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Documents citing Jetmull Bhojraj vs The Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Co. ... on 2 May, 1962

Union Of India (Uoi), By Its General ... vs Alapati Viswanatham on 6 April, 2004

From the above discussion, it goes without saying that the ground of waiver is not available to the appellant and the Tribunal has rightly refused the same and thus, the question of waiver does not arise in this case, in view of the ratio laid down in Jetmull Bhojraj case by the Supreme Court. That notice under Section 106 of the Act within the period of six months from the date of booking has to be given and when a notice is not given as contemplated under Section 77 of the Act, therein, the suit was dismissed. On the other hand, the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 106 of the Act held that it has to be liberally construed i.e., a notice in a particular form is not required to be given demanding the payment of compensation, but a letter is written to the railway administration bringing the non-delivery of goods to the notice is sufficient and thus, the claim of compensation is implied by such a letter. Therefore, I am not able to accede the reasons given by the Tribunal that the respondent has waived his right to take objection under Section 106 of the Act and the demand is made by the claimant at a later stage is waived. Viewed from any angle, I am unable to agree with the reasons given by the Tribunal while allowing the claim made by the claimant.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - E D Rao - Full Document

Brooke Bond India (Private) Ltd. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 8 July, 1968

14. Thus, most of the authorities, Mr. Basu refers me to, cannot alter the conclusion I have come to, on the Refunds Officer having been held out by the rail-way administration as the duly authorized person to receive notices of claims for refunds. The more so, as the intention behind Section 78B (formerly Section 77) is only to afford protection to the railway, administration against fraud and not to provide means for depriving the consignors of their legitimate claims: Jethmull Bhojraj v. Darjeeling Himalayan Rly. Co. Ltd. . Such provision must, therefore, be construed liberally.
Calcutta High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

The Union Of India (Uoi) vs Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd. And Anr. on 14 January, 1966

8. These decisions make it clear that even before the execution of the deed of subrogation on June 11, 1953 the plaintiff had a claim in equity against the Union of India. The notice given to the General Manager, though inaccurate in mentioning the execution of the deed of subrogation gave the said Manager fill details about the goods, the loss thereof and the basis of the plaintiff's claim. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jethmull Bhojraj v. Darjeeling Himalayan Rly. Co. Ltd. . "a notice under Section 77 should be liberally construed. In our opinion, that would be the proper way of construing a notice under that section. In enacting the section the intention of the legislature must have been to afford only a protection to the railway administration against fraud and not to provide a means for depriving the consignors of their legitimate claims for compensation tor the loss of or damage caused to their consignments during the course of transit on the railways."
Calcutta High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 9 - G K Mitter - Full Document

State Of West Bengal vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 24 June, 1986

5. The second ground on which the suit was dismissed by the trial Judge was that no notice of claim under Section 77 of the Railways Act, as it stood before the Railways (Amendment) Act of 1961, was served on the three out of the four Railways sued in this case and that in respect of the fourth one, the notice of claim was not addressed to any Manager as required under Section 140 of the Railways Act, as it stood before the Amendment as aforesaid. It is not disputed that the notice of claim having been served long before the replacement of Section 77 of the Railways Act by Section 78B and the amendment of S. 140 by the Amendment Act of 1961, was required to comply with the provisions of Section 77 and Section 140 as they stood at the relevant time. Whatever might be the position under the new Section 78B, the position under the old Section 77, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Jetmull Bhojraj v. Darjeeling Himalayan Railways, , was that "a notice thereunder must be given to every Railway Administration against whom a suit is eventually filed" and that a suit against any such Railway Administration without such notice was to be dismissed. In that view of the matter, the suit was rightly dismissed by the learned Judge against the three Railway Administrations to whom no notice of claim under Section 77 was given. A notice of claim was, however, sent to one of the Railways Administrations, being the D. H. Railway, later succeeded by N.E. Railway, which was the destination Railway; but the notice was sent to the Traffic Superintendent of that Railway.
Calcutta High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Union Of India (Uoi) vs Khetwat Oil Mills And Anr. on 20 January, 1988

and actually deals with it. In reaching the above conclusion support was drawn from Jothmull Bhojraj v. Darjeeltng Himalayan R/y. Co. Ltd. In Union of India v. Hart Nagar Sugar Milts Ltd. AIR 1968 Pat. 146, a Division Bench followed the Full Bench decision (supra) and held that notice under Section 77 of the Act served on the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent of the Railway was valid.
Orissa High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Union Of India vs Kewal Parkash on 8 November, 1976

In such circumstances, the relevant law is laid down by the Supreme Court in Jetmull Bhojraj v. Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Co. Ltd., . in this judgment the Supreme Court held that where what is claimed in a suit against the Railway Administration is compensation for the damage to the goods which were eventually delivered, the appropriate article applicable would be Art. 30 and not Art. 31 and the burden would be on the railway administration who want to non-suit the plaintiff on the ground of limitation to establish that the loss or injury occurred more than one year before the institution of the suit. After the coming into force of the new Limitation Act, the Art. 10 is the corresponding provision to the old Art. 30 and now the period of limitation is three years from the time the loss or injury occurs. Since open delivery was given in the present case on 25-11-1964, the limitation would begin to run from 25-11-1964. Taking into account the time taken in sending the notices, the suit, having been filed on 25-1-1968 is within three years. Therefore, it must be held that the suit is within time and is not barred by time.
Delhi High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Y Dayal - Full Document

Union Of India, Railway ... vs Eastern Match Co., Tirumangalam on 20 February, 1963

60. Section 77 of the Act was recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Jetmull Bhojraj v. Darjeeling Himalayan Railway Co., Ltd., . It was laid down by their Lordships that the intention of the legislature enacting Section 77 must have been to afford only a protection to the railway administration against fraud, and not to provide a means for depriving the consignors of their legitimate claims for compensation for the loss of or damage caused to their consignments during the course of transit on the railways. Bearing in mind the object of the section, it was held, notice under Section 77 should be liberally construed. It was also held in that case that, where within six months of booking the consignment, the consignor brought to the notice of the railway administration by a letter that part of the consignment had not reached the destination, and requested the General Manager of the Railway to make a search for the goods without delay, it amounted to a sufficient notice for the purpose of Section 77, and that the claim must be deemed to be implied in that notice, It was further laid down that on the language of Section 77, as it stood before the amendment in 1961, notice thereunder must be given to every railway administration against whom the suit is eventually filed. Their Lordships also laid "down that where the plaintiff is claiming compensation for the damage to goods which were eventually delivered, the appropriate article applicable would be Article 30, but not Article 31 of the Limitation Act. It was further held that under Section 80 of the Act it is for the consignor to establish if he wants to sue a railway administration other than the one which booked the consignment, that the damage had occurred on its system.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 31 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
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