interest income also as pointed out by
the appellant in his written submission, however, because of low
margin on sale of vehicle, it has earned nominal net profit of
Rs.7,24,976/-. Because of earning of nominal profit from its vehicles
trading activities, this company cannot become being engaged in the
business of money lending as it is very clear from the P & L A/c
looking to its turnover and trading debtors and creditors as pointed
by the AO. Looking to the nature of the business of the company, M/s
13 ITA Nos.37 & 86/Agr/2012
A.Y. 2008-09
Malwa Vehicles Pvt. Ld. and finding that the interpretation of the Ld.
AR about the word 'substantial' as used with respect to substantial
part of business of the company is misplaced by wrongly referring to
a definition of substantial interest in a concern, I find that the Ld. AR
is not correct in his argument that the loan given by M/s Malwa
Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. to the appellant was during the ordinary course of
the business of money lending. Therefore, the second argument taken
by the Ld. AR to oppose the addition u/s 2(22)(e) on account of loan
taken from M/s Malwa Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. as per Ground no.1(d) is
also rejected.