Though in some cases the view is taken that the grant should commence from the date of application under Section 24, I am unable to share the view. The section does not contain any limiting provision. The object of the enactment does not justify the court imposing on itself any such fetter, when the Parliament in its wisdom has not chosen to do so. The view taken by the Mysore High Court in N. Subramaniam v. M.G. Saraswathy and by the Punjab and Haryana Court in Sarita Mehta v. Aravind Kumar Mehta (1978) 8 P.L.R. 213 and the Calcutta High Court in Samir Banerjee v. Sujata Banerjee 70 C. W.N. 642 according to me, reflects the correct legal position. I would accordingly direct that the payment will be effective from the date of service of summons of the main petition for divorce on the wife.
"Though in some cases the view is taken that the grant should commence from the date of application under Section 24. I am unable to share the view. The section does not contain any limiting provision. The object of the enactment docs not justify the court imposing on itself any such fetter, when the Parliament in its wisdom has not chosen to do so. The view taken by the Mysore High Court in N. Subramaniyam v. M. G. Saraswathy and by the Punjab and Haryana Court in Sarita Mehta v. Aravind Kumar Mehta (1978) 80 Pun LR 213, and the Calcutta High Court in Samir Banerjee v. Sujata Banerjee, (1966) 70 Cal WN 633 at p. 642, according to me, reflects the correct legal position. I would accordingly direct that the payment with be effective from the date of service of summons of the main petition for divorce on the wife."
(19) The position would have been altogether different if some order had been made after notice to the husband. A petition for revising such an order or an appeal would have remained entertainable, though meanwhile the main proceeding had terminated in a decree. That is all that can be derived from N. Subramanyam v. Mrs. M.G. Sarnswathi, Air 1964 Mysore 38, on which counsel for the wife relied. But, here, the application for interim. maintenance was never brought to a hearing, and the question of making an order did not arise. As I have said, the application must be deemed to have been abandoned by the conduct of the wife and her advisers. The position is, thus, the same as if no application had ever been made. To make an order for interim maintenance, now, in revision, would be as if to make the order at first instance after the main proceeding for divorce had terminated. That would be directly contrary to section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
18. We have therefore, no doubt that interim maintenance cannot be granted from a date on which one of the spouses deserted the other. The order made under s. 24 of the Act can only cover the period between the date of the presentation of the petition and the date of the termination of the petition by a final order. It is contended on behalf of the husband that the interim maintenance can be ordered to be made only from the date of service of the notice in the main original petition. Reliance for this proposition is placed on Subramanyam v. M. G. Saraswathi, AIR 1964 Mys 38, wherein it was held as as under (para 7):-
The same view was taken by a Division Bench of Mysore High Court in N. Subramanyam v. Mrs. M. G. Saraswathi, AIR 1964 Mys 38. It was held therein that it cannot be said that since the proceedings had themselves terminated, there was no occasion to grant interim maintenance or expense. The right to those items, if established, could not be defeated by allowing time to elapse and the pendency of the proceedings to end. We are in respectful agreement with the observations made in the aforesaid cases."
26. Though in some cases the view is taken that the grant should commence from the date of application u/s. 24, I am unable to share the view the section does not contain any limiting provision. The object of the enactment does not justify the court imposing on itself any such fetter, when the Parliament in its wisdom has not chosen to do so. The view taken by the Mysore High Court in N. Subramaniyam v. M.G. Saraswathy (AIR 1964 Mys 38) and by the Punjab and Haryana Court in Sarita Mehta v. Aravind K. Mehta, (1978) 80 Pun LR 213, and the Calcutta High Court in Samir Banerjee v. Sujata Banerjee, (1966) 70 Cal WN 633 at p. 642, according to me, reflects the correct legal position. I would accordingly direct that the payment will be effective from the date of service of summons of the main petition for divorce on the wife.
The same view was taken by a Division Bench of Mysore High Court in N. Subramanyam v. Mrs. M. G. Saraswathi, AIR 1964 Mys 38. It was held therein that it cannot be said that since the proceedings had themselves terminated, there was no occasion to grant interim maintenance or expense. The right to those items, if established, could not be defeated by allowing time to elapse and the pendency of the proceedings to end. We are in respectful agreement with the observations made in the aforesaid cases.