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Documents citing A. Satyanarayan Shah vs M. Yadigiri on 21 November, 2002

Ajay Gupta & Anr. vs M/S Greenways on 3 July, 2024

In A Satyanarayan Shah v. M. Yadgiri, (2003) 1 Supreme Court Cases 138, the question was whether, a wooden structure which is in the nature of a permanent structure standing on the land having walls and roof would constitute a building. The Court observed that the structure needs to have some sort of permanency and should be capable of some use either residential or non-residential, and in any case, the same depends on facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant portion is set out below:
Delhi High Court Cites 57 - Cited by 0 - P M Singh - Full Document

Mahender Kumar vs Mohd. Allauddin And Anr. on 29 November, 2005

13. In the instant case, though the petitioner-tenant contends that it is a tin shed, in his evidence, he stated that the schedule premises is having walls on three sides and there is a firewood shop behind the schedule premises. This being the oral testimony of the petitioner as R.W.I, and there being no clear evidence let in by the petitioner-tenant to show that only an open land was leased out to him by the respondents-landlords, the appellate Judge looked into the contents of Ex.P9-rental agreement dated 16-7-1953 and Ex.P16-lease agreement dated 21-2-1980, which are oldest in point of time, when compared to the other lease agreements, namely Exs.P16, P17, P18, P19, P2 and P3, which are later in point of time, dated 21-2-1980, 13-4-1982, 2-6-1983, 1-5-1985, 5-6-1986 and 6-6-1986 respectively, to ascertain whether only open land was leased out or it contained any structures thereon. In Para 5 of Ex.P9-rental agreement dated 16-7-1953, it was mentioned that a thatti shed is there, and it was inter alia agreed to by the parties that the tenant shall not make any material additions or alterations to the premises without written consent of the landlord, and similar such recitals are found in Clause 9 of Ex.P16-lease agreement dated 21-2-1980. These recitals clearly go to show that the land leased out to the petitioner-tenant contained a shed, for if there was no shed at all, there was no necessity for the parties to agree that "the tenant shall not make any material additions or alterations to the premises without written consent of the landlord". The shed in question, which is said to be having three walls covered by a tin roof, enclosing space within the three walls, wherein the petitioner is carrying on the business of motor workshop, can be said to be a "building", because of the permanent nature of the walls and. more so having regard to the judgment of the apex Court in A. Satyanarayana Shah v. M. Yadigiri (supra).
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 5 - Cited by 0 - N V Ramana - Full Document

Vayalilakath Abdul Nazar vs Paruthithodi Mammad Koya on 8 February, 2011

The meaning of the word 'building' given in Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition) as "a structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a roof" was also considered by the Apex Court in the decision in A.Satyanarayan Shah v. M.Yadgiri [ (2003) 1 S.C.C. 138). It was further held in the aforesaid decision that the term building has to be interpreted liberally and not narrowly. In that case it was held that a wooden structure, which is in the nature of a permanent structure standing on the land and which has walls and roof though made of wood, would fall within the definition of building as defined in clause (iii) of Section 2 of the A.P.Rent Control Act. Since that part of the definition of the building occurring in Section 2(iii) of the A.P.Rent Control Act is in pari materia with Section (2)(1) of the Kerala Act 2 of 1965, the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case can be made applicable to this case as well, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits. But, according to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the Apex Court emphasized the fact that the structure should be of a permanent structure standing on the land and not on four wheel as in this R.C.Rev.31/2008 10 case. There can be no doubt that in the context in which the term 'building' has been used it has to be so interpreted as to include therein a structure having some sort of permanency and capable of being used for residential or non-residential purpose. 'Gumpty' mentioned in this case is not a very small structure which can be easily lifted or removed. If it is to be removed from one place to another, the planks used for the walls, doors etc. and the sheet of the roof have to be detached one after the other. The revision petitioner contends and is not disputed by the landlord that earlier the gumpty was at site 'B' shown in the sketch appended to Ext.C1 report and was shifted to site 'A' which is marked by the Commissioner in the sketch appended to the report. The evidence would show that the gumpty was originally situated blocking the direct entry from the road to the building situated behind and so it was removed to site 'A'. There is no case for the tenant that after it was built at the site 'A' it was ever removed. There is also no case that this gumpty was on four wheels though that was the description in Ext.A1 lease deed. So much so, the contention that the gumpty is actually a mobile one and can be moved from one place to another and as such it lacks R.C.Rev.31/2008 11 permanency cannot be accepted.
Kerala High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Sh. Prahlad Rai vs Smt. Tara Devi on 16 March, 2018

 Further, the judgments relied upon by Ld. Counsel for plaintiffs are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The judgment in A. Satyanarayan Shah Vs. M. Yadgiri, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has No. 7938/16 Page no. 9 0f 12 spoken about the definition of building, which is not the issue in hand. The other two judgments are on distinct facts and are not applicable to the facts of the present case.
Delhi District Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shri Hari Singh vs Shri Ram Nath on 10 September, 2012

