"24. A Bench of this Court in the case of Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [1979 AIR SC 577], stating this distinction with some clarity, held as under :
"24. A Bench of this Court in the case of Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [1979 AIR SC 577], stating this distinction with some clarity, held as under :
"24. A Bench of this Court in the case of Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [1979 AIR SC 577], stating this distinction with some clarity, held as under (SCC pp. 36-37 para 11):
"24. A Bench of this Court in the case of Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [1979 AIR SC 577], stating this distinction with some clarity, held as under :
"24. A Bench of this Court in the case of Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [1979 AIR SC 577], stating this distinction with some clarity, held as under :
"24. A Bench of this Court in the case of Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [1979 AIR SC 577], stating this distinction with some clarity, held as under :
24. A Bench of this Court in Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab [(1979) 3 SCC 30 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 635 : AIR 1979 SC 577] stating this distinction with some clarity, held as under: (SCC pp. 36-37, para 11)
"11. A question now arises whether the appellant was guilty under Part I of Section 304 or Part II. If the accused commits an act while exceeding the right of private defence by which the death is caused either with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death then he would be guilty under Part I. On the other hand if before the application of any of the Exceptions of Section 300 it is found that he was guilty of murder within the meaning of clause 'Fourthly', then no question of such intention arises and only the knowledge is to be fastened on him that he did indulge in an act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause it or without any intention to cause such bodily injuries as was likely to cause death. There does not seem to be any escape from the position, therefore, that the appellant could be convicted only under Part II of Section 304 and not Part I."