Ajai Verma vs Ram Bharosey Lal And Ors. on 28 February, 1951
The facts in Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Bakhsh Singh, 47 ALL. 158, relied on by the appellants, were different. There F, a reversioner, brought a suit against a Hindu widow R, her transferee J and another reversioner C. The suit was for a declaration that an alienation by R in favour of J was invalid. It was contested by R and J that G was the nearer reversioner in whose presence F had no right to sue. F replied that he had a right even if G was the nearer reversioner because he had colluded with R and J. While the suit was pending, R died and the question of declaration became of no importance because p and G at once became entitled to possession over the property. F got the plaint amended by seeking the relief of possession. He applied for permission to amend the plaint further by taking the plea, that there existed a custom in his family according to which he and G were equal in degree from R. That application was rejected. It was conceded that he could not succeed as against G in the absence of the custom. As he was not allowed to plead the custom, his suit was dismissed. But, while dismissing the suit, the Court gave him permission to file a fresh suit for possession on account of fresh cause of action having accrued to him by R's death. He filed a fresh suit and the Judicial Committee decided that it was barred by res judicata. They held that the allegation of the family custom was one which might and ought to have been made in the earlier suit because it was the alternative case and that F having lost on one alternative case, could not fight on the other alternative case. The earlier suit was dismissed on merits on the ground that G was the nearer reversioner in whose presence no decree for possession could be passed in favour of F. F failed to take the plea that under the family custom he was equal in degree. It is not that he took the plea and the Court refused to adjudicate upon it as in the present case. In the present case Kr. Vijai Verma took the alternative plea that even apart from the Mitakshara Law he was entitled to a moiety under the will of his father, and the Judicial Committee expressly refrained from deciding his case on the basis of the will because in their opinion the decision of that question was rendered nugatory by his death leaving as his heirs none other than his opponents in the suit. If F could succeed in the second suit, he ought to have first succeeded in the earlier suit and when he failed in the earlier suit, he could not be permitted to file another suit.