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Documents citing Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs B.M. Edward, India Sea Foods on 26 February, 1979

Manish Plastics vs Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes In ... on 24 February, 1995

22. I find no substance even in this submission of the learned counsel. In order that the petitioners or any one of them could rely upon the principles of promissory or equitable estoppel, it was essential for them to lay the requisite factual foundation for any such claim. It was imperative for the petitioners to have stated that they had acted upon the clarifications in question and changed their position to their detriment. It was only if the petitioner had clearly asserted and convincingly demonstrated the above by reference to some acceptable evidence or material that they could possibly rely upon the principles of promissory estoppel. No such case has however been made out by the petitioners or any one of them. The clarification relied upon by the petitioners was never addressed to them nor is it otherwise shown to have been circulated for the information of the industry. Even assuming that the clarification had been sent to the subordinate officers of the department, as was urged by Mr. Prasad, which fact is not borne out by record of this Court, yet unless the petitioners showed further that they had acted upon the representation contained in the clarification, they can neither claim prejudice nor call in aid any equitable considerations in their favour. Reliance upon the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. B. M. Edward [1979] 119 ITR 334 [FB] and that of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Kerala [1986] 158 ITR 102 is therefore wholly misplaced particularly when the facts of the said cases are distinguishable from the facts of the present cases noticed above.
Karnataka High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 4 - T S Thakur - Full Document

Basf (India) Ltd. And Anr. vs W. Hasan, Commissioner Of Income-Tax ... on 28 October, 2005

In the above view of the law laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in consonance with the law laid down by the Kerala High Court, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the application moved by the petitioners for refund was liable to be considered in accordance with Circular No. 769 (see ) issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes as the circumstances for refund referred to therein are liable to be held applicable to the facts of the case at hand in its true letter and spirit.
Bombay High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 23 - V C Daga - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Kerala Financial Corporation on 24 October, 1984

It is also true that if the first two circulars were applicable to the facts of this case, the income-tax authorities would be bound to act in terms of those circulars even though those terms implied a deviation from the provisions of the Act provided they were of a benevolent or beneficial nature from the point of view of the assessee (see Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. Sen, AAC of I.T. [1965] 56 ITR 198, 203 (SC); Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 913 (SC); Varghese v. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC) and CIT v. Edward, India Sea Foods [1979] 119 ITR 334 (Ker) [FB]), Gestetner Duplicators Private Ltd. v. CIT, [1979] 117 ITR 1 (SC). However, none of the circulars is part of the records and no reference to any one of them had been made either in the memorandum of appeal or in arguments before the Commissioner or the Tribunal. The circular of 1924 was intended to apply to a money-lender who kept his books on the commercial system and maintained a suspense account in which he entered loans which in his opinion were extremely unlikely to be recovered and the ITO was satisfied that there was little probability of such loans being repaid. The interest accruing on such loans was excluded by the circular from the assessee's taxable income. In the present case, no loan is stated to have been credited to a suspense account and there is no evidence to show that any loan was not likely to be recovered. In the circumstances, the circular of August 25, 1924, has no application to the facts of this case. The circular of October 6, 1952, extended the principle of the 1924 circular to banks which, "instead of transferring the doubtful debts to a suspense account, credit the interest on such debts to that account provided the ITO is satisfied that recovery is practically improbable". It would appear from the wording of this circular that it applied only to a case where the recovery of the principal amount itself was "practically improbable", There is no evidence in this case that that was the position with regard to the recovery of either the principal or the interest. The assessee had no such case before the authorities, and no evidence was placed by it to such effect. All that the assessee said was that the interest was not paid for three years on loans which were secured by mortgages. The state of affairs of the debtors, their ability and willingness to repay the amounts, their general reputation and standing in the society, the chances of recovery by recourse to courts are all matters on which the assessee could have placed evidence, but did not do so. Moreover, the Tribunal had no opportunity to consider whether the 1952 circular which applied only to banks had any application to a financial institution such as the assessee. In the circumstances, the facts on record do not enable the assessee to seek the aid of this circular as well.
Kerala High Court Cites 43 - Cited by 9 - T K Thommen - Full Document

M/S Toyato Kirloskar Motors Pvt. Ltd.,, ... vs Department Of Income Tax on 17 April, 2012

In the case of CIT Vs. B.M. Edward India Sea Foods (supra), a CBDT circular was in force at the commencement of the assessment year and the same was withdrawn later. The Assessing Officer passed the order of assessment after the withdrawal of the said circular and took a view contrary to the said circular. The Hon'ble High Court held that the circular was in 24 ITA Nos.20 & 88/Bang/2011 force at the commencement of the assessment year and therefore, the same was binding on the Revenue authorities despite withdrawal of the said circular subsequently. 11.7 In the instant case, the provisions of FBT are intended to tax collective enjoyment of benefits by employees and it is not the intention of legislature to tax a legitimate business expenditure which does not result in any benefit to employees. However, it is seen in circular No.8 of 2005 that the CBDT has opined that expenditure as a result of payment to third parties is also liable for FBT. In Answer to Q.No.14, it is stated that no segregation of expenses incurred on employees and expenses incurred on others is permissible under section 115WB(2). In Answer to Q.No.15, it is stated that there is no requirement to segregate the various expenses referred to in section 115WB, between those incurred for official purposes and personal purposes. For instance in Answer to Q.No.57, it is stated that expenditure on brand or brand ambassador or celebrity endorsement is liable to FBT. In Answer to Q.No.67, it is stated that expenditure for the purpose of boarding and lodging or travel of customers / clients would be liable for FBT. There are some of the instances where the Board has taken a view that appears to be not in tandem with legislative intention.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Bangalore Cites 54 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Raojibhai Chhotabhai Patel vs First Income-Tax Officer on 31 May, 1985

10. As far as the instructions are concerned, the instruction of the Board dated 28-8-1970 laid down the correct legal position in this behalf as observed by the Tribunal in the earlier decision. Even presuming that, this ins truction was withdrawn by the later instruction dated 20-9-1983, as observed by the Kerala High Court in B.M. Edward, India Sea Foods' case (supra) the earlier instruction was in force on the first day of the assessment year and, therefore, the same would be applicable to the assessment year 1980-81. No doubt, the learned Commissioner has observed that the later instruction was only clarificatory in nature and the legal position as per the amended Section 139(3) would have been in vague for all the assessment years after the amendment. As regards this, we have to disagree inasmuch as we are of the opinion that the amendment in Section 139(8) has not brought about any substantial change so as to nullify the decision of the Supreme Court in Kulu Valley Transport Co. (P.)
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Nagpur Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sahney Steel And Press Works Ltd. vs Income-Tax Officer on 24 January, 1981

The argument of the learned departmental representative was that the circular was not in force on the first day of the assessment year 1974-75 and further that it related to Central Outright Grant of Subsidy which was a different subsidy from that which obtained in the present case. According to him, therefore, the circular was not binding on the ITO and, in any event, the circular could not fetter his judicial discretion. There is the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in CIT v. B.M. Edward, India Sea Foods [1979] 119 ITR 334 which sets out the effect of the circulars. The Court, after referring to various pronouncements of other High Courts and the Supreme Court, has observed that there may be circulars which affect certain important rights in regard to assessment of the assessee apart from administrative matters and the provisions of Section 119 contemplate such instructions being issued by the Board.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Hyderabad Cites 23 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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