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Documents citing Maharashtra State Financial ... vs Ashok K. Agarwal & Ors on 30 March, 2006

K. Raja Rao vs A.P. Industrial Development ... on 4 January, 2013

Under the first deed of guarantee, though the Corporation has the option to proceed against the petitioner when the principal borrower has committed default as also to make a demand under the said deed of guarantee, it has not chosen to do so, but only proceeded against the borrower under section 29 of the SFC Act. On 22.5.1996 the Corporation addressed letter to the District Collector, Hyderabad to initiate action under the Revenue recovery Act and on 15.7.1996 the Mandal Revenue Officer, Golconda issued distraint warrant, but, it appears that no steps have been taken and again notice was given on 23.6.1998 to the petitioner for payment of Rs.135.33 lakhs and thereafter no steps appears to have been taken and finally the impugned notice dated 6.1.2000 was issued by the 2nd respondent. From the above, it is clear that though the Corporation issued notices to the principal debtor from time to time for sale of the Unit of the Company no concrete steps have been taken for realization of the debt due by sale of the Unit of the Company and it could realize the debts to the extent of Rs.61.00 lakhs only on 29.12.1993. Nothing prevented the Corporation to proceed against the guarantors for realization of the debt due simultaneously when the proceedings under section 29 SFC Act are taken up against the Company for sale of the Unit by issuing a demand for payment of the amount due. It failed to initiate the steps for realization of the debt from the guarantor within the period of limitation of three years ie from 28.3.1990 when the liability of the petitioner was crystallized. Even if we take the letter dated 28.5.1992 into consideration as the date when the debt was crystallized the demand made against the petitioner on 22.3.1996 is clearly time barred. Article 137 of the Limitation Act provides that any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Act, it provides that the period of limitation begins to run when the right to apply accrues. The Supreme Court in MAHARASHTRA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION v. ASHOK K. AGARWAL AND OTHERS held that the liability of the sureties would crystallize when the proceedings under the State Financial Corporation Act would be initiated for sale of properties of the borrower company. Therefore, whether we take the date of crystallization of debt as 28.3.1990 or 28.5.1992 the letter of demand issued to the petitioner on 22.3.1996 is clearly beyond the period of limitation.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 28 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Rfc Chittorgarh vs M/S Anis Ahmed Habib Khan & Anr on 22 September, 2008

In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), the present application, which was filed by the appellant in the court on 26th April, 1995 for the recovery of loan amount of the year 1982 and first installment of which was paid to the borrower on 26.2.1982 and for which notices were issued long ago and as per the finding recorded by the trial court while deciding issue no.4, the appellant could prove the loan payment against loan which on 28th Oct., 1984 from from 28th Oct., 1984 the period of limitation was available to the appellant upto three years i.e., upto 28th Oct., 1987 whereas the application under Section 31 of the Act was submitted on 25th April, 1995 which was barred by time.
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - P C Tatia - Full Document

The Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment vs M/S. Jamal Bran Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd on 2 September, 2024

12.3.The Hon'ble Suprem Court in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. Vs. Ashok K.Agarwal reported in 2006 9 SCC 617 has held that three years period commences from the date of sale of property of principal borrowers. Applying the said principle, the claim of the appellant corporation is also barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act for the reason that they have not made the claim within three years either from the date of the sale that took place on 11.08.2003 or from the date of the appropriation of sale amount in the account of the principal borrower on 30.12.2003.
Madras High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 0 - P Velmurugan - Full Document

Karnataka State Industrial vs Madhu Paper Mills (P) Ltd on 27 February, 2025

In Deepak Bhandari, there is a reference to Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs Ashok Agarwal and it has been observed that the question that arose there was which of the two Articles namely 136 or 137 of the Limitation Act was applicable, but did not discuss the issue in regard to starting date for counting the period of limitation. And the facts in that case show that financial corporation, i.e., Himachal Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation instituted a suit invoking deed of indemnity executed by the guarantor, it did not take action
Karnataka High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Karnataka State Financial Corporation vs M/S Gualbarga Steels(O) Ltd on 18 December, 2025

25. The District Judge has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra State Financial Vs. Ashok K Agarwal in Civil Appeal No.3727/1999 decided on 30.03.2016 to hold that Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Necessary to note that in the facts involved in the said judgment of the Apex Court, Corporation therein had filed an application under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act, 1951 against the borrowers therein on 25.10.1983, when the liability of the sureties had crystallized by then. Amendment of Section 31 of the Act, 1951 providing for action to be taken enforcing the liability against the sureties was brought about in the year 1985 by insertion of clause (aa) to Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act, 1951. That even after such amendment, the Corporation therein had not taken steps
Karnataka High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 0 - M G Kamal - Full Document

Orissa State Financial Corporation vs Bhargabi Cold Storage on 9 August, 2019

8. Per contra, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents submitted that in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Ashok Kumar Agarwal, 2006 (9) SCC 617, the apex Court held that the period of limitation for initiation of proceeding under Sec.31 of the S.F.C Act is three years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The language used in Secs.29 and 31 of the S.F.C Act, though little different, but the purpose is identical. The entire purpose of taking action either under Sec.29 or under Sec.31 of the S.F.C Act is for realisation of the liability as on the date of the notice. The power assigned under Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act is an unbridled power. It is mandatory for the Corporation to issue a prior notice before any action under Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act is taken. Such notice prior to any action taken under Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act is the date of cause of action before any steps is taken for either taking delivery of possession or disposal of the property to mitigate the liability. It is not the legislative intention that the Corporation will wait for an indefinite period to take action under Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act after the notice of recall of loan or demand. If the proposition of indefinite period is accepted, then the borrower will always be under the threat of the Corporation throughout his life like a Damocles sword handing over his head. The action to be taken either under Sec.31 or under Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act must be within the period of limitation as contemplated under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The period of limitation is three years from the date of accrual of the cause of 6 action, which is from the date of either date of recall notice or notice of demand.
Orissa High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - A K Rath - Full Document

Sishupal Singh And Ors vs R F C on 13 February, 2013

Further contention of the appellants is that proceedings are barred by limitation and reliance has been placed on 2006 DNJ (SC) 508 Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs Ashok K. Agarwal and ors, it has been categorically held that applications under section 31 sub clause 1 (aa) and 32 of the Financial Corporation Act, Article 137 would apply. Admittedly, the loan was advanced on 11.11.1982 whereas the proceedings have been started in the year 1994 and period of limitation prescribed under section 137 of Limitation Act is only three years. Hence,in view of the above, the proceedings for enforcement of liability against the sureties are time barred. The respondents have relied upon 1997 (2) WLC 199 where it has been held that in proceedings under section 31 sub clause 1 of State Financial Act, Article 137 of Limitation Act has no application but this view cannot be found good.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

C528/1136/2025 on 16 July, 2025

11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in view of the above, the compounding application is allowed. The entire proceedings of Criminal Case No.1581 of 2019 State vs. Alok Agarwal, for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 498-A, 504 and 506 of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, District Dehradun are hereby quashed.
Uttarakhand High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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