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Documents citing Rachappa Subrao Jadhav Desai vs Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhav Desai on 3 December, 1918

Zenith Lamps And Electricals Ltd. vs The Registrar, High Court And Ors. on 31 March, 1967

It is therefore clear that one of the essential elements laid down by the Supreme Court as the requisite of a fee, namely, that it must be appropriated to a separate fund earmarked to meet the expenses of the services, had never been true of the Court-fees at any time and is also not true of the Court-fees levied after the Constitution. We agree, therefore, with the learned Advocate-General that the Court-fee does not fall in the category of fees with which their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing.... The learned Advocate-General, in our opinion, is right in saying that the levy of Court-fee for raising the general revenue has been, authorised by the relevant Entries in the Legislative Lists under the Constitution and the challenge therefore to the validity of such fees on the ground that they are not earmarked as a separate fund for the purposes of meeting the expenses of the services rendered cannot be sustained.
Madras High Court Cites 81 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

The Central Provinces Syndicate ... vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Nagpur on 9 March, 1961

20. In our opinion, there is considerable substance in the submissions which are urged by the learned Advocate-General. The only feature of the court-fee which distinguished it from a tax was that unlike the tax, which was an imposition made for public purposes without any reference to any special benefit to be conferred upon the payers of the tax, the court-fee was imposed on persons who wanted to file documents in court or obtain certified copies from the court and the imposition could thus be said to have reference to the special benefit of getting documents filed or receiving copies which was obtained by the persons from whom payment was asked. There was, however, no monetary measure of the fees charged for the services rendered, and the levy of the fees could also not be said to be in proportion to the services rendered. As to the second element, namely, that the fees collected had to be earmarked to meet the expenses for rendering the services and must not go to the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes the said element was never present in the court-fees levied and collected. The fees collected under the Courts-fees Act were always considered as raised for general revenue and went to the general public revenue. That the Court-fees Act was a measure for raising public revenue was held by the Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao, to which the learned Advocate-General referred. That the Court-fees Act was in essence a taxing statute and that the fees collected under the Act were for the purposes of raising general public revenue has been the view expressed about the enactments in several judicial decisions. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Federal Court was empowered to make rules as to the fees to be charged in respect of the proceedings in that court. Under item 53 of the Federal Legislative List of the Seventh Schedule in the Act, the Federal Legislature was given power to legislate with regard to the jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Federal Court, and, under enter 59, which gave power to levy fees in respect of any of the matters contained in the Federal Legislative List, the fees taken in any court were excluded from the exercise of that power. In the Legislative List of the State, entry No. 1 empowered the State legislature to legislate with reference to administration of justice, constitution and organisation of all courts except the Federal Court and the fees taken therein. Entry No. 54 in this list which provided for fees in respect of any of the matters mentioned in the list, excluded again the fees taken in any court. Entry No. 36 in the Concurrent Legislative List, which gave power to levy fees, similarly excluded the power to levy fees in courts. It will thus be seen that the Legislative Lists under the Government of India act, 1935, made a distinction between the court-fees and the other fees. Sections 216 and 228 of the Government of India Act, 1935, will also indicate that the feature of the fees that they must be earmarked as a separate fund to meet the expenses of the services which were to be rendered to the payers of such fees was not to hold good of the fees levied in courts. Under section 216, the fees and the other moneys taken by the Federal Court were to form part of the revenues of the Dominion, and under section 228, the fees or other moneys taken by the courts in the States were to form part of the revenues of the Provinces. It will thus be seen that under the Government of India Act, 1935, distinction between court-fees and the other fees was recognised and maintained and the availability of the court-fees as the general source of revenue was not done away with. We find the same position maintained under the Constitution also. Article 77 in List No. 1 in the Seventh Schedule, which in the Union List, empowers the Parliament to levy fees in Supreme Court. Entry No. 96, which gives power for the imposition of fees with regard to matters in the list, excludes fees taken in any court. In entry No. 3 of List II, which is the State List, the State legislatures are empowered to legislate with regard to fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court. The fee taken in any court is excluded from entry the No. 66 which provides for the levying of fees in any of the matters in the Second List. Entry No. 47 in List III, which is the Concurrent List, again excluded the court-fees from the categories of fees with reference to which that entry empowers the State legislatures to make laws. As in the Government of India Act, 1935, under the Constitution also, a distinction has been made between court-fees and the other fees. Article 146 and article 229 again provide that the fees levied in courts are to form part of the general revenue of the Union or the State, as the case may be. Thus, under article 146(3), any fees or other moneys taken by the Supreme Court are to form part of the Consolidated Fund of India. Article 229 provides that fees or other moneys taken by the High Court will form part of the Consolidated Fund of the State. It is, therefore, clear that one of the essential elements laid down by the Supreme Court as the requisite of a fee, namely, that it must be appropriated to a separate fund earmarked to meet the expenses of the services, had never been true of the court-fees at any time and is also not true of the court-fees levied after the Constitution. We agree, therefore, with the learned Advocate-General that the court-fee does not fall in the category of fees with which their Lordship of the Supreme Court were dealing in the cases which are referred to by Mr. Kolah, and the levy of the court-fee, therefore, cannot be declared to be unconstitutional because it does not possess the requisites which the Supreme Court held as being essential of the fees with which they were dealing. The learned Advocate-General, in our opinion, is right in saying that the levy of court-fee for raising the general revenue has been authorised by the relevant entries in the Legislative Lists under the Constitution, and the challenge, therefore, to the validity of such fees on the ground that they are not earmarked as a separate fund for the purposes of meeting the expenses of the services rendered, cannot be sustained. The first contention, therefore, which Mr. Kolah has urged with reference to the constitutional validity of the court-fees fails.
Bombay High Court Cites 52 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kiran Singh And Others vs Chaman Paswan And Others on 14 April, 1954

The defendant then took up the matter in appeal to the Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao Jadhav v. Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhav(2), and there, his contention was that, in fact, on its true valuation the suit was triable by the Court of the Subordinate Judge of the Second Class, and that the District Court was the proper Court to entertain the appeal. The Privy Council held that this objection which was " the most technical of technicalities " was not taken in the Court of first instance, and that the Court would not be justified " in assisting an objection of that type," and that it was also untenable. Before concluding, it observed:
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 1029 - Full Document

The President vs V.Balasubramaniam on 28 February, 2018

22.In the light of the above discussions from Paragraphs 13 to 21, the technical plea raised by the Revision Petitioner, the President of No.1655, Udumalpet Taluk Co-operative Housing Construction Society, Udumalpet, Tiruppur District, is found unacceptable, particularly, in the light of the observation of the Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao Jadhav v. Shidapa Venkatrao Jadhav reported in 46 IA 24.
Madras High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Maganlal Chunilal Choksi vs Kanchanlal Manchharam on 16 March, 1936

That being so, the Privy Council case of Rachappa Subrao Jadhav v. Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhav has no application, because, as explained in Shivsangappa v. Muchkhandeppa , that was in effect a suit for a bare declaration without consequential relief. It is only in suits of that nature that the dictum of their Lordships applies, that it is the real value of the property and not the notional value that determines the valuation for jurisdiction. I may note also that it is clear from their Lordships' judgment that the suit before them was one embracing two or more distinct subjects so that it was capable of being brought under Section 17 of the Court-fees Act. We hold that this must be regarded as a suit for accounts coming under Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court-fees Act, and that in view of the valuation placed by the plaintiffs on the relief claimed by them and the provisions of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the subject-matter of the suit is less than Rs. 5,000 in value and the appeal lies to the District Judge.
Bombay High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Khacheru Singh vs S.D.O. Khurja on 22 January, 1960

The Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatarao, 46 Jnd Apt) 24 at p. 32: (AIR 1918 PC 188 at p. 191), pointed out that the Court-fees Act was not passed to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality against his opponents "but to secure revenue for the benefit of the State", and in F. A. Shihan v. Abdul Alim; AIR 1930 Gal 787, the Court-fees Act was bluntly described by Rankin, C. J., as a taxing statute.
Allahabad High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 4 - R Dayal - Full Document

Hiralal Patni vs Sri Kali Nath on 27 January, 1955

It may also be observed that the pecuniary defect of jurisdiction which falls under Section 11 Suits Valuation Act and which can be waived is a defect of under-valuation or over-valuation of the subject-matter of the dispute, but if there is no under-valuation or over-valuation and if on the valuation given in the plaint itself, the suit was not entertainable by a particular Court, and the Court renders judgment by assuming jurisdiction, the judgment rendered by it will be treated as a nullity, vide 'Shidappa Venkatrao v. Rachappa Subrao', 36 Bom 628 (C), affirmed by the" Privy Council in 'Rachappa Subrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao', AIR 1918 PC 188 (D).
Allahabad High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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