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Ajai Verma vs Ram Bharosey Lal And Ors. on 28 February, 1951

The facts in Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Bakhsh Singh, 47 ALL. 158, relied on by the appellants, were different. There F, a reversioner, brought a suit against a Hindu widow R, her transferee J and another reversioner C. The suit was for a declaration that an alienation by R in favour of J was invalid. It was contested by R and J that G was the nearer reversioner in whose presence F had no right to sue. F replied that he had a right even if G was the nearer reversioner because he had colluded with R and J. While the suit was pending, R died and the question of declaration became of no importance because p and G at once became entitled to possession over the property. F got the plaint amended by seeking the relief of possession. He applied for permission to amend the plaint further by taking the plea, that there existed a custom in his family according to which he and G were equal in degree from R. That application was rejected. It was conceded that he could not succeed as against G in the absence of the custom. As he was not allowed to plead the custom, his suit was dismissed. But, while dismissing the suit, the Court gave him permission to file a fresh suit for possession on account of fresh cause of action having accrued to him by R's death. He filed a fresh suit and the Judicial Committee decided that it was barred by res judicata. They held that the allegation of the family custom was one which might and ought to have been made in the earlier suit because it was the alternative case and that F having lost on one alternative case, could not fight on the other alternative case. The earlier suit was dismissed on merits on the ground that G was the nearer reversioner in whose presence no decree for possession could be passed in favour of F. F failed to take the plea that under the family custom he was equal in degree. It is not that he took the plea and the Court refused to adjudicate upon it as in the present case. In the present case Kr. Vijai Verma took the alternative plea that even apart from the Mitakshara Law he was entitled to a moiety under the will of his father, and the Judicial Committee expressly refrained from deciding his case on the basis of the will because in their opinion the decision of that question was rendered nugatory by his death leaving as his heirs none other than his opponents in the suit. If F could succeed in the second suit, he ought to have first succeeded in the earlier suit and when he failed in the earlier suit, he could not be permitted to file another suit.
Allahabad High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Ayanikkattu Unniraja vs K.P.Gurudas

Therefore, they cannot be called upon, at the instance of the landlord, to challenge those observations before the Apex Court and the absence of a challenge will be immaterial in the light of the legal position already explained by us. Apart from the same, in the light of the principles stated in Fateh Singh's case (AIR 1925 P.C. 55) which have been approved by the Apex Court in Dadu Dayalu Mahasabhal's case (AIR 2008 SCW 3324) RCR No.301/2012 -30- also, the said observations will not help the landlord to sustain the maintainability of the present eviction petition. The findings in the earlier round of litigation will affect its maintainability under Section 15 of the Act, which contention has been specifically raised by the tenants in their counter statement. Therefore, neither the principle of acquiescence nor waiver will come to the aid of the landlord herein.
Kerala High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - B K Pasha - Full Document

Yaddanapudi Lakshmi Narasimham vs Dorapalli Lakshmipathi And Ors. on 31 July, 1931

12. So in the present case it may be that the District Munsif ought to have forthwith granted a mortgage decree. But rightly or wrongly he considered himself precluded from the manner in which the suit was brought from doing this. I am unable to see that he thereby decided any such matter as would make it res judicata between the parties, For the appellant I am referred to the Privy Council case, Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Baksh. But the facts there were quite different, the plaintiffs having omitted to plead in their first suit a certain family custom which in their second suit they made the foundation of their claim. It was held that they were barred by res judicata by virtue of Expl. (4). No such circumstance exists in the present case.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Maharama And Anr. vs Ram Bux on 24 July, 1978

As regards the power of a court to allow the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit the only provision contained in C. P. C. is under Order 23 Rule 1 C. P. C. Such power is not absolute and can only be exercisedj when an application in this regard is made by the plaintiff and the court is satisfied that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect or that there were sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of a suit or part of a claim. The learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to show that any application for withdrawing the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit was filed by his client in the earlier suit. There is no mention of such application in the previous judgment and it so seems that the Court while holding the suit to be premature granted a liberty to the plaintiff to file fresh suit. This direction is contained in the last portion of the judgment. In this view of the matter when there was no formal application under Order 23 Rule 1 C. P. C. for withdrawal of the suit, such remark cannot amount to a permission to bring fresh suit under Order 23 Rule 1 C. P. C. It can also not be inferred that the court while granting such permission was alive with the grounds contained in Order 23 Rule 1. I am fortified in my above view by the decisions of Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Baksh Singh, AIR 1925 PC 55, and Robert Watson & Co. v. The Collector of Zillah Rajshahye, Dost Mohamed Khan Chowdhry, Ranee Anundomoye and Horace John Abbott (1869-70) 13 Moo Ind App 160 (PC),
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 4 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Ganesh Jha vs Baidyanath Jha And Ors. on 2 January, 1958

