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Chanbasappa Gurushantappa Hiremath vs Baslingayya Gokurnaya Hiremath on 14 April, 1927

85. Reliance was again placed upon the remarks of Rankin J. in Amar Chand's case in which he said (p. 612) : "In any case the logical gap, if there bo any, is stopped up by Section 89." With great respect I find myself again unable to agree. Section 89 excepts from its operation "any other law for the time being in force." Having regard to the context that must, I think, mean any other law relating to arbitration. I do not think that "other law" refers only to statute law. I think it would include any other law, such as the general law of contract, whereby parties may agree to refer their disputes to arbitration. If this be the right construction of the section, as I think it is, then the provision that "all references to arbitration whether by an order in a suit or otherwise, and all proceedings thereunder, shall be governed by the provisions contained in Schedule II" can only apply to cases in which persons choose to avail themselves of the machinery provided by Schedule II, and not to cases in which they adopt other methods of submitting their differences to arbitration.
Bombay High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Nune Ayyannamma vs Valloori Ramaswami on 11 February, 1927

The most recent decision of this Court is a decision by a single Judge in S. A. No. 882 of 1925 where also the prior decisions of this Court have been followed in preference to the view expressed in Amar Chand Chamaria v. Banwari Lall Rakshit (1921) ILR 49 C 608. In the present state of authorities we are asked by the learned vakil for the appellant to accept the decisions of the Calcutta High Court as laying down the correct law.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

The Andhra Mennonite Self-Supporting ... vs Sundramma And Ors. on 22 June, 1972

The full bench followed the view expressed by the Calcutta High court in Dekhari Tea Co. Ltd., v. India General Steam Navigation co. Ltd., AIR 1921 Cal 238; Amar Chand Chamaria v. Banwari Lal Rakshit, AIR 1922 Cal 404; Guimoni Dasi v. Rarini Charan, AIR 1927 Cal 887 and Rohini Kanta v. Rajani Kanta, AIR 1935 Cal 643 for coming to the conclusion that the consent that is required is a consent to the award itself and not merely a consent to an arbitration reference and an agreement to abide by it. Their Lordships also stated that the proviso to Section 47 was enacted only to bring into line the view expressed by the Calcutta High court.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 11 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Babubhai Tansukhlal vs Madhavji Govindji And Co. on 12 December, 1930

14. It is urged on behalf of the applicant that he was never prepared to refer the dispute between the parties on contracts which were not in the sanctioned form to arbitration, and the award on such contracts as were not in the sanctioned form would be illegal and void. It would, therefore, appear that if the contention of the applicant, which the arbitrators entered upon a consideration of matters when they had no jurisdiction to do so, is correct, it cannot be said that the suit has been adjusted by a lawful compromise. The view of the Calcutta High Court in Amar Chand Chamaria v. Banwari Lall Rahshit (1921) I.L.R. 49 Cal.
Bombay High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Kokil Singh vs Ramasray Prasad Choudhary And Ors. on 24 January, 1924

In Amar Chand Chamaria v. Banwari Lal 69 Ind. Cas. 808 : 49 C. 608; (1922) A.I.R. (C.) 404 Rankin, J., has expressed the opinion that the rules in paragraphs 20 and 21 cannot be applied in such a case. The authority is clear that no assistance can be obtained from Order XXIII, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. As to paragraph 20 of the Second Schedule, these decisions, in my opinion, have no application to the present facts. On the 25th of February, 1922, the following petition was filed before the Court in the suit: "On the advice of well, wishers it has been agreed by the parties to get the suit decided by arbitrators. The petitioners have, therefore, executed an ekrarnama dated 25th February, 1922. Therefore, they do not like to prosecute this case. This suit may be dismissed without trial. Costs may be borne by the parties." In this the Subordinate Judge passed the following order: "The suit is dismissed in terms of the solehnama." This order is final and cannot be questioned now and, in any case, I can see nothing illegal in it. I see no reason why the suit should not have been withdrawn by consent of the parties. The euit then was at an end but the agreement to refer to arbitration stood.
Patna High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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