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Documents citing Smt. Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan vs Vasant Raghunath Dhoble And Anr on 8 September, 2003

Gyanesh Rai And Another vs State Of U.P. And 9 Ors on 21 September, 2015

Apex Court in the case of Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan vs. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble and another 2003 (7) SCC 749 has proceeded to make a mention that who are at the helm of affairs who proclaim from rooftops to be the defenders of democracy and protectors of people's rights and do not hesitate to condescend behind the screen to let loose their men in uniform to settle personal scores, reigning ignorance of what happens and pretending to be peace-loving puritans and saviours of citizens' rights. Relevant extract of said judgement is as follows:
Allahabad High Court Cites 46 - Cited by 2 - V K Shukla - Full Document

Dalbir Singh vs State & Ors. on 26 June, 2023

iii) Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble,(2003) 7 SCC 749 "6. Rarely, in cases of police torture or custodial death is there direct ocular evidence of the complicity of the police personnel alone who can only explain the circumstances in which a person in their custody had died. Bound as they are by the ties of brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel prefer to remain silent and more often than not even pervert the truth to save their colleagues -- and the present case is an apt illustration -- as to how one after the other police witnesses feigned ignorance about the whole matter."
Delhi High Court Cites 55 - Cited by 0 - M Gupta - Full Document

State vs . Vipin Nahar @ Dev on 26 August, 2014

Vs. State of Orissa' 1991 AIR 1388, 'Balvinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab' AIR 1996 SC 607, 'Tanviben Pankaj Divetia Vs. State of Gujrat' 1997 Crl.L.J. 2535, 'Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan Vs. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble' (2003) 7 SCC 749, 'Zahira Habibullah Sheikh Vs. State of Gujrat' (2006) 3 SCC 374, 'Raju Vs. State of Madhya Pardesh' (2008) 15 SCC 133, 'Abbas Ahmed Choudhary Vs. State of Assam' (2010) 12 SCC 115, 'Narender Kumar Vs. State of NCT of Delhi' (2012) SC 2281, 'Tukaram & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra' (AIR 1979 SC 185), 'Uday Vs. State of Karnataka' AIR 2003 SC 1639, 149 of 152 150 FIR No. 171/10 PS - Shahbad Dairy 'Rai Sandeep @ Deepu Vs. State of NCT of Delhi' 2012 (131) DRJ 3 (SC), 'Radhu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh' (2007) Cr.L.J. 4704 and 'Mumtaz Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)' ILR (2013) IV DELHI 2706.
Delhi District Court Cites 34 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sharad Subramanyan & Anr vs Smt. Soumi Majumdar & Anr on 27 September, 2019

In similar vein, the judgments reported at (2003) 6 SCC 1 (Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar); (2006) 7 SCC 756 (Jai Narain Parasurampuria v. Pushpa Devi Sharaf) and (2003) 7 SCC 749 (Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble) are referred to. What emerges from the discussions in the various judgments is that it is imperative for the court to do justice and for such purpose disregard the structure of an entity to garner the meat of the matter. The concept of a company and the jurisprudence that follows it was alien in the Indian context. The sanctity of the structure attached to a corporate entity in English law may not always be applicable in the Indian context. As much as companies have been set up in India to carry any business venture, the corporate facade has been put up time and again to shield the humans behind it. Corporate jurisprudence is no longer in its initial stage for it to be regarded as a bride for the 44 veil to be removed. Courts are more prone now than ever before to disregard the veil and go straight at the controlling mind without stopping to question the propriety or necessity of piercing the veil. In the synopsis relating to the petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court filed by Sharad, there is more than passing reference to the lease of October 21, 1992 said to have been created by Reba Mitra in favour of the petitioner. At pages F and G of the synopsis, Sharad asserted that he received a letter of April 16, 1999 from the legatees that he was in illegal possession of the first floor of premises no. 13/1, Promotesh Barua Sarani to which he replied that he "was not in possession of the first floor of the said premises as alleged." In such assertion Sharad did not deny that he was not in possession but merely denied that he was in possession as alleged. It would not be outlandish to infer that what Sharad left unsaid was that he may have physically been in possession, but such possession was by virtue of his association with the petitioner which was in de jure possession of the first floor of the premises. The special leave petition papers contain an affidavit affirmed by Sharad on February 8, 2000. In such affidavit, in response to a petition for removal of the joint executors on the allegations of misappropriation of funds and usurpation of the estate, Sharad insisted that there was no estate of Kamal Mitra in existence as all his assets had devolved upon his widow as legatee on the assent given by her as the first executrix. In such affidavit Sharad referred to the deed of October 21, 1992 by which a lease was granted in favour of the petitioner and the copy of the registered deed was appended to his affidavit. In the order passed on the application for removal of the joint executors, a learned Single Judge appointed an administrator pendente lite and also directed eviction of one of the occupants at premises no. 13/1, Promotesh Barua Sarani. Sharad's appeal failed except that the appellate court held that no occupier could be evicted except under due process of law. It appears that the entire basis 45 of Sharad's argument was that notwithstanding Kamal Mitra's Will, it was his widow on whom his entire estate devolved and the widow was free to deal with the estate that had become her own. It was such contention that did not find favour with this Court in the two stages here and with the Supreme Court in the appeal resulting from the special leave petition. It is necessary to go into such aspect to assess whether it would be appropriate to permit the same issue to be raised again. For, if the delay in the petitioner applying for revocation of the probate is condoned, and the petitioner's apparent right to seek revocation is recognised, the entire process that culminated in the conclusion of the lis by the Supreme Court order would be undone and reopened for fresh adjudication. The matter is not, as the petitioner simplifies and puts it, of the court being liberal in the matter of condonation of delay to allow a right to be canvassed. Equally, the principal issue is not, as the legatees' suggest, to affix the petitioner with the knowledge that Sharad had and to consequently find the petitioner's explanation of the delay to be unmeritorious. It is the recognition of the fact that a settled position would be undone if by an apparently gracious act of condonation of delay, an undesirable second round of the same challenge is unleashed. Even if the petitioner is permitted to take the challenge forward, it can progress no more upon it being recognised that the only possible issue has been conclusively pronounced upon by the Supreme Court, albeit in proceedings where the petitioner was not a eo nominee party. In assessing the impact of Sharad's knowledge on the company, the first point of note is that neither of the Subramanyans had any conflict of interest with the petitioner. It is also of singular importance that the effect of what the petitioner now seeks to establish is, willy-nilly, for the present benefit of Sharad or Vasant in course of their association with the petitioner. It is not a point of technicality on which a petitioner is denied justice by not being permitted to assert a right on grounds of delay, it is the warding off of a technical 46 argument of distinction between a corporate entity and one of the principal persons in control thereof to avoid abuse of process. Sharad may not have had any legal duty to inform the company (if the company was any more different from himself) upon discovering, although in his capacity as executor, that Reba Mitra had acquired no right to the estate to transfer it to the petitioner. Yet it was so overwhelming a moral duty that a director of a company in Sharad's place had, even if he were not its controlling shareholder, to inform the company of its imminent loss of its valuable asset, that the fine distinction between a legal duty and a moral duty vanishes. That Sharad had produced and relied upon the petitioner's lease to assert that notwithstanding Kamal Mitra's Will his estate passed to his widow, would also show that Sharad was aware that he was also fighting his company's cause. To ignore all that has gone on before and to accept the petitioner's simple case and apparent innocence would lead to gross injustice and undoing the finality that is attached to the result on the substance of the dispute following the Supreme Court verdict. The result is that the petitioner's application for condonation of delay fails as the petitioner is deemed to have had notice for a period much prior to the receipt of the administrator pendente lite's first letter of August 28, 2007 which the petitioner has chosen to ignore for want of any plausible explanation. As a consequence, the petitioner's application for revocation of the grant is not taken on board, but even if it were it would have to be dismissed for the only issue therein having been decided in favour of the legatees in the earlier proceedings. The petitioner will pay costs assessed at 2000 GMs."
Calcutta High Court Cites 35 - Cited by 0 - S Munshi - Full Document

Mr. Arvind Kejriwal & Anr. vs State Nct Of Delhi on 21 October, 2020

"13. The documents in terms of Sections 207 and 208 are supplied to make the accused aware of the materials which are sought to be utilized against him. The object is to enable the accused to defend himself properly. The idea behind the supply of copies is to put him on notice of what he has to meet at the trial. The effect of non-supply of copies has been considered by this Court in Noor Khan v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1964 SC 286) and Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan (Smt.) v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble and Anr. (2003 (7) SCC 749). It was held that non-supply is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused. The Court has to give a definite finding about the prejudice or otherwise. Even the supervision notes cannot be utilized by the prosecution as a piece of material or evidence against the accused. If any reference is made before any court to the supervision notes, as has noted above they are not to be taken note of by the concerned court. As many instances have come to light when the parties, as in the present case, make reference to the supervision notes, the inevitable conclusion is that they have unauthorized Crl.M.C. 1867/2020 Page 22 of 37 access to the official records."
Delhi High Court Cites 56 - Cited by 1 - S K Kait - Full Document

Women Lawyers' Association vs Government Of Tamil Nadu on 29 October, 2009

In the case of Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble (2003) 7 SCC 749, while considering the criminal appeal against the conviction under Section 302 IPC, where the deceased died of injuries received during the police custody, even though evidence was not sufficient to convict the police man concerned under Section 302 IPC, the Supreme Court inter alia issued directions for payment of compensation to the heirs of the deceased against the State.
Madras High Court Cites 209 - Cited by 4 - F M Kalifulla - Full Document
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