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M/S.Apollo Tyres Ltd vs The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax on 4 August, 2021

18. Having regard to the view taken by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above and the contradictory findings recorded by the Tribunal, which according to us clearly amounts to making a new case in favour of the revenue, We are of the view that the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside and a fresh consideration is to be carried out by the Tribunal.
Kerala High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 1 - B K Thomas - Full Document

Grasim Industries Ltd., Mumbai vs Department Of Income Tax on 3 September, 2002

55 Before us, the ld DR has relied upon the order of the Assessing Officer and on the other hand, the ld Sr counsel for the assessee has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax v. Torqouise Investment and Finance Ltd. reported in 300 ITR 1 as well as in the case of Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan reported in 263 ITR 706. 56 We have considered the rival contention as well as the relevant material on record. We do not agree with the arguments of the Assessing Officer that the income of the Branch Office of the assessee would be taxable in USA as well as in India when the said Branch Office is treated as PE within the meaning of Article 5 of the Indo-US DTAA. The Assessing Officer has also accepted the proposition that if the transactions are at ALP, then, the benefit of Article 7 of the DTAA is available to the assessee. Accordingly, we do not find any error or illegality in the order of the CIT(A), qua this issue 45.2 Therefore, following the earlier orders of this Tribunal, we decide this issue in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 38 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M/S Flipkart India Private Limited , ... vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax ... on 25 April, 2018

(i) Union of India Vs. Azadi Bachao Andoloan 263 ITR 706 (SC) wherein it was held 'Treaty shopping' is a graphic expression used to describe the act of a resident of a third country taking advantage of a fiscal treaty between two Contracting States. It is rightly urged by the counsel for the appellants that if it was intended that a national of a third State should be precluded from the benefits of the DTAC, then a suitable term of limitation to that effect should have been incorporated therein. Art. 24 of the Indo-US Treaty on Avoidance of Double Taxation specifically provides the limitations subject to which the benefits under the Treaty can be availed of. One of the limitations is that more than 50 per cent of the. beneficial interest, or in the case of a company more than 50 per cent of the number of shares of each class of the company, be owned directly or indirectly by one or more individual residents of one of the Contracting States. Art. 24 of the Indo-U.S. DTAC is in marked contrast with the Indo-Mauritius DTAC. The appellants rightly contend that in the absence of a limitation clause, such as the one contained in art. 24 of the Indo-U.S. Treaty, there are no disabling or disentitling conditions under the Indo-Mauritius Treaty prohibiting the resident of a third nation from deriving benefits thereunder. They also urge that motives with which the residents have been incorporated in Mauritius are wholly irrelevant and ITA Nos.202 & 693/B/18 30 cannot in anyway affect the legality of the transaction. They urge that there is nothing like equity in a fiscal statute. Either the statute applies proprio vigore or it does not. There is no question of applying a fiscal statute by intendment, if the expressed words do not apply. This contention of the appellants has merit and deserves acceptance. There is no doubt that, where necessary, the Courts are empowered to lift the veil of incorporation while applying the domestic law. In the situation where the terms of the DTAC have been made applicable by reason of s. 90 even if they derogate from the provisions of the IT Act, it is not possible to say that the principle of lifting the veil of incorporation should be applied by the Court. The whole purpose of the DTAC is to ensure that the benefits thereunder are available even if they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian IT Act. Therefore, the principle of piercing the veil of incorporation can hardly apply to a situation as the present one. The maxim "Judicis est jus dicere, non dare" pithily expounds the duty of the Court. It is to decide what the law is, and apply it; not to make it. The weighty recommendations of the Working Group on Non-resident Taxation are again about what the law ought to be, and a pointer to the Parliament and the Executive for incorporating suitable limitation provisions in the treaty itself or by domestic legislation. This per se does not render an attempt by resident of a third party to take advantage of the existing provisions of the DTAC illegal. The recommendations of the Working Group of the JPC are intended for Parliament to take appropriate action. The JPC might have noticed certain consequences, intended or unintended, flowing from the DTAC and has made appropriate recommendations. Based on them, it is not possible to say that the DTAC or the impugned circular are contrary to law, nor would it be possible to interfere with either of them on the basis of the report of the JPC.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Bangalore Cites 55 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Madras Craft Foundation Society vs Commissioner Of Income Tax ... on 23 February, 2024

i) Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan reported in [(2004) 10 SCC 1], wherein a circular was issued by CBDT under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act, Page 11 of 16 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P. No.10673 of 2021 1961. It was challenged inter alia on the ground that it was ultra vires the provisions of Section 119(1). The argument was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following words:
Madras High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - M Shaffiq - Full Document
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