The decision reported in (2007) 1 SCC 257 (State of U.P. Vs. Desh Raj) does not, in any manner advance the case of the petitioner Bank and the purchaser. The Apex Court pointed out that an appointment made "throwing all constitutional obligations and statutory rules to the winds would render the same illegal, whereas the irregularity presupposes substantial compliance with the rules."
15. The prosecution's case is that on the aforesaid date, time and place of incident,
accused was found driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and
State Vs. Desh Raj 4/5 FIR no. 234/08
caused the death of Parminder. There is only one public witness namely Sh. Krishna
Sharma which has been found mentioned in the list of witnesses. However, as per his
statement u/s 161 of the Code he reached the spot after the accident has already been
caused. He is claimed to have not witnessed the accident in question. He has not
stated anything about the rashness or negligence on the part of the accused.
Testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution cannot form the basis of
conviction of the accused. Accused has conceded the genuineness of certain
documents but that also by itself is not sufficient to warrant his conviction. Prosecution
has to prove rashness or negligence on the part of the accused by adducing cogent
evidence. Rashness or negligence cannot be presumed just because an accident did
occur resulting in an injury or death. Therefore, it is said that there is no harm in
coming to the conclusion that the case of the prosecution is not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
6. Accused Rajeshwari and Amar Singh are ,accordingly,
discharged for offences u/s 498A/406 IPC. However, their
State Vs. Desh Raj and others, FIR No. 327/03 4/5
5
B/Bs & S/Bs shall remain extended for a period of six
months u/s 437A IPC.
13.An analysis of his controversy would reveal that the petitioner has been found guilty whereas 5 persons who were working along with him at the relevant point of time when the accident took place were exonerated but the petitioner alone has been found guilty without any satisfactory reason being available for exonerating these individuals and these invididuals held the positions of Director of Elementary Education, District Educational Officer (In-charge) Thanjavur, District Educational Officer (In-charge) Thanjavur, Chief Educational Officer (In-charge) Thanjavur and Superintendent to District Educational Officer (In-charge) Thanjavur. Apart from this, it could be evidently seen from the counter affidavit itself that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated only at the behest of the report submitted by the Justice K.Sampath Commission of enquiry. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down in the State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Raj pal Singh, (2010) 5 SCC 783 that though it might be open to the disciplinary authority to deal differently with different delinquents, however, once when the charges are similar and in relation to the same incident, the same would amount to discrimination if only one delinquent is singled out and several others who could have been equally responsible for the same have been exonerated without any sufficient material basis.
a. the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 2004 Allahabad 105 in the matter of Vashisht Kumar Jaiswal vs. State of U.P. & others: (para 17)
In view of the above, it is evident that the Court should not grant interim relief which amounts to final relief and in exceptional circumstances where the Court is satisfied that ultimately the petitioner is bound to succeed and fact-situation warrants granting such a relief, the Court may grant the relief but it must record reasons for passing such an order and make it clear as to what are the special circumstances for which such a relief is being granted to a party.
b. the Supreme Court judgment relied on by the counsel for the appellant in the matter of State of U.P. & others vs. Desh Raj reported in (2007) 1 SCC 257:(paragraph 6)
A bare perusal of the impugned order could show that the learned Single Judge for all intent and purport had allowed the writ petition on the very first day, which in our opinion, was not justified. It is now well settled that a relief which can be granted only at the final hearing of the matter, should not ordinarily be granted by way of an interim order.