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Shree Singhvi Brothers And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 9 May, 1990

In this respect, reliance has been placed on a decision of this court in Kuldeep Singh v. Union of India [1974] RLR 171, wherein the word' " consideration" came up for interpretation before the Division Bench of this court and it came to the conclusion that the word "consider" or the process of consideration has within its ambit an examination of circumstances with objectivity rather than a mere subjective conclusion. Essentially, it implies a duty to act judicially. The order dated May 31, 1988, clearly shows that the facts of the case have been taken into consideration and thereafter, a conclusion was arrived at that the case does not deserve any waiver and, therefore, the waiver application was rejected. It was, therefore, submitted by Mr. Arora that, judged from any angle, this contention of Mr. Kothari cannot be sustained. I am in agreement with the contention of Mr. Arora that so far as this particular aspect of the matter is concerned, in the absence of any firm or specific assurance, the learned Commissioner could not have been held bound by that promise. He only assured that he would consider the matter favourably or sympathetically. Consideration does not mean any subjective conclusion and, therefore, to this extent, the contention of Mr. Kothari cannot he sustained.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 61 - Cited by 28 - Full Document

Phool Chand vs The State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 18 April, 1980

In my opinion the interpretation placed by this Court on the word "consider" in Kuldeep Singh's case (supra) can equally be applied to the said word contained in Rule 16 (10) (ii) (b) of the Rules. This would mean that the aforesaid provisions impose on the Disciplinary Authority a duty to make an objective examination of the submissions contained in the reoresentation submitted by the Government servant in reply to the show cause notice. An objective examination of the submissions would imply that the Disciplinary Authority must record its reasons for rejecting the said submissions. In other words Rule 16(10)(ii)(b) of the Rules postulates that the Disciplinary Authority must record its reasons for rejecting the submissions made by a Government servant in his representation In the present case, the reply submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice served on him, shows that the petitioner had raised various objections with regard to the conduct of the Enquiry Officer. One of the aforesaid objections was with regard to the Enquiry Officer having closed the defence evidence on 30th April, 1977 and having proceeded to hold the Enquiry ex-parte, even though the petitioner bad rent a telegram on April 30,1977, with regard to his illness and consequent inability to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 30th April, 1977. The order dated September 23,1977, passed by the Disciplinary Authority does not show that the various submissions contained in the representation have been given due consideration by the Disciplinary Authority. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Disciplinary Authority has failed to consider the representation submitted by the petitioner in reply to the show cause notice, and the order dated September 23,1977 was passed by the Collector, Jalore, in contravention of the provisions of Rule 16(10)(ii)(b) of the Rules.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 2 - Cited by 23 - Full Document

G.D. Mehta vs The State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 15 July, 1980

In Kuldeep Singh v. Union of India 1974 RLW 171, a Division Bench of this court had the occasion to construe the word "consider" used in Rule 1719 of the Railway Establishment Code and this Court has laid down the word "consider" or the process of consideration has within its ambit an examination of circumstances with objectivity rather than a mere subjective conclusion and that essentially it implies the duty to act judicially. In the said case this Court has further observed that it is necessary to pass a speaking order containing reasons which could be communicated to the railway servant against whom action is being taken.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ruldu Singh vs State Of Rajasthan on 11 April, 1996

24. Now all of us must imbibe that principle of speedy trial evolved by the apex court is binding upon us within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India as precedent. Under Article 144 of the Constitution of India all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India are bound to act in the aid of the Supreme Court pronouncement. It is further to be noticed that the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh (supra) interpreting statutory Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules of 1980 is also binding upon all the subordinate courts of the State of Rajasthan and from future any breach of the aforesaid rules will be viewed seriously.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 12 - Cited by 2 - R R Yadav - Full Document

Manjit Singh Dhillon vs Union Of India And Others on 23 January, 1998

The petitioners also relied up on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Union of India, (1996) 1 Rec Cri R 522 : (1995 Cri LJ 3737). That was also a case where a detainee was served with the detention order while he was in judicial custody. The Delhi High Court held that in such a case it was necessary for the detaining authority to re-consider the fact that the detainee was in detention in a criminal case and whether his detention under COFEPOSA would still be necessary, and if that was not done, the detention order could not be enforced against the detainee. As in the case on our hand, in the case before the Delhi High Court also though the detention order was passed on 12-1-1993 the detainee who was on bail chose to get the bail cancelled and for being taken into custody. He had even stated that he had learnt that an order of detention is pending against him for execution. The bail bond was cancelled and the detainee was taken into custody on 26-8-1994. The detention order was served on him on 30-8-1994 when he was in judicial custody. Although the Delhi High Court observed that it is an abstract proposition of law that a person in judicial custody cannot be detained under COFEPOSA, it is also held that in such cases the detaining authority must be the satisfied that there are circumstances present on the record to show that the said person presently in judicial custody would act prejudicially if he is not detained. It was also held that the detaining detaining authority ordering his detention should be aware of the fact that he is actually in custody and has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material, that there is possibility of his being release that on being so released the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 5 - K S Kumaran - Full Document

Nafis Ahmed Ansari vs The State Of Maharashtra, Through ... on 2 July, 2003

8. The facts involved in the present case are akin to the facts of reported judgment of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Kuldeep Singh v. Union of India, 1995 Cri. L. J. 3737. In the said case, the order of detention was passed on 12th January 1993 by the Lt. Governor of National Capital Territory of Delhi in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. After pre-detention litigation, on 26.8.1994 the accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate and thereafter on 30.8.1994 the order was served upon him.
Bombay High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - S B Mhase - Full Document
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