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Documents citing Appathurai Aiyer'S Daughter ... vs Nanit Pattar'S Son Krishna Pattar And ... on 26 November, 1915

The Commissioner Of Gift Tax, Madras vs P. Rangasami Naidu on 16 December, 1969

16. In support of his contention that where a coparcener converts his self-acquired property into joint family property there is a transfer of property within the definition of gift in Section 2(xii) read with the main part of Section 2(xxiv). Mr. V. Balasubramaniam, learned counsel for the Revenue, referred to the decisions In Sirdar Indra Singh v. Commr. of I. T. 11 ITR 16 = (AIR 1943 Pat 169) and Thayalambal v. Krishna Pattar 32 Ind. Cas. 955 = (AIR 1917 Mad 706). In the former case. Manohar Lall, J. has expressed the view that the property of an individual cannot become the property of a Joint Hindu family by mere expression of intention unless the property is transferred to the joint Hindu family by some means recognised by law, for instance, if it is moveable property then it should be handed over to the joint family and its subsequent possession or enjoyment should be shown to be on behalf of the joint Hindu family, or if it is immovable then it must be transferred by a registered document if its value is more than Rs. 100. Similar view has been expressed by Srini-Vasa Aiyangar, J. in 32 Ind. Cas. 955 = (AIR 1917 Mad 706) but obiter.
Madras High Court Cites 36 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Venkata Reddi And Ors. vs Kuppa Reddi And Anr. on 25 April, 1918

7. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar suggested that it was open to the first branch to throw its extra share into the hotchpot. A transaction of this nature can only be regarded as a gift of a half of the extra share to the fourth branch. Such a transaction must be in writing and registered. It can bear no analogy to renunciations by a member of a joint family in favour of others. Mr. Krishnasami, Aiyar quoted the decision in Thyalambal v. Krishna Pattar 32 Ind. Cas. 965, where a learned Judge of this Court suggested that, even when members are undivided, in order that the self-acquisitions of any one of them may become joint family property, there must be a document which the law would recognise as a proper conveyance. It is not necessary in this case to go that length. In my opinion, the giving up of the extra share by the senior branch can only be by a duly executed registered document and, as that has not been done, I mast hold that that share has not become the common property of the two branches of the family.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Controller Of Estate Duty vs Arunachalam Chettiar. on 7 March, 1966

We must then consider the vital questions to whether in the process of so impressing separate property with the character of coparcenary in the process of so impressing separate property with the character of a coparcenary property any transfer is involved. The earliest case, to which our attention has been drawn on this aspect, is the case decided by Justice Courts Trotter as Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar in Thyalambal v. Krishna Pattar. Justices Courts Trotter did not express any opinion on this question. But Mr. Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar observed :
Kerala High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Ramaswami Nayakar vs Raju Padayachi And Ors. on 11 September, 1925

The third case that was principally relied on in this connection is Thylambal v. Krishna Pattar (1919) 32 I.C. 955 at 960 decided by Coutts Trotter and Srinivasa Aiyangar, JJ. The former said that it is possible for a member of a 'Hindu family who has got self-acquired properties to convert them, if he chooses, into family property in which the other members of the family will have a vested interest and that the only question in that case was whether the facts pointed to the conclusion that the first defendant did convert his own property into family property or not. Not a word is said by the former learned Judge about the necessity of a registered deed. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., while concurring in the judgment of Coutts Trotter, J., entertained some doubt as to whether a member of a joint Hindu family who owns immoveable property as his self-acquisition can convert it into a joint family property without an instrument in writing registered at least where the Transfer of Property Act is in force. The learned judge found difficulty in understanding the conversion of individual property into joint property except by way of a transfer and thought that such a conversion would on analysis be found to partake of the character of one or other of gift, exchange or sale. It is certainly difficult, speaking for myself and with all deference to the learned Judge, to see how the conversion would ordinarily be by exchange or sale. If the transaction were one by way of gift, it being impossible for a man to make a gift to himself, I gather we should have to conceive the donor as in the position of a stranger to the co-parcenary of which he is in fact himself a member. However, this is a question that need not be gone into by me at the present moment. The question is an interesting one raised by the learned Judge as a matter of doubt in his own mind and it still awaits as far as I am aware an authoritative decision.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Abdul Samad Khan Khiladar And Anr. vs Bibijan Alias Hanifa Khathu And Ors. on 3 March, 1925

In Thyalambal v. Krishna Pattar (1915) 32 IC 955 Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., found difficulty in understanding the conversion of individual property into joint family property except by way of transfers which presumably would require a registered deed. This, however, was clearly obiter. It has to be remembered that we are not now dealing with a joint Hindu family, but with Mahomedan co-sharers living together. There is thus no question of their status having become divided by the previous decree ; they were never united or joint. A right to execute a decree does not apepar to be a right in or to immoveable property, but merely a right to apply for process of the Court in execution. It is, therefore, difficult to see how an agreement not to exercise that right can be said to fall within the meaning of Section 17, Registration Act. I am, therefore, of opinion that this agreement did not require registration and that the District Judge was right on this point.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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