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Documents citing Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar vs Poona Municipality on 16 December, 1943

State Of Maharashtra vs Kusum Charudutt Bharma Upadhye on 17 November, 1980

The power under Article 227 is exercisable only over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. By no stretch of imagination can the writ of habeas corpus or mandamus or quo warranter or prohibition be ever said to be part of the power of superintendence. The power to issue a writ of certioretri is also not a part of the power of superintendence, though at times a contention has been raised that it is. So far as the old prerogative writ jurisdiction was concerned, the power to' issue these writs was held to be an exercise of original jurisdiction. It was expressly so held with respect to a writ of habeas corpus in Mahomedalli Allabux v. Ismailji Abdulali, with respect to a writ of certiorari in Ryots of Garabandho and other villages v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, and Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar v. Poona Municipality and with respect to a writ of quo warranto in Hamid Hasan Nomani v. Banwarilal Roy. In the last-mentioned case the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held (p. 93(2), para. 17):
Bombay High Court Cites 192 - Cited by 22 - Full Document

Bakul Debnath And Ors. vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. And Anr. on 11 October, 2007

100. Under Article 226 an order, direction or writ is to issue to a person, authority or the State. In a proceeding under that Article the person, authority or State against whom the direction, order or writ is sought is a necessary party. Under Article 227, however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate Court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate Court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the Chartered High Court as also the Judicial Committee had held that the power to issue prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts was an exercise of original jurisdiction (see Mahomedalli Allabux v. Ismailji Abdulali , Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar v. Poona Municipality , Ryots of Garabandho and other villages v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi and Moulvi Hamid Hasan Nomani v. Banwarilal Roy (1946-47)74 IndApp 120, 130-31 : AIR 1947 PC 90, 98). In the last mentioned case, which dealt with the nature of a writ of quo warranto, the Judicial Committee held:
Gauhati High Court Cites 58 - Cited by 0 - U B Saha - Full Document

Adishwar Jain vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 30 March, 2006

10. We feel that notwithstanding the fact that the said decision was rendered in the context of a writ petition, wherein an order under the Tenancy Act had been questioned, yet the decision brings into focus the nature of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It clearly lays down that when proceedings under Article 226 concern civil rights, these are original civil proceedings falling within the ambit of Clause X of the Letters Patent.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - D K Jain - Full Document

Lady Dinbai Petit vs M.S. Noronha on 14 October, 1945

It also seems to be curious that whereas the High Court should have the jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari, it should not have a similar jurisdiction to issue the cognate writ of prohibition. As I have already pointed out, these two writs are complementary and co-related to each other. It is beyond doubt or dispute now that the High Court has the power to issue the writ of certiorari. The case I have just referred, Mrs. Besant's case, laid that down and Parlakimedi's case also decided to the same effect; and our own High Court in Muljee Sicka and Company v. Municipal Commissioner and Raghunath Keshav v. Poona Municipality (1943) 46 Bom. L.R. 675 has also come to the conclusion that the power of the High Court to issue the writ of certiorari remains unimpaired.
Bombay High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 16 - H J Kania - Full Document

Firm Juggilal Kamlapat vs Collector Of Bombay And Anr. on 9 August, 1945

He urged that the writ of prohibition was not at all mentioned in Clause (55) of the Charter and that, therefore, the Court should construe Clauses (5) and (55) as meaning that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition was not vested in the Supreme Court under the terms of the Charter. This argument was, however, fallacious. Clause (55) did not purport to, nor could it limit or control the generality of the powers which were invested in the Supreme Court under Clause (5) of the Charter. Clause (55) of the Charter dealt only with the powers which were vested in the Supreme Court to control the Courts of Bequest and Courts of Quarter Sessions, etc., and it was in that connection only that the writ or writs of Mandamus, Certiorari, Procedendo, or Error were mentioned therein. The mention of these writs did not curtail the general jurisdiction which was invested in the Supreme Court and was a jurisdiction similar to the jurisdiction of the King's" Bench in England including the jurisdiction to issue all the writs including the writ of prohibition which was exercised by the Court of King's Bench in England. If authority be needed in this behalf, it is to be found in the decision of our Appeal Court in Raghunath Keshav v. Poona Municipality :
Bombay High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Juggilal Kamlapat vs Collector Of Bombay on 9 August, 1945

He urged that the writ of prohibition was not at all mentioned in Clause (55) of the Charter and that therefore the Court should construe Clauses (5) and (55) as meaning that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition was not vested in the Supreme Court under the terms of the Charter. This argument was, however, fallacious. Clause (55) did not purport to nor could it limit or control the generality of the powers which were invested in the Supreme Court under Clause (5) of the Charter. Clause (55) of the Charter dealt only with the powers which were vested in the Supreme Court to control the Courts of Request and Courts of Quarter Sessions, etc., and it was in that connection only that the writ or writs of Mandamus, Certiorari, Procedendo, or Error were mentioned therein. The mention of these writs did not curtail the general jurisdiction which was invested in the Supreme Court and was a jurisdiction similar to the jurisdiction of the King's Bench in England including the jurisdiction to issue all the writs including the writ of prohibition which was exercised by the Court of King's Bench in England. If authority be needed in this behalf, it is to be found in the decision of our Appeal Court in Raghunath Keshav v. Poona Municipality (1943) 46 Bom. L.R. 675 (p. 677):
Bombay High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Madhukar Chandrabhan Mohite vs Balkrishna Govind Sulakhe on 6 August, 1999

100. Under Article 226 an order, direction or writ is to issue to a person, authority or the State. In a proceeding under that Article the person, authority or State against whom the direction, order or writ is sought is a necessary party. Under Article 227, however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate Court or Tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate Court or Tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee had held that the power to issue prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts was an exercise of original jurisdiction (see Mahamedalli Allabux v. Ismailji Abdulali ; Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar v. Poona Municipality ; Ryots of Garabandho and other villages v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi and Moulvi Hamid Hasam Normani v. Banwarilal Roy (1946-47) 74 Ind. App. 120 : AIR 1947 PC 90. In the last mentioned case which dealt with the nature of a writ of quo warranto, the Judicial Committee held :
Bombay High Court Cites 43 - Cited by 5 - R J Kochar - Full Document

State Of M.P. & Ors vs Visan Kumar Shivcharan Lal on 5 December, 2008

"Under Article 226 an order, direction or writ is to issue to a person, authority or the State. In a proceeding under that article the person, authority or State against whom the direction, order or writ is sought is a necessary party. Under Article 227, 3 however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee had held that the power to issue prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts was an exercise of original jurisdiction (see Mahomedalli Allabux v. Ismailji Abdulali (AIR 1926 Bom 332), Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar v. Poona Municipality,(AIR 1945 Bom 7) Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (AIR 1943 PC 164) and Moulvi Hamid Hasan Nomani v. Banwarilal Roy [(1946-
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 65 - A Pasayat - Full Document

M/S. M.M.T.C. Limited vs Commr.Of Commercial Tax & Ors on 3 November, 2008

"Under Article 226 an order, direction or writ is to issue to a person, authority or the State. In a proceeding under that article the person, authority or State against whom the direction, order or writ is sought is a necessary party. Under Article 227, however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee had held that the power to issue prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts was an exercise of original jurisdiction (see Mahomedalli Allabux v. Ismailji Abdulali (AIR 1926 Bom 332), Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar v. Poona Municipality,(AIR 1945 Bom 7) Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (AIR 1943 PC 164) and Moulvi Hamid Hasan Nomani v. Banwarilal Roy [(1946-
Supreme Court of India Cites 21 - Cited by 32 - A Pasayat - Full Document
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