Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 3 of 3 (0.21 seconds)
Documents citing Muralidhar Kulthia vs Sm. Tara Dye on 6 September, 1950

Damodaran And Ors. vs Shekharan And Ors. on 20 March, 1992

10. In this case the maximum right the defendants can have is only a mortgage right and that also for the period mentioned in the agreement. Merely because of the non-execution of the mortgage deed the defendants will not be entitled to get any additional right by virtue of Section 53A of the T.P. Act. The words 'other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract' have to be understood in this context. In case the agreement was only to convey part of the right over the immovable property, the defendants can by relying on Section 53A of the Act claim on that part of the right and nothing more. Certainly in case the agreement was to convey full rights over the property, the defendants will be entitled to claim full rights by relying on Section 53A. See Ram Protap Kayan v. The National Petroleum Co. Ltd., AIR (37) 1950 Cal 23 and Muralidhar Kulthia v. Sm. Tara Dye, AIR 1953 Ca! 349, In other words, in the case of an agreement to execute a mortgage for a definite period under which possession was handed over to the defendant, if the conditions of Section 53A of the T.P. Act are satisfied, the defendant will be entitled to get all the rights under the mortgage which was agreed to be executed. The claim of the defendant to continue in possession after the expiry of that period relying on Section 53 A of the T.P. Act is not at all warranted by that provision. The general law of mortgages or the rights and liabilities of the mortgagor and mortgagee are not modified or abrogated by Section 53A of the T.P. Act. The maximum benefit that the defendant can claim is only that of a mortgagee for the period mentioned in the agreement. There is no necessity of a provision in the agreement for recovery on the expiry of the period. The right of recovery is governed by the law relating to mortgages. That this is the real scope of the section is clear from the following passage in the report of Law Commission of India chaired by Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India (Law Commission of India Seventieth Report on The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 -- page 316 para 49.8):
Kerala High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Periaswami Pillai And Ors. vs Sri Arunjadeswaraswami Temple At ... on 25 March, 1966

Learned counsel also relied upon the decision in Muralidhar v. Mt. Tara Dye, and Ramachandra Agarwala v. Syameswari Dasya, AIR 1925 Cal 1171 in support of his further contention that as the lease deed was unregistered, the possession of Dorasami Kothan was only that of a tenant--will and therefore on his death there was nothing which the first defendant would inherit, and that after 1940 the possession of the first defendant would be without any right and only that of a trespasser. In this view, too, he contended that the plaintiff's suit would be barred by limitation as the first defendant should be held to have acquired title to the property by adverse possession. I see no substance in these contentions.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 3 - Full Document
1