Chanbasappa Gurushantappa Hiremath vs Baslingayya Gokurnaya Hiremath on 14 April, 1927
85. Reliance was again placed upon the remarks of Rankin J. in Amar Chand's case in which he said (p. 612) : "In any case the logical gap, if there bo any, is stopped up by Section 89." With great respect I find myself again unable to agree. Section 89 excepts from its operation "any other law for the time being in force." Having regard to the context that must, I think, mean any other law relating to arbitration. I do not think that "other law" refers only to statute law. I think it would include any other law, such as the general law of contract, whereby parties may agree to refer their disputes to arbitration. If this be the right construction of the section, as I think it is, then the provision that "all references to arbitration whether by an order in a suit or otherwise, and all proceedings thereunder, shall be governed by the provisions contained in Schedule II" can only apply to cases in which persons choose to avail themselves of the machinery provided by Schedule II, and not to cases in which they adopt other methods of submitting their differences to arbitration.