In this behalf, the pronouncement of the Apex Court reported at
(1994) 1 SCC 502 Svenska Handelsbanken & Ors. vs. Indian
Charge Chrome Ltd. & Ors. sets down the applicable legal
principles. In para 53 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held that
even after entering into an arbitration clause, any party may institute
legal proceedings. It is for the other party to seek stay of the suit by
showing the arbitration clause and satisfying the terms of the
provisions of law empowering the court to stay the suit. It is
noteworthy that this judgment was rendered in the context of the
Arbitration Act, 1940. However the principles laid down therein
would hold good even for the purposes of consideration of the
question under the later legislation. The Apex Court placed reliance
on authoritative texts and the pronouncement of the House of Lords
and in paras 51 and 52 of the judgment, the Apex Court had held
thus:-
30) 57 IA 133 : (1930) 31 LW 803 : AIR 1930 PC 158] , has made the
following two observations which hold relevance to the present
discussion: (IA pp. 140-41)
“Two observations may be added. First, the implied authority of counsel
is not an appendage of office, a dignity added by the courts to the status
of barrister or advocate at law. It is implied in the interests of the client,
to give the fullest beneficial effect to his employment of the advocate.
Secondly, the implied authority can always be countermanded by the
express directions of the client. No advocate has actual authority to settle
a case against the express instructions of his client. If he considers such
express instructions contrary to the interests of his client, his remedy is to
return his brief.”
(See: Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand [(1975) 2 SCC
609] and Svenska Handelsbanken v. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. [(1994)
2 SCC 155] )
17. Mr. Dhruba Mukherjee, learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr Anmol Chandan, learned counsel has appeared on behalf of
Respondent No.5. He submits that the Respondent No.5 is major
shareholder of the company in question i.e. Respondent No.1 and
Company Appeal (AT) No.106-107 of 2023
18
on his prayer the order dated 30.09.2022 was passed by learned
NCLT. The order dated 30.09.2022 passed by learned NCLT was
assailed by the appellant by way of filing appeal vide Company
Appeal (AT) No.198 of 2022. However, this Appellate Tribunal by
detailed judgement declined to interfere with the impugned order
and appeal was dismissed on 11.11.2022. He submits that once
the original order i.e. order dated 30.09.2022 after rejection of the
appeal by this Tribunal had attained its finality the appellant was
not permitted to move before the NCLT in the garb of rectification
of the order. Moreover, it has been argued by Mr. Mukherjee,
learned senior counsel that once consent was given on behalf of
the appellant and thereafter an order was passed by the learned
NCLT on 30.09.2022 the appellant was not permitted to assail the
order on the plea as if learned counsel had given consent without
any authorisation by the appellant. He has placed reliance on para
34 of judgement Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1994) 2 SCC
155 at page Svenska Handelsbanken V. Indian Charge Chrome
Ltd which has been reproduced at running page 19 and 20 of the
Memo of Appeal and accordingly we propose to reproduce the same
as follows:-
For the same proposition he relied on Svenska Handelsbanken v. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. [1994] 79 Comp Cas 589 ; [1994] 2 SCC 155 wherein at para. 43, the apex court held that the right to foreign arbitration provided by Parliament is an indefeasible right in which the court does not have any kind of discretion.
In that behalf he referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Svenska Handelsbanken and Ors. v. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 155 : 1994 (1) Scale 156 : 1994 (1) Arb. L.R. 205, wherein the Apex Court has clearly held that when the right to foreign arbitration has been provided by the Parliament as an indefeasible right in which the Court does not have any kind of discretion. The Apex Court has further held that the arbitration as contemplated as per Section 3 of the Foreign Awards Act and the Plaintiff by filing a Plaint, cannot make the arbitration clause invalid or inoperative, and therefore, the finding of the High Court that the arbitration agreements have become inoperative and incapable of being performed or invalid was erroneous in law and therefore must be set aside.
28 On the aspect as to whether the said Clause 16 is mandatory in
nature, a useful reference could be made to the authoritative pronouncement
of the Apex Court in the case of Svenska Handelsbanken v/s Indian Charge
Chrome Ltd. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 155. The facts in the said case were
that Clause 18 was the jurisdiction clause, and, Clause 18.02 of the said clause
18 provided that all disputes arising from the provisions of the Agreement or
its performance shall be finally settled by arbitration under the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by
three arbitrators appointed by and in accordance with these Rules. However by
sub clause 18.03 a provision reserving the right of a party to go against the
other party in the Courts of India or Sweden or the United Kingdom or the
State of New York was provided for. On the basis of the said clause 18.03,
which was the concerned clause, an argument was sought to be raised that the
agreement in question was not an Arbitration Agreement, since it expressly
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49 wp-10475.11.sxw
contemplates approaching a civil court. This argument was negated by the
Apex Court by the findings recorded in Paras 49 to 54 by holding that the a
clause which gives an additional right to a party to approach a civil court does
not detract from the mandatory nature of the Arbitration Agreement. What is
significant to note is that the Apex Court further held that even where there is
an Arbitration Agreement contemplating a right to civil court, a civil action
instituted by a party in breach of an Arbitration Agreement was liable to be
restrained. Paragraphs 53 and 54 of the said Judgment are material and are
reproduced herein under :-