9. On the other hand, ld counsel for the defendant placed strong reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2003) 1 SCC138 A. Satyanarayan Shah versus M. Yadgiri wherein it was held that the term 'building' had to be interpreted liberally and not narrowly and on (1996) 6 SCC 342 Ashok Kapil versus Sana Ullah (Dead) and Others where it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that even a roofless structure could be regarded as a building. It was argued by Ld. Counsel for the defendant taking aid of the expressions used in the translated copy of the rent agreement (Ex.PW1/1) placed on record by the plaintiff, that the agreement mentioned clearly that boundary walls/four enclosure walls were set up along with electrical fittings and even if there was no roof thereon, the same Suit No. 205/06 7 was still a building/premises and section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act would bar the civil court's jurisdiction and the appropriate remedy for the plaintiff was to file an eviction petition before the Ld. Rent Controller.
Delhi District Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

On The Death Of Rakesh Ch. Dey His Legal ... vs Moklisa Khatun And Ors on 21 July, 2016

But if the defendants for some or other reasons were in possession of the land since beginning, in that event, institution of a suit for confirmation of possession by the plaintiffs would be not maintainable because of bar under proviso to Section 34 of Specific Relief Act. Of course, no such objection has been made in the written statement by the defendants. RSA No.35/2006 Page 15 of 18 But if plaint shows that it is a suit for confirmation of possession on assertion of title and possession and a contrary evidence is led by the plaintiffs, apparently such evidence would be beyond pleadings. It has been settled by the Privy Council in the case of Siddik M ahom ed Shah Vs. M t. Saran and others , reported in AIR 1930 PC 57 that no amount of evidence can be taken into consideration which is beyond pleadings. The same law has been adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of the Country in various judgments. Law that has been crystallized so far in this regard is that any amount of evidence beyond pleading cannot be taken into consideration and if that law is applied under the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned First Appellate Court fell into error in taking note of the evidence of the PW's 1 and 3 in regard to dispossession of the plaintiffs from the suit land. Thus, at least two infirmities come forward on the face of the pleadings of the parties that the plaintiffs have failed to justify their claim over the alluvial land in terms of the pleadings made in paragraph-5 of the plaint and the plaintiffs failed to get the plaint amended in appropriate time after the written statement was filed by the defendants specifically claiming possession over the suit land since beginning. The learned First Appellate Court has exercised the inherent power under Order-VII Rule-7 and Order-XLI Rule-33 of the CPC to give complete relief to the plaintiffs, but in so doing, failed to question the title of the plaintiffs on alluvial land in terms of the law holding the field. The materials available on record, therefore, are not sufficient to arrive at the finding that the plaintiffs have any claim whatsoever on the alluvial land described in Schedules to the plaint. The plaintiffs having claimed to have purchased the suit land from their vendors, it was necessary to establish that the alluvial land was owned and possessed by their vendors before executing the Sale RSA No.35/2006 Page 16 of 18 Deed. I have examined all the Sale Deeds from Exhibit-1 to Exhibit-5 to find out as to whether there is any mention about the alluvial land therein. What has been recited in these documents is about transfer of Patta land, but not of alluvial land. Even DW-1 in course of his evidence deposed in no uncertain terms that land covered by their Patta was only transferred to the plaintiffs and not other lands. Such a statement followed by another claim of the defendants since beginning on the basis of appropriate pleadings that there was an exchange between the parties with respect to the suit land and that parties had antecedent title thereto, there was necessity for appropriate evidence from both sides. The plaintiffs as well as the defendants had failed to discharge their respective burdens in this respect. Even after such lacuna, the learned First Appellate Court came forward suo-moto to convert a decree of confirmation of possession into a decree of recovery of possession when there was neither a cross objection under Order-XLI Rule 22 of the CPC nor was an appeal against order dated 05.04.1997 u/S 104 of the CPC by way of cross appeal after the suit was decreed only for confirmation of possession and not for recovery of Khas possession. Plaintiffs did not make any prayer for conversion of the decree into a one for decree of recovery of Khas possession. That question was not arisen before the learned First Appellate Court, but it went further and by making a suo-moto exercise did convert the appeal in favour of the plaintiffs in an appeal preferred by the defendants only. Such an exercise by the learned First Appellate Court in view of entire facts and circumstances referred to above, does not appear to be just and proper. The sole substantial question of law is accordingly decided in the affirmative and in favour of the appellants.
Gauhati High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - N Chaudhury - Full Document

Sh. Pehlad Rai vs Smt. Tara Devi (Now Deceased) Through ... on 12 December, 2023

35. The judgments A. Satyanarayn vs. M. Yadgiri 2002 X AD(SC) 126 can be distinguished from the facts of the case. In the said case, the wooden structure was in the nature of permanent structure standing on the land which had walls and roof made of wood. However, in the present case, the subject matter are six wooden boxes i.e. three wooden almirah partitioned in two boxes each.
Delhi High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - M P Arora - Full Document
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