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Documents citing State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Raja Anand Brahma Shah on 16 September, 1966

State vs . Brahma Nand on 17 December, 2012

7. PW­4 Smt. Asgari stated that she do not remember the date 6 FIR No:530/2003 State Vs. Brahma Nand of accident. However, it happened 5 years back. It was rainy season. It occurred at about 4:00 pm. On the day of accident while her grand son namely Saddam, aged about 1 ½ years was playing outside her rented house, a vehicle being used to carry fruits, being driven by the accused came there and ran over his said grandson. The accident was caused on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver. The accident occurred when she was in her room. She had sound of vehicle and came out and saw that the said vehicle being driven by the accused came there and ran over her said grandson. She became perplexed and unconscious. Her grandson died on the spot.
Delhi District Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

State vs . Raju Shah on 8 November, 2019

PW­1 Complainant/victim deposed that she was residing at her address for last 20 years. She did not remember the date of incident. At the time of incident her husband was not present in the house as he had gone State Vs. Raju Shah; FIR No.485/2014;PS Govindpuri 2/16 to his village at Kolkata for some urgent work. The accused came to her house at 11.00 PM and asked about her husband that "where was Dada (my husband)". Accused Raju Shah used to call her husband as Dada. Thereafter, accused asked her for water and when she asked him to take the water from his own shop as he was running a tea stall at that time. Accused Raju again insisted for water and told her that "kya mere upar Viswash nahi hai". Thereafter, When she brought water from kitchen and gave him the water, the accused held her and dragged/laid down her on bed and came over her and thereafter she kicked him upon which he fell down from the bed. Thereafter, she gave beatings to him by broom. Thereafter the accused fled away from the spot and threatened her with dire consequences. On that day, she did not visit the police station as she was alone in her house. Next day she went to the police station and told the incident to police and police persons brought the accused in the police station. Thereafter, the witness was cross­examined by Ld. APP for the State.
Delhi District Court Cites 5 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Nellore Bujjanna And Anr. vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. on 4 March, 1982

25. After a careful consideration of all the decisions cited by the counsel on either side, we are of the view that the contention of the State that Article 31-A is applicable as the amending Act relates to agrarian reform has to prevail. As pointed out earlier, the parent Act had to be enacted as it was found that certain inams and other intermediary tenures had escaped the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act. It was decided that these inams also should be abolished and the Act of 1956 was enacted. But at that time no provision was made with regard to forest land, grazing land., etc It was considered necessary that in order to effectively implement the agrarian reform envisaged by the parent Act by the abolition of the intermediary tenure and converting all the lands into ryotwari tenure all the forest lands, etc. Should also be vested in the Government. These lands also formed part of the grant, and, but for the amendment the lands would continue to be under inam tenure without being abolished or converted into ryotwari tenure. We are of the view that the decision in State of U. P. v. Anand Brahama (supra) is applicable to this case also. If these provisions had been enacted in the main Act itself, there cannot be any doubt that the entire Act including this provision would have been protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution as the Act was for implementing agrarian reform that is, to abolish the inam tenure. The mere fact that Section 2-A was introduced by way of amendment later would not in our view, make any difference.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 24 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. ... vs The State Of Kerala on 21 June, 1972

"Lands which are held or let for the purpose of agriculture -- as undoubtedly most of these lands are, being covered with rubber, coffee etc.. if held under a single tenure which could be said to be equivalent to an estate -- would come under Article 31-A (2) (iii), but waste lands, forest lands, land for pastures or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land etc. would only be out of the purview of Article 31-A (2) if they are held on independent tenures and are not parts of land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto. This is the result of the decision of this Court in U. P. State v. Raia Anand. 1967-1 SCR 362 = (AIR 1967 SC 661). In that case It was held that in the case of a grant of the nature of a jasir or inam its acquisition for the purpose of agrarian reform would be protected under Article 31-A in spite of the fact that hundreds of square miles of forest land were comprised therein. The Court also held that forest lands or waste lands etc. would not be deemed to be estates within Clause (iii) (2) of Article 31-A unless the same were held or let for purposes ancillary to agriculture.
Kerala High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Sterlite Optical Technologies Ltd. vs Oil India Limited And Ors. on 31 July, 2007

25. From the decision in Raja Anand (supra), it becomes clear that the word 'including' can be used, in a given context, for the purpose of clarification or explanation and it is not necessary that the word 'include' would always convey expansiveness. In the present case, when telephones, mobile phones and pagers fall within the term 'sound transmitting equipment', there was, if Mr. Dubey's contention is to be accepted, no purpose in specifying these items in Entry 4, while defining as to what items would be included within the term 'sound transmitting equipment'. Had telephones, mobile phones and pagers not been the items, which are, normally, regarded as sound transmitting equipments, then, telephones, mobile phones and pagers, appearing under Entry 4, could have been held to have been included, within the expression 'sound transmitting equipment', by way of enlargement. Enlargement is required for the purpose of covering only such items, which do not, ordinarily, belong to the class within which an item is sought to be included. But when an item, otherwise, also stands included within a term, which is defined, the implication would be that the item, mentioned by way of inclusion, is clarificatory and imposes limitation.
Gauhati High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - I Ansari - Full Document

Municipal Board, Ghaziabad vs Seth Jai Prakash And Ors. on 31 October, 1973

"the expression 'estate' shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its focal equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any Jagir, inam, or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala any Janmam right." The Supreme Court's decision, therefore, has no relevance in the present case where the word 'estate' has been defined in the Act. Learned counsel also referred to State of U. P. v. Anand Brahma, AIR 1967 SC 661. That case too was on the interpretation of Article 31-A(2) of the Constitution. The case before us is different on facts in which a definite record of rights exists.
Allahabad High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mohinder Pal vs State Of H.P. And Ors. on 9 May, 1994

71. It was contended by the petitioner that the forest intended to be acquired is not an estate within the meaning of Article 31 A(1)(a) and Article 31 A(2)(a), therefore, Article 31A has no application. In order to bring it within the definition of an estate, the definition of estate has to be seen from the existing law relating to land tenure in force in the area. The Tenancy Laws do not define 'estate' and the definition of 'estate' in the Land Revenue Act is not relevant. Further, it does not fall under (i) and (ii) and in case it is to be brought under (iii), it is necessary that the forest should be held or let for the purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto as held by the apex Court in AIR 1967 SC 661 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah) and AIR 1972 SC 2240 (Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu).
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 73 - Cited by 28 - Full Document
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