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Documents citing Gurpreet Singh vs Chatur Bhuj Goel on 15 December, 1987

Mr. S.P. Minocha vs Lila Ram on 5 April, 2002

"Appellants have argued that to allow a party to go back upon what he has orally agreed in open Court would be unjust and that strict compliance with Order 23 Rule 3 was not required. But then, the language of Order 23 Rule 3 is quite clear that the compromise must be in writing and signed. Further the facts in the judgment of Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel -, are almost similar and show that strict compliance with Order 23 Rule 3 is necessary. In that case too, before a Division Bench which heard the appeal parties or counsel made oral submissions on 28.1.1987 stating that the appeal could stand dismissed as respondent agreed to receive Rs. 2,25,000/- from appellant. The case was adjourned to 17.3.1987 to check if the money as agreed to on 28.1.87 was paid. But later the respondent went back, taking advantage of Order 23 Rule
Delhi High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 1 - M Sarin - Full Document

Arunachalam M. vs Tamil Nadu Electricity Board And Anr. on 31 December, 1996

11. There is no difficulty in accepting the contention of the writ petitioner that once the Labour Court was justified that the Order of dismissal was not justified it should have awarded full backwages. There can be no dispute over the proposition of law that it is not open to the Court to act on the basis of the memorandum signed by the advocate alone. In my view, the then counsel for the writ petitioner might have consented or even invited the Labour Court to pass the award denying the benefit of backwages to the writ petitioner, but the Labour Court as a creature of law must exercise the powers according to the statute. The Labour Court is not competent to pass orders on the basis of the consent of counsel which is de hors the provisions of the statute. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, (supra) and Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (supra) and the decision of this Court in Ideal Garden Complex Private Ltd., Salem-4 v. Vijai Agencies, Salem-4, (supra) make it clear that the Labour Court should have insisted upon the parties to reduce the terms of compromise into writing and the compromise should be signed by the party. The requirement of the signature of the party when a part of claim is given up is all the more necessary in the case of industrial adjudication where the workman is a party and there are possibilities of a workman becoming the victim of circumstances. The sine quo non for the denial of the relief of the backwages when the order of termination was not found justified is the application of mind of the Labour Court to the facts of the case and then decide the question for the grant of necessary relief. The counsel for the workman might have voluntarily invited or might have led the golden path of the compromise, but the Labour Court should not have gone on the basis of the memorandum signed by the counsel alone. However, on the facts of the case, it is seen, Labour Court has not acted on the basis of memorandum signed by the advocate, but also took into account other circumstances.
Madras High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

M. Arunachalam vs The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board ... on 31 December, 1996

11. There is no difficulty in accepting the contention of the writ petitioner that once the Labour Court was justified that the Order of dismissal was not justified it should have awarded full backwages. There can be no dispute over the proposition of law that it is not open to the Court to act on the basis of the memorandum signed by the advocate alone. In my view, the then counsel for the writ petitioner might have consented or even invited the Labour Court to pass the award denying the benefit of backwages to the writ petitioner, but the Labour Court as a creature of law must exercise the powers according to the statute. The Labour Court is not competent to pass orders on the basis of the consent of counsel which is de hors the provisions of the statute. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel and BanwariLai v. ChandoDevi and the decision of this Court in M/s. Ideal Garden Complex Private Ltd., Salem-4 v. M/s. Vijai Agencies, Salem-4 1995 T.L.N.J. 23, make it clear that the Labour Court should have insisted upon the parties to reduce the terms of compromise into writing and the compromise should be signed by the party. The requirement of the signature of the party when a part of claim is given up is all the more necessary in the case of industrial adjudication where the workman is a party and there are possibilities of a workman becoming the victim of circumstances. The sine quo non for the denial of the relief of the backwages when the order of termination was not found justified is the application of mind of the Labour Court to the facts of the case and then decide the question for the grant of necessary relief. The counsel for the workman might have voluntarily invited or might have led the golden path of the compromise, but the Labour Court should not have gone on the basis of the memorandum signed by the counsel alone. However, on the facts of the case, it is seen, Labour Court has not acted on the basis of memorandum signed by the advocate, but also took into account other circumstances.
Madras High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

K.Ravichandran vs The Management Of Indo Tech Electric on 5 October, 2020

In Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel [Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, (1988) 1 SCC 270] it has been said: (SCC p. 276, para 10) ‘10. Under Rule 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be Page 11 of 16 http://www.judis.nic.in Review Appl.No.218 of 2019 dispensed with. The court must therefore insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing.”
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - S Ramamoorthy - Full Document

Kerala State Electricity Board vs Kurien E. Kalathil on 9 March, 2018

In the case of Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel (1988) 1 SC 207 it has been said: (SCC p. 276, para 10) “Under Rule 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The court must therefore insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing.”
Supreme Court of India Cites 29 - Cited by 48 - R Banumathi - Full Document

Kshounish Chowdhury And Ors. vs Kero Rajendra Monolithics Ltd. And Ors. on 23 June, 1999

The question is whether, in all types of cases, the compromise should be in writing and signed by the parties as held in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goe, AIR 1988 SC 400. It is to be noted that the above case was related to a compromise entered into in a suit, the proceedings of which are governed by the provisions of the Code. Proceedings before the Company Law Board are not governed by the provisions of the Code as the same are not applicable to proceedings before the Company Law Board.
Company Law Board Cites 17 - Cited by 12 - Full Document
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