The learned Advocate General relied on a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. [1940] L.R. S7 I. A. 222 : s.c. 42 Bom. L.R. 757. But there the question was whether the subject's right to approach the civil Court to entertain a challenge on the merits of a decision under Sections 188 and 191 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, was excluded by the declared finality of the decision of the Assistant Collector and appeals therefrom. In the present case, however, the challenge is against the Provincial Government's authority under the Defence of India Act to appoint a Controller for deciding matters within the civil Court's jurisdiction which cannot be taken away except by express provisions made by an appropriate authority.
52. That ease is of little assistance to the appel
lant in this case because here the respondents have
relied on the explicit and clearly expressed exclu
sion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts laid down
inSection 47, Encumbered Estates Act quoted above.
One of them was the decision in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 105, 110), in which the Judicial Committee had observed that it was settled law that the exclusion of the civil courts was not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicity expressed or clearly implied. It was also well settled that even if jurisdiction was so excluded, the civil courts had jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The Supreme Court also observed that in their earlier decision it was not the intention of the court to overrule a rule which had been firmly established; otherwise, there would be found a fuller discussion on this question. Its error in the present case being a fundamental error, as notice under section 34 was a condition precedent, it would vitiate the entire assessment proceedings. It would therefore be clear that the civil courts' jurisdiction would not be excluded by such an invalid assessment which was clearly a nullity and no assessment at all.
The Special Bench refrained from either accepting the dictum of Mask Co. 's
case, 67 Ind App 222 - AIR (1940) PC 105 or rejecting it, to the effect
that even if jurisdiction is excluded by a provision making the decision of
the authorities final, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into
cases where the provisions of the particular Act are not complied with.
The Special Bench refrained from either accepting the dictum of Mask Co. 's case, 67 Ind App 222 - or rejecting it, to the effect that even if jurisdiction is excluded by a provision making the decision of the authorities final, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the particular Act are not complied with.
One of them was the decision in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. in which the Judicial Committee had observed that it was settled law that the exclusion of the civil courts was not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It was also well settled that even if jurisdiction was so excluded, the civil courts had jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The Supreme Court also observed that in their earlier decision it was not the intention of the court to overrule a rule which had been firmly established; otherwise, there would be found a fuller discussion on this question. Its error in the present case being a fundamental error, as notice under section 24 was a condition precedent, it would vitiate the entire assessment proceedings. It would therefore be clear that the civil courts' jurisdiction would not be excluded by such an invalid assessment which was clearly a nullity and no assessment at all.
In such cases, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded, as stated by the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (AIR 1940 PC 105 at p. 110) and Ram Swarup's case AIR 1966 SC 893: (1966 All LJ 360 para 17). This is another fundamental infirmity in the later decision rendered by the land Tribunal, rendering it a nullity.
The very scheme of levying sales tax by various States will come to a standstill if a procedure is to be adopted by the Assessing Authorities of any State of giving notice to other States. Each State is here exercising its own sovereign power of levying tax and it is not bound to exercise that power by issuing notices to various other States in connection with transactions which concern more than one State. Infact, in such a situation, the aggrieved party has a remedy of ultimately carrying the matter to the highest Court of the land, namely the Supreme Court of India, and have the conflict resolved. Therefore, the absence of a notice by the Assessing Authorities at Delhi to the State of Haryana or to other States does not bring the case within the principles laid down inMask's case. There is no violation of any fundamental principle by the Delhi Assessing Authorities merely because they did not issue any notice to the Haryana Authorities or other States. Admittedly, so faras the assessee is concerned, the Delhi Authorities followed the principles of natural justice and there is, in fact, no submission that the assessment orders were passed without notice to the plaintiff.