In Fateh Singh v. Jagannath, Bakhsh Singh AIR 1925 PC 55 (A) the plaintiffs had in a previous suit based their claim on nearness of kin but did not mention the family custom but for the proof of which the nearness could not be proved and the suit therefore failed. It was held by the Privy Council in these circumstances that the plaintiffs could not bring a fresh suit basing their claim on the family custom.
Patna High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 9 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Raja Ram Singh And Ors. vs Kishori Saran Singh And Ors. on 1 September, 1967

In coming to this decision, the bench of this court relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Fateh Singh v. Jagan-nath Baksh Singh, 52 Ind App 100: (AIR 1925 PC 55). The appellants before the Privy Council brought a suit to set aside a gift made by a Hindu widow out of her husband's estate; they alleged that they were presumptive heirs. After the death of the widow the appellants applied to amend their plaint by setting up a family custom of inheritance, and by claiming possession of a share in the whole property. Upon that application failing, and the appellants admitting that apart from the alleged custom they could not succeed, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, but gave them liberty to file a fresh suit for possession. Subsequently the appellants brought a suit to recover from parties to the former suit a share in the property, basing their claim upon family custom. It was held that the suit was barred by res judicata under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, since the custom was a matter which might arid ought to have been set up in the former suit. It was further held that the Subordinate Judge, having dismissed the suit, had no power under order 23 of the Civil Procedure Code to give liberty to bring a fresh suit.
Patna High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

S. Rajdev Singh vs Royal Studios And Ors. on 29 July, 1971

In Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Baksh Singh, , also the application for amendment to plead the other available ground of attack was rejected and the suit was also dismissed on merits. It was a stronger case than the present one inasmuch as while dismissing the suit, the trial Judge expressly gave liberty to the plaintiff to bring a bring a fresh suit for possession. In the 1960 petition for eviction, the Controller did not give any such express leave to bring a fresh eviction petition. Even then the Party Council held that the second suit was barred by constructive res judicata and pointed out that the first suit had been dismissed and had not been withdrawn under O. Xxiii Civil Procedure Code and the trial Court had, therefore, no power to grant leave to bring a fresh suit. The ratio of the Privy Council decision fully applies to the present case. The eviction petition brought by the landlord is, therefore, barred by the principle of res judicata as the landlord had failed to plead the ground of attack covered by proviso (b) to Section 14(1) in the previous eviction petition of 1960.
Delhi High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Cheria Veetil Madhavan Variar (Died) ... vs Chathu Nambiar Of Memenda Amsom Kizhal ... on 25 February, 1950

4. It was also suggested on behalf of the respondent that, at any rate, the plaintiff in the earlier suit must have made this alternative title as a ground of attack and as he did not do so it must be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit under Expl. 4 to Section 11, Civil P. C., and he is now precluded from raising that question in a suit in which the tarwad rights are being agitated. The explanation requires that the matter not only "might" but "ought" to have been made a ground which implies that he was bound to include the present claim also in the earlier suit. There is no justification for holding that the plaintiff was under a duty to have included in that suit his individual or private right to the property. No principle of law and no decision in support of the argument that he is under an obligation to so include the present claim in the earlier suit has been brought to our notice; nor are we able to find any authority in support of such a view. No doubt a person in instituting a suit for recovery of possession of property based on his title in his individual capacity 13 bound to include all the available grounds of attack, that is, all the available titles under which he could have recovered possession of the property as, for example, in the case in Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Baksh Singh, 47 ALL. 158: (A. I. R, (12) 1925 P. O. 55). In that case, the first suit was instituted by the plain-tiffs as the presumptive heirs to a widow's estate and when the widow died during the pendency of the suit the presumptive heirs applied to amend the plaint by setting up a family custom of inheritance and claiming possession of a share in the property. That application failed and the presumptive heirs thereafter admitted that, apart from the alleged custom, they could not succeed in the suit. The suit was accordingly dismissed. They instituted the subsequent suit basing their right to recover possession of the property on the alleged family custom. One of the questions decided was that they could not maintain a suit as they were bound to have included the title based on family custom in the earlier suit. On those facts if I may say so with respect it was rightly held by the Privy Council that the claim was within Expl. 4 to Section 11, Civil P. C., and was barred by res judicata. But that decision, in my opinion, has no bearing on the question now under consideration, for the reason that the capacities of the plaintiff in which the two suits were instituted were different and the titles agitated by the parties were also totally different. As karnavarthe of the tarwad the plaintiff was bound to include in the earlier suit all the available titles of the tarwad and not his individual right.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 8 - Full Document
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