18. Having regard to the view taken by the Supreme
Court in the decisions referred to above and the contradictory
findings recorded by the Tribunal, which according to us clearly
amounts to making a new case in favour of the revenue, We are
of the view that the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside
and a fresh consideration is to be carried out by the Tribunal.
55 Before us, the ld DR has relied upon the order of the Assessing Officer and on
the other hand, the ld Sr counsel for the assessee has relied upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax v.
Torqouise Investment and Finance Ltd. reported in 300 ITR 1 as well as in the case of
Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan reported in 263 ITR 706.
56 We have considered the rival contention as well as the relevant material on
record. We do not agree with the arguments of the Assessing Officer that the income
of the Branch Office of the assessee would be taxable in USA as well as in India when
the said Branch Office is treated as PE within the meaning of Article 5 of the Indo-US
DTAA. The Assessing Officer has also accepted the proposition that if the transactions
are at ALP, then, the benefit of Article 7 of the DTAA is available to the assessee.
Accordingly, we do not find any error or illegality in the order of the CIT(A), qua this
issue
45.2 Therefore, following the earlier orders of this Tribunal, we decide this issue in
favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
(i) Union of India Vs. Azadi Bachao Andoloan 263 ITR 706 (SC) wherein it was
held 'Treaty shopping' is a graphic expression used to describe the act of a
resident of a third country taking advantage of a fiscal treaty between two
Contracting States. It is rightly urged by the counsel for the appellants that if it
was intended that a national of a third State should be precluded from the benefits
of the DTAC, then a suitable term of limitation to that effect should have been
incorporated therein. Art. 24 of the Indo-US Treaty on Avoidance of Double
Taxation specifically provides the limitations subject to which the benefits under
the Treaty can be availed of. One of the limitations is that more than 50 per cent
of the. beneficial interest, or in the case of a company more than 50 per cent of the
number of shares of each class of the company, be owned directly or indirectly by
one or more individual residents of one of the Contracting States. Art. 24 of the
Indo-U.S. DTAC is in marked contrast with the Indo-Mauritius DTAC. The
appellants rightly contend that in the absence of a limitation clause, such as the
one contained in art. 24 of the Indo-U.S. Treaty, there are no disabling or
disentitling conditions under the Indo-Mauritius Treaty prohibiting the resident of
a third nation from deriving benefits thereunder. They also urge that motives with
which the residents have been incorporated in Mauritius are wholly irrelevant and
ITA Nos.202 & 693/B/18
30
cannot in anyway affect the legality of the transaction. They urge that there is
nothing like equity in a fiscal statute. Either the statute applies proprio vigore or it
does not. There is no question of applying a fiscal statute by intendment, if the
expressed words do not apply. This contention of the appellants has merit and
deserves acceptance. There is no doubt that, where necessary, the Courts are
empowered to lift the veil of incorporation while applying the domestic law. In
the situation where the terms of the DTAC have been made applicable by reason
of s. 90 even if they derogate from the provisions of the IT Act, it is not possible
to say that the principle of lifting the veil of incorporation should be applied by
the Court. The whole purpose of the DTAC is to ensure that the benefits
thereunder are available even if they are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Indian IT Act. Therefore, the principle of piercing the veil of incorporation can
hardly apply to a situation as the present one. The maxim "Judicis est jus dicere,
non dare" pithily expounds the duty of the Court. It is to decide what the law is,
and apply it; not to make it. The weighty recommendations of the Working Group
on Non-resident Taxation are again about what the law ought to be, and a pointer
to the Parliament and the Executive for incorporating suitable limitation
provisions in the treaty itself or by domestic legislation. This per se does not
render an attempt by resident of a third party to take advantage of the existing
provisions of the DTAC illegal. The recommendations of the Working Group of
the JPC are intended for Parliament to take appropriate action. The JPC might
have noticed certain consequences, intended or unintended, flowing from the
DTAC and has made appropriate recommendations. Based on them, it is not
possible to say that the DTAC or the impugned circular are contrary to law, nor
would it be possible to interfere with either of them on the basis of the report of
the JPC.
i) Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan reported in [(2004) 10 SCC 1],
wherein a circular was issued by CBDT under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act,
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W.P. No.10673 of 2021
1961. It was challenged inter alia on the ground that it was ultra vires the provisions of
Section 119(1). The argument was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
following words: