Nawab Shuja-Ul-Mulk Bahadur vs Umir-Ul-Umra Bahadur And Ors. on 29 April, 1925
The decision in Aiyasamier v. Venkatachala Mudali (1916) ILR 40 M 989 : 31 MLJ 513 (FB).
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1 - 9 of 9 (0.34 seconds)Chamava Rachaya vs Iraya Sangava Hiremath on 10 February, 1931
The decision in Dakshinamurthi Pillai v. Vedamurthy Mudaliar is inconsistent with the decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Aiyasamier v. Venkatachela Mudali [1916] 40 Mad.
Sm. Gauri Kumari Devi vs Krishna Prasad And Ors. on 8 January, 1957
(M); Badri Das v. Inayat Khan, ILR 22 All 404 (N); Aiyasamier v Venkatachela Mudali ILR 40 Mad 989 : (AIR 1918 Mad 1187) (PB) (O); Janar-dan Shankar v. Krishnaji Balkrishna, 22 Bom LR 953 : (AIR 1920 Bom 95) (P); Gurumukh Singh v. Hari Chand, AIR 1935 Lah 850 (Q) ; Sundermull v. J. C. Galstaun, AIR 1929 Cal 387 (R); Raja Ram Lal v. Hanuman Upadhya, AIR 1916 Pat 350 (S); Profulla Nath v. Asia Khatun, AIR 1934 Cal 426 (T) ; Palaniappa v. Narayanan, AIR 1936 Mad 34 (U) ; Ram Saran Das v Ban-wari Lal, AIR 1938 All 98 (V) and Ulfat Hussain Khan v. Girdhari Lal, AIR 1937 Oudh 252 (W).
Mangamma Nayakuralu vs B.M. Ramdasappa Nayanimavary And Ors. on 18 December, 1924
4. I agree with my learned brother's proposed order, but would like to add my own view of this case. I think the principle to be applied is the general principle that a decree or an application for execution which cannot be executed cannot be time-barred. This principle has with respect to questions of limitation under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code been applied in a Full Bench case of this Court in Aiyasamier v. Venkatachala Mudali (1916) 40 Mad. 989.
Rajam Naidu And Anr. vs Meenakshi Ammal And Ors. on 16 April, 1948
9. (The other clauses are omitted as they are not material). This section applies as between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor who are parties to the suit. Where there is a combined decree passed under the old Code in a mortgage suit providing for the sale of the property in the first instance and also for the personal liability of the mortgagor for the balance found due after such sale, it was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Aiyasamier v. Venpatachela Mudali (1916) 31 M.L.J. 513 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 989 (F.B.) that the decree-holder had twelve years under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code for the recovery of such balance reckoned from the time when it was ascertained to be due. Under the present Code however a fresh decree has to be passed under Order 34, Rule 6, on the personal covenant for the balance due after the hypotheea was sold.
Mangamma Nayakuralu vs B.M. Ramadasappa Nayanimvary And Ors. on 18 December, 1924
4. I agree with my learned brother's proposed order, but would like to add my own view of this case. I think the principle to be applied is the general principle that a decree or an application for execution which cannot be executed cannot be time-barred. This principle has with respect to questions of limitation under Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code been applied in a Full Bench case of this Court in Aiyasamier v. Venkatachala Mudali (1916) ILR 40 M 989 (FB).
Rango Ramacharya Katti vs Gopal Narayan Kulkarni on 2 August, 1938
5, has laid down the law in this sense and treated Aiyasamier v. Venkatachela Mudali (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad.
Surajman Chaube vs Anjore Shukul on 31 July, 1923
In Aiyasamier v. Venkatachela Mudali (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 989, the date of the decree in Clause (a) of Pection 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure was similarly interpreted as meaning the date when the decree became executable. The decree in the present case did not become capable of execution till a default had been made by the judgment-debtor in paying the decretal money within the period allowed; and whether Article 181 or Article 182, Clause (7) of the Indian Limitation Act (No. IX of 1908) was applied, the time from which the period of limitation began to run would not be deemed to have commenced till after the expiry of that period. The amount to which the decree-holder (sic) became then determinable and recoverable.
Venkataraya Goundan vs Mallappa Goundan And Ors. on 5 December, 1945
These observations very clearly bring out the distinction between the facts in that case and the present case. In the present case, unlike the above two cases the adjudication became ripe for execution on the date of judgment, in that the respective rights of the parties had been adjudicated and decided on. It was only the formalities to be observed in drafting the decree that had to be yet carried out.